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This document is a compilation of the papers presented at the 
Conference on the Progress of the X-15 Project held at the NASA Flight 
Research Center, Edwards Air Force Base, California, November 20-21, 
1961. This conference was held by the '~esearch Airplane Committee of 
the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Navy, and the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration>to report on the technical status of this research 
airplane. The paper"s were presented by members of the staffs of North 
American Aviation, Inc.; Aeronautical Systems Division, U.S. Air Force; 
Air Force Flight Test Center; and National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration. 
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It was recogniz-ed -early in planning for the X-15 project that a 
very important benefit would be derived from accelerating and focusing 
the research re~uired to support manned flight in the hypersonic speed 
ranges within and outside the earth's atmosphere. It has been evident 
from the previous two X-15 conferences that there has been much research 
generated within both the government and industry during the development 
of the X-15. Equally important was the development of a flight research 
program designed to assess the various problem areas in relation to each 
other, thereby allowing them to be viewed in their proper perspective. 
The program also was expected to uncover certain problem areas that had 
been overlooked. It is in these latter areas that the greatest progress 
has been made since the last X-15 conference. 
The purpose of this conference is to present some of the most per-
tinent information obtained in the conduct of the flight program and to 
give some indication of the immediate and future plans for completing 
the project. 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss briefly the events and 
progress of the project since the last conference to give the project 
status at the present time, and to orient generally the various papers 
to be given during these two days. 
It may be recalled that at the time of the 1958 Conference, con-
struction of the first X-15 aircraft was nearing completion and prepa-
rations were being made for delivery of the airplane to the Flight Test 
Division of North American Aviation, Inc. The final airplane configu-
ration discussed at the conference and on display at North American 
after the conference is shown in figures 1 and 2. Some features worth 
noting are the wing leading-edge sweep angle of 25°, side turillels ~xn­
ning lengthwise of the fuselage for housing plumbing and control cables, 
a horizontal tail that provided both pitch and roll control, and verti-
cal tail surfaces which are nearly symmetrical about the fuselage. A 
portion of the lower vertical surface was to be jettisoned before each 
landing and recovered by parachute. It also was stated at the 1958 Con-
ference that delays in the development of the X-15 engine would re~uire 
that the first flights be accomplished with an interim rocket engine, 
having less than 1/3 the thrust expected from the X-15 rocket engine. 
The landing weight was stated to have increased to approximately 
15,000 pounds and the corresponding launch weight would be approximately 
33,000 pounds. 
,-.' 
The external configura~lul' vi tne X-15, as it has been flown in 
the program, generally speaking, is similar to that shown here. The 
flight program has included some specific external-configuration vari-
ations, however, which are pertinent to the papers to be presel1ted at 
this conference. These configuration variations are shown in figure 3. 
The interim engine used initially in'the prog~ was a combination 
of two of the engines designed for the X-I airplane, which had a total 
of eight rocket cylinders, produced a total thrust of approximately 
16,000 pounds, and used alcohol and water as fuel. The upper right 
portion of the figure shows the installation of the X-15 ammonia-burning 
engine, which produces approximately 57,000 pounds thrust at an altitude 
of 45,000 feet and is throttleable to 28,000 pounds. All flights except 
one have been flown with the lower rudder on, except, of course, for 
landing. One flight to a Mach number of 4.3 and to an altitude of 
78,000 feet has been made with the lower rudder off. As the program 
progressed to the higher temperature conditions, the familiar nose boom 
with attitude sensing vanes and static- and total-pressure sensors was 
replaced with a nitrogen-cooled, null-seeking ball, which provided air-
plane attitude to the pilot and to the recording e~uipment. 
The mode of operation for the X-15 flight program was described 
at the 1958 Conference and is illustrated in figure 4. Two B-52 air-
planes had been converted for launching the X-15 aircraft from a loca-
tion between the fuselage and inboard engine nacelles of the right wing 
of the B-52 bombers. This arrangement has worked extremely well, and 
some aspects of the operation will be discussed in subse~uent papers. 
The research flights were planned to be conducted along the instru-
mented range extending approximately 420 nautical miles northeast of 
Edwards, Calif., to Wendover, Utah. Only two of the three instrumented 
stations along the range, Edwards and Beatty, have been re~uired in 
the program completed to date. Later flights, at altitudes above 
250,000 feet with corresponding higher speeds, will re~uire the use 
of the Ely station and a greater length of the range. 
The flight progress, relative to the overall X-15 project, is 
shown in figure 5. As may be recalled, the X-15 project was initiated 
with conceptual stUdies made by the NACA and discussions between the 
NACA and the military services during the period from 1952 to 1954. 
The design and construction of the three airplanes occurred during the 
period from 1956 to 1959, with additional construction periods re~uired 
to ma~e repair as a result of two accidents. One period of two months 
followed damage to an aircraft during a landing, which will be discussed 
at this conference. An additional construction period is indicated for 
rebuilding and modification of the third aircraft after an explosion 
during a ground run of the X-15 rocket engine, which will also be dis-
cussed at this conference. 
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A total of 45 flights have been made in the 29 months since the 
first X-15 flight. Of this total, 30 flights, one of which was a glide 
flight, have been made with the interim engine in the period from June 
1959 to February 1961. The remaining 15 flights were made with the 
X-15 rocket engine during the past year. To complete the project prog-
ress, the dates of the conference reports by the Research Airplane 
Committee to Industry are shown as mid 1956, 1958, and the present date. 
The conduct of the X-15 flight program to date possibly can best 
be described simply as a series of progressive steps to.higher speed 
and higher altitudes, with some deviations froIl!.this approach made to 
investigate higher structural heating rates and stability and control 
• 
• 
at high angles of attack. The program therefore has effectively focused 
and directed the desired research efforts in areas such as aerodynamic 
heating, structural integrity, hypersonic stability and control, and 
flight control systems, and at the same time has provided the program 
support required to insure a reasonable level of flight safety. 
Figure 6 presents a summary of the flight program progress for 
each of the three airplanes, including the events that affected the 
program progress. During the last half of 1959, the contractor flew 
the number 1 airplane for two flights - one glide and one powered. The 
contractor also flew the number 2 airplane from September 1959 until 
approximately mid 1960. All eleven of the contractor flights were with 
the interim engine for the purpose of evaluating the airplane and the 
various propulsion and flight control systems. During this period, 
the number 2 airplane was damaged during an emergency landing after a 
fire developed in the engine compartment during flight. The government 
received the number 1 airplane with the interim engine and performed 
the first flight in March 1960. Airplane 1 was tested from this date 
until February 1961, during which time the maximum speed and altitude 
for the interim engine was achieved. Six pilots of the Air Force, Navy, 
and NASA participated in this phase of the program. The number 2 air-
plane was the first to be converted to the X-15 engine and was flown 
by the contractor for three flights during November and December of 1960 
to demonstrate engine throttling and engine restart capability. 
~ne government flew the X-15 with the XLR99 engine first in M8~rch 
of 1961 and continued the research program that had been started with 
the number 1 airplane. After engine conversion, the number 1 airplane 
was returned to the government and was flown again in August. Both the 
number 1 and number 2 airplanes have been used interchangeably since 
that time in support of the flight program. The number 3 airplane has 
not as yet been flown but has now been prepared for initiation of its 
flight program. This airplane suffered major damage in May 1960, during 
a ground run of the XLR99 rocket engine and has been rebuilt and modi-
fied to accommodate an advanced control system which will be discussed 
during this conference. 
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A summary of the predicted and accomplished performance is pre-
sented in figure 7. The solid curves show the design envelopes of 
altitude and velocity predicted for the LRll and XLR99 engines. The 
shaded area shows what has been accomplished to date. A maximum alti-
tude of 217,000 feet has been achieved, and in the recent speed flight 
a velocity of 6,005 feet per second was reached. 
The sources of the information being derived from the X-15 program 
which forms the basis for the papers to be presented are summarized as 
follows: 
X-15 airplane Instrumentation 
Postflight inspection 
X-15 pilot Biomedical data 
Pilot commentary 
Launch airplane Instrumentation 
(B-52) Crew commentary 
Chase aircraft Pilot comments 
Photography 
Ground equipment Tracking 
Photography 
Telemetry 
It should be emphasized that valuable research data are derived from 
many sources in addition to the basic instrumentation carried on board 
the airplane. The manner in which these various sources contribute 
will become more obvious as the conference progresses; however, for a 
program of this nature, it is not possible to provide specific instru-
mentation to take care of all eventualities. Therefore, much of our 
understanding of the results of the program comes from such sources as 
postflight inspection, comments by the pilots of the X-15 and chase 
airplanes, and from photography. 
Next, the research areas that form the basis for the program objec-
tives are itemized: 
RESEARCH AREAS 
Aerodynamic and structural heating 
Hypersonic stability and control 
Control at low dynamic pressure 
Piloting problems 
Landing 
Aeromedical stUdies 
Simulation 
Flight control systems 
---~-----
~ 
~ 
~ 
I 
I 
5 
••• •• ••• •• • •• • •••••• 
••• • •• ••• ••• • •• • 
••• 
• 
• • • ••• • • •• • • ••• • •• 
••• • •• • • ••• • ••• From the time the program was·first cone~i~, tl'\.e·~:res-e :f~ur-"it~~ • • •••• 
listed have been recognized as being of primary importance. The pro-
gram has been very productive in these areas, in that answers are being 
obtained which, for the most part, could not have been obtained by 
other means. 
Considerable information on aerodynamic heating and its effect on 
the aircraft structure already has been obtained, and it is expected 
that the program can continue to be productive in this area for some 
time to come. Problems of stability and control at hypersonic speeds 
had been anticipated at the 1958 Conference. The present vertical-tail 
configuration was arrived at as the best compromise with respect to the 
various areas of concern. At present some assessment is possible of 
the relation of the airplane geometry to its handling qualities. Expe-
rience to date with control at low dynamic pressures still is rather 
limited; however, it is expected that flights planned for the near 
future should be very productive in this area. The problems of piloting 
have, of course, received considerable attention and will be dealt with 
in four papers. It seems appropriate to remark at this time, however, 
that the pilot has appeared to be the most trouble-free component of 
the entire X-15 system. 
The usefulness of the X-15 in providing information on the last 
four items - landing problems, aeromedical studies, simulation, and 
control systems - was not fully anticipated originally, but has become 
obvious as the potential of the aircraft was considered in greater 
detail. Papers will be presented to cover the results obtained to date 
in all of the research areas listed above. 
In the process of performing any research program, valuable infor-
mation frequently is obtained as a result of problems that had not been 
anticipated. Some of the more significant items of this category are 
as follows: 
Panel flutter 
Structural deformation 
Landing loads 
Structural effects on stability augmentation system 
Engine-nozzle erosion 
Aerodynamic noise (B-52) 
Panel flutter had not been expected, but was detected early in the pro-
gram. Although the basic structure of the airplane has been proven 
sound, some local structural deformations have occurred. Flight expe-
rience has revealed interesting phenomena relative to the development 
of loads in the landing gear on ground contact. A problem resulted 
from unexpected coupling of structural response with the action of the 
•• 
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reduction in engine life and has ins~ired some very interesting studies 
of the causes. With regard to the condition of the X-15 coupled to 
the B-52, some concern was expressed at the 1958 Conference of the pos-
sibility of a problem resulting from the effect of B-52 engine noise 
on the X-15 structure. Although this problem did not materialize, 
effects of pressure fluctuations in the B-52 wing cutout provided to 
accommodate the X-15 vertical tail did bring about a requirement for 
a structural change to both the upper and lower X-15 vertical-tail sur-
faces. All of these problems will be described in detail along with 
the solutions that have been applied in the various papers to be 
presented. 
These remarks have briefly indicated the status of the X-15 flight 
research program. Those papers that follow, in view of time allocated 
in this conference and due to recency of some of the data, represent 
only a brief summary of the large amount of detailed data that have 
been collected to date from the X-15 flight program. The detailed data 
are being analyzed as rapidly as possible for publication and for dis-
cussion as required with individual specialists having interest in the 
X-15 results. 
••• •• • •• • • • 
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The results of the preliminary flight heat-transfer studies on the 
X-15 airplane are presented, together with a discussion of the manner 
in which the data have been obtained, a comparison of measured and cal-
culated turbulent heat-transfer coefficients, a correlation of the model 
test results and the flight results for turbulent heat transfer, some 
information on boundary-layer transition, and a comparison of measured 
and calculated skin temperatures at several locations on the airplane. 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the primary purposes of the X-15 program is the measurement 
and analysis of the aerodynamic heating of the airplane in actual flight. 
In the course of expanding the performance and altitude capabilities of 
the airplane, a considerable amount of heating data in the form of meas-
ured temperature has been obtained. These data, together with simpli-
fied calculations, have been used to define a safe operational environment 
for the airplane. For certain flight conditions the temperature data 
have been used to obtain heat-transfer coefficients and have been com-
pared with the results of model tests and prediction methods. 
In view of the discrepancies between the various turbulent heat-
transfer methods, designers attempt to choose a conservative approach. 
The heat-transfer data 0btained in the X-15 model tests, together with 
flight-test data of the airplane, provide a means of assessing the ade-
quacy of current aerodynamic heat-transfer design procedures. 
h 
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SYMBOLS 
Btu 
specific heat, lb-oF 
heat-transfer coefficient, 
altitude, ft 
Btu 
ft2- OF-sec 
--. II 
NSt,i 
p 
R 
T 
T* 
v 
x 
Mach number 
• ••• ••• ••• ••• 
• •• • • •• 
• pU.n.~ n''''''~et·· : .. .. ~~ . 
Stanton number, 
pressure 
• • 
• • • 
• • 
• • 
••• •• 
h 
••• •• 
• • • 
•• • • 
• • • 
••• • • 
attached-shock total pressure 
total pressure behind normal shock 
free-stream total pressure 
Reynolds number, pYx 
~ 
temperature, of or oR 
••• 
• •• 
• • 
• •• 
••• 
reference temperature, T* = TI + O.5(TW - T1) + O.22(TR - T1) 
adiabatic-wall reference temperature, 
(T*)aw = TI + O.72 (TR - TI) 
boundary-layer recovery temperature, TR" TJ(l + 1 ; 1 ~MJ~ 
velocity, ft/sec 
length, ft 
length from wing leading edge, ft 
length from fuselage nose, ft 
-~ 
~ 
a. 
r 
5SB 
11 
~ 
p 
angle 
ratio 
, 
, 
of 
of 
••• 
••• 
• • 
••• 
••• 
attack, 
• • 
deg 
specific heats 
speed-brake deflection 
recovery factor (VNpr 
flOW) 
•• 
• 
• • 
• • 
• •• 
for laminar flow, 
coefficient of viscOSity, lb/ft-sec 
density, lb/cu ft 
Subscripts: 
local 
w wall or skin 
00 free stream 
INSTRUMENTATION 
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for turbulent 
The number and location of surface thermocouples and static pres-
sure orifices for the X-15 flight tests are shown in figure 1. There 
are 293 surface thermocouples on the airplane. The thermocouples are 
30-gage chromel-alumel wires, spot-welded to the inside surface of the 
skin. There are 136 surface pressure orifices. The static pressure 
taps are 5/16-inch outside-diameter tubing installed flush with the out-
side surface of, the skin. Both the thermocouple wires and the tubes 
are connected to onboard recording instruments in the fuselage of the 
aircraft. 
The instrumentation is primarily located on the right-hand side of 
the airplane; however, there are corresponding measurements on the left-
hand side of the forward fuselage and the midspan station of the verti-
cal tail. No instrumentation is located in the vicinity of the liquid-
oxygen and fuel tanks, which are integral tanks. The instrumentation 
on the wing is primarily located at three spanwise stations, both top 
and bottom. On the top and bottom of the horizontal tail, only thermo-
couples have been installed. 
Although temperature data have been obtained at most of the loca-
tions shown in figure 1 during all of the flights accomplished to date, 
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relatively few have met the requirements for accurate reduction of heat-
transfer data by the transient-skin-temperature procedure. Transient 
analysis requires high skin heating rates and low skin temperatures, 
while relatively constant flight conditions are maintained. 
TEST CONDITIONS 
Two types of flights which are of interest in the aerodynamic 
heating study are shown in figure 2. The maximum speed for both flights 
was near 5,000 feet per second. The flight shown on the left of fig-
ure 2 attained a relatively low altitude near 100,000 feet. Heat-
transfer-coefficient data were obtained from the skin heating rates 
during a period of time (shown by the shaded strip) when velocity, alti-
tude, and angle of attack were relatively constant and when the skin 
temperature was increasing at a rapid rate. The flight shown on the 
right of figure 2 is typical of many high altitude flights during which 
the velocity, altitude, and angle of attack are changing quite rapidly, 
and for this reason heat-transfer-coefficient data are not reduced. 
However, the heat transfer during high-altitude flights can sometimes 
be inferred from comparisons of calculated and measured skin temperatures. 
Flight heat-transfer data have been obtained at Mach numbers near 
Moo = 3, 4, and 5. During the design of the X-15, heat-transfer tests 
were conducted on a 1/15-scale model of the X-15, and turbulent heat-
transfer data were obtained at Mach numbers of Moo = 3, 4.65, and 7. 
Both the model test conditions and the present flight-test conditions 
are shown in figure 3 in terms of the parameters which affect heat 
transfer. Also shown is the variation in the heat-transfer parameters 
that is obtained from the X-15 design speed and altitude flight mis-
sions. (The Reynolds numbers and wall (or skin) temperatures have been 
based upon a location 1 foot behind the wing leading edge.) 
As is frequently the case, the X-15 design flight conditions were 
outside the range of the wind-tunnel test conditions, and it was neces-
sary to extrapolate the turbulent heat-transfer data on the model, 
obtained at relatively low Reynolds numbers and heating rates, to the 
Reynolds numbers and heating rates of the flight conditions. 
Mll'HODS 
The difficulty in extrapolating turbulent heat-transfer data, as 
well as in predicting the actual level, is illustrated in figure 4. At 
the lower Mach number, Eckert's reference-temperature method (ref. 1) 
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and the theory of Van Driest (ref. 2) tend to agree better than at the 
higher Mach number. At both Mach numbers, however, the reference-
temperature method indicates a lower level at the adiabatic-wall condi-
tion and a greater increase in heat transfer with increased heating 
(lower values of Tw/TR) than does the theory of Van Driest. 
Some recent results of a study by Winkler (ref. 3) indicate about 
the same level of heat transfer as the reference-temperature method at 
the adiabatic-wall condition but show a decrease with increasing rate 
of heat transfer, which is the opposite behavior to that predicted by 
the other theories and empirical methods. Winkler interprets the results 
as confirmation of data previously obtained (ref. 4). The data of ref-
erence 4 were generally discounted by Sommer and Short in their develop-
ment of the T' method (ref. 5). 
One of the primary. difficulties in the analysis of turbulent heat-
transfer data is the determination of the conditions to be used in the 
flat-plate equations based on the flow properties at the boundary-layer 
edge. In this regard, the X-15 data, presented herein, have been based 
upon the assumption that the flow properties at the boundary-layer edge 
(behind leading-edge regions) can be calculated by conventional attached-
shock methods (ref. 6). The adequacy of this assumption is discussed in 
the next section. 
DISCUSSION OF RESUUTS 
Surface Pressures and Heat Transfer 
Surface-pressure and heat-transfer-coefficient data have been 
obtained during low angles of attack for Mach numbers near 3, 4, and 5, 
and at altitudes of less than 100,000 feet. For the most part, the flow 
has been turbulent. The surface pressures and heat transfer which have 
been measured on the lower wing surface about midsemispan and on the 
lower fuselage center line at a Mach number of about 4 and at an angle 
of attack of about 40 are shown in figure 5. In the upper part of the 
figure measured pressur~s are compared w~th calculated pressures and in 
the lower part of the figure measured heat-transfer data are compared 
with calculations. For the wing, the surface pressures are closely 
estimated by assuming an attached shock and expanded flow over the wing. 
Similarly, good agreement is shown for the lower fuselage center line, 
where a tangent-cone approximation has been used to calculate the local 
pressure levels. Calculation of the turbulent heat transfer is not quite 
so straightforward, however, since, in addition to the local static-
pressure level, some idea of the local total pressure is required. The 
estimation of a local total pressure is somewhat involved, since an 
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understanding of the entropy change along a streamline is re~uired. 
In lieu of this information, the total-pressure level can be bracketed 
between the free-stream total pressure and the total pressure that would 
exist behind a specified number of shocks. When the limiting local-flow 
conditions have thus been established and a choice of a turbulent heat-
transfer method has been made, local heat-transfer coefficients can be 
calculated. 
The calculations shown in figure 5 as the upper and lower bound-
aries of the shaded areas represent the heat-transfer coefficients that 
would be calculated when Eckert's reference-temperature method is used, 
together with the measured static pressures and the assumption of the 
free-stream total pressure and the total pressure behind a normal shock. 
The assumption of free-stream total pressure overestimates the measured 
levels of turbulent heat transfer by 50 to 60 percent. The assumption 
of a total-pressure level e~ual to that behind a normal shock overesti-
mates the measured data by 15 to 25 percent. 
Shown by the solid line in figure 5 are calculated heat-transfer 
coefficients which have been obtained by assuming the calculated static 
pressure, the total pressure that is calculated behind the attached shock, 
and neglecting the effect of heating rate on the heat-transfer coeffi-
cient. This approach overestimates the measured data by 10 to 20 per-
cent. Neglecting the effect of heating rate in the calculation of the 
heat-transfer coefficient is accomplished by substituting the boundary-
layer recovery temperature for the skin temperature in the e~uation used 
to calculate the reference temperature. The result is interpreted as 
an adiabatic-wall reference temperature and accounts only for the effects 
of compressibility on the heat transfer. The attached-shock total pres-
sure was used, since it is believed that it is a better approximation 
than either the free-stream or the normal-shock total pressure. Whether 
this approach can be generalized depends largely on subse~uent measure-
ments of the actual total-pressure levels in flight over a range of skin 
heating rates. The simplicity afforded by this approach and the favor-
able agreement that has been obtained has resulted in the choice of 
this method for computing the local levels of turbulent heat transfer. 
This approach has also been chosen to illustrate the correlation 
between flight-test data and the model data which were obtained at dif-
ferent Reynolds numbers and heating rates. The correlation is shown 
in figure 6. Flight data, obtained at Mach numbers of 3, 4, and 5, and 
model data, obtained at a Mach number of 3, have been reduced by the 
adiabatic-wall reference-temperature method to the incompressible value 
of the dimensionless heat-transfer coeffiCient, the Stanton number, 
divided by the local Reynolds number to the 0.8 power and are shown 
plotted against the local Reynolds number. In this manner, the flat-
plate theory now corresponds to the solid lines shown and the data 
obtained at various Mach numbers and local Reynolds numbers can be 
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shown for comparison. For the lower wing surface, both the flight data 
and the model data are correlated fairly well over the Reynolds number 
range of the tests. For the forward fuselage, the dashed line repre-
sents a 15-percent increase over the flat-plate theory to allow for 
conical flow. Most of the flight data correlate fairly well over the 
Reynolds number range, and the use of a conical transformation results 
in slightly conservative estimates. The model data, which were obtained 
at Mach 3 and an angle of attack of zero on the side of the fuselage, 
seem to agree favorably. The bottom fuselage data on the model, how-
ever, are from 50 to 100 percent higher than the remainder of the data. 
This result is thought to be caused by roughness effects, since sand-
grain roughness was applied on both sides of the model bottom center 
line in order to trip the boundary layer and assure turbulent flow at 
angles of attack. 
At a conference on the X-15 in July 1958, Martin R. Kinsler at 
North American Aviation, Inc., used the model data to determine empir-
ical factors that would correct flat-plate heat-transfer coefficients 
to those computed from the model data. These same factors were incor-
porated in computed programs to correct heat-transfer coefficients com-
puted for the full-scale airplane flying assigned missions. It is 
interesting to note that if the theory is adjusted to fit the model 
bottom center-line data and the results are extrapolated to the flight 
Reynolds number range, a considerable overestimate of the flight heat 
transfer is obtained. 
Boundary-Layer Transition 
A particular area of interest in the flight results is boundary-
layer transition. At present, two methods are used to detect laminar 
and turbulent areas on the airplane in flight. The first, of course, 
is the thermocouple data reduced to heat-transfer coefficients, which 
show a much higher level of heat transfer in a turbulent boundary layer 
than in a laminar boundary layer. The second is in the use of 
temperature-sensitive paints which are applied to large surface areas 
of the airplane prior to a flight. 
How these methods are used and an illustration of the type of 
transition that has been detected on the X-15 is shown in figure 7. In 
the upper right is a postflight photograph of the lower surface of the 
X-15 wing, which had been coated with temperature-sensitive paint prior 
to flight. This wing is opposite the heavily instrumented wing. The 
line on the photograph shows the corresponding location of the midsemi-
span thermocouple row. The postflight temperature-paint patterns indi-
cated high-temperature, wedge-shaped areas originating at leading-edge 
expansion joints and extending a considerable distance rearward. The 
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surface discontinuities of the expansion joints, which are rather 
severe, apparently produce turbulent flow during the entire flight and 
lead to higher temperatures in the wedge-shaped areas. 
The measured heat-transfer data seem to substantiate this analy-
sis, an example of which is shown in the lower left-hand side of fig-
ure 7. Two independent sets of data are shown for a Mach number of 
about 4 and an angle of attack of about 40 • The data shown by the round 
symbols are for the normal leading edge of the wing with expansion 
joints. The data shown by the square symbols were obtained with the 
boundary layer artifically tripped at the leading edge immediately 
ahead of the thermocouple station. The data that were obtained with 
the normal leading edge show an abrupt increase in the heat transfer 
from a laminar level to a turbulent level at a distance of about 
1.2 feet from the leading edge. This distance corresponds approxi-
mately to the point where the lateral spread of turbulence originating 
at the leading-edge joint would cross the thermocouple station. From 
this point rearward the turbulent level of heat transfer is about the 
same as that for the all-turbulent case, and both sets of data appear 
to be fairly well predicted by the turbulent method discussed previously. 
Since these data were obtained, small shields (fig. 8) have been 
used to cover the leading-edge expansion joint and thus to reduce the 
severity of the surface discontinuity. Recent tests with the shields 
installed still show the wedge-shaped patterns in the temperature 
paints, although it is believed that the length of time during a flight 
that the turbulent wedges exist has been reduced. It should be pointed 
out that the light areas shown in the photograph of the wing (fig. 7) 
do not necessarily imply laminar flow, but rather that these areas were 
at least not all turbulent during the flight. 
Boundary-layer tranSition, which may be produced by such discon-
tinuities in the surface of a high-speed vehicle, would be extremely 
difficult to predict. As yet, for the X-15, there has not been estab-
lished parametric correlation which would allow the prediction of the 
transition location on the wing a priori. Under these circumstances, 
it would seem that conservative estimates of transition should still be 
required. 
Skin Temperatures 
In order to compare measured skin temperatures with predicted 
values, based on the turbulent heat-transfer correlation presented ear-
lier, and to illustrate how boundary-layer transition during flight 
affects the resulting skin temperature, figure 9 shows measured and 
calculated temperatures for a point on the wing during both the low-
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and high-altitude flights. This location is on the lower surface of 
the wing, about midsemispan, and is 1.4 feet from the leading edge. 
For the low-altitude flight, the measured data indicate all-turbulent 
flow at this point, since a fairly high skin heating rate and maximum 
temperature were experienced. The calculated turbulent skin temperature 
agrees quite well during the high heating period but slightly overesti-
mates the measured value near its peak and during a period of cooling 
just following the peak temperature. A close look at the trajectory 
(fig. 2) indicates a fairly high angle of attack during this period, 
and the differences seen in the measured and calculated temperatures 
may be due to the inability to predict the local flow conditions prop-
erly during this period of time. 
For the high-altitude flight, this point on the wing appears to 
be experiencing some laminar flow. An all-turbulent calculation results 
in a higher temperature than was measured during the exit phase of the 
trajectory, greater cooling during the ballistic portion, and an over-
estimate of the maximum temperature that was experienced during the 
reentry. The assumption of laminar flow during the latter part of the 
exit phase and the ballistic portion of the trajectory results in better 
agreement between the measured and calculated data. This location on 
the wing is felt to be affected by the adjacent turbulent wedge, which 
originates at the leading edge and was previously discussed. Exactly 
what causes this location to go laminar at the higher altitudes is not 
known, but it may be that the turbulent wedge either vanishes or that 
its lateral spread is delayed. 
It appears that when the boundary layer is known to be either lam-
inar or turbulent, the skin temperature can be predicted with reasonable 
accuracy. This statement seems to apply regarding other areas of the 
airplane also. Flow on the fuselage, for example) seems to be turbulent 
over the entire length, at least for the relatively low angles of attack 
that have been experienced to date. In discussing the fuselage temper-
atures, it will be of interest to look first at typical temperature 
measurements that have been obtained near the stagnation region of the 
fuselage, which is the area of the high-speed flow-direction sensor. 
These data are shown in figure 10. 
The sensor is 6.5 inches in diameter, spherically shaped, and heat-
sink constructed. An orifice is located at the stagnation point and 
measures the stagnation pressure. Four other orifices are located 
about 400 from the stagnation point in the vertical and horizontal 
planes and measure differential pressures. A servo system nulls the 
sensor in the free-stream direction. 
Thermocouples have been installed on the inside surface of the 
sensor at various angular positions. Measured data which were obtained 
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during the high-altitude flight at locations 200 and 800 from the stag-
nation point are shown by the symbols. It is noted that the measured 
temperatures at the 200 location are 2000 to 2500 higher than at the 
800 location. In order to calculate the inside surface temperatures, 
a spherical segment of the sensor was divided into small lumps and the 
conduction and convective heat-transfer problem was simulated in a dig-
ital computer. Newtonian pressures with isentropic expansion and Lees' 
laminar theory were used to obtain the aerodynamic heating input and 
the resulting calculated temperatures are shown by the solid lineS. 
Good agreement is shown for the calculated and measured values at the 
200 location, but the measured values at the 800 location are consider-
ably higher than the calculations. Significant differences are noted 
between the measured and calculated heating rates at the 800 location 
during the early part of the exit phase and during the reentry and sug-
gest that the high heating at the 800 location is associated with high 
Reynolds numbers. There are several possible reasons why heating at 
the 800 location is higher than would be expected. First, there may be 
turbulence induced by the upstream pressure orifice at this location; 
secondly, the close proximity of the lip on the assembly may create 
either a stagnant region or separated flow; or, the cause may be a com-
bination of these phenomena. Some early wind-tunnel tests obtained at 
the Langley Research Center of a similar configuration had shown quite 
high heating could be expected on the assembly lip itself, but the 
results that are presently being experienced in flight were not evident 
in the tunnel tests. The higher heating in this region has not caused 
any alarm, nor is it expected to, since cooling has been provided for 
the assembly in the event it is required. 
The surface discontinuity presented by the assembly lip certainly 
seems sufficient to trip the boundary layer to turbulent flow, if it 
is not already turbulent, since most of the heat-transfer and skin-
temperature data that have been obtained on the fuselage have been at 
the turbulent level. Evidence of this is presented in figure 11, 
where measured skin temperatures are compared with calculated values 
for the low-altitude flight. In addition, similar comparisons are 
made for the lower speed brake, which also seems to be in an all-
turbulent area. 
On the the forward-fuselage lower center line, the measured tem-
perature data are shown for a point 11 feet behind the nose. The solid 
line represents calculated values based on tangent-cone static and 
total pressures and the adiabatic-wall reference temperature. The cal-
culated temperatures agree fairly well with the measured data, although 
slightly high near and just following the peak temperature, where higher 
angles of attack were experienced during the flight. 
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The speed brake provides another interesting area for comparisons 
to be made, since the use of such a high drag device is intended to 
reduce the overall heating of the airplane during reentry flight, as 
well as to provide increased directional stability. The measured skin 
temperature is shown in figure 11 for a point near the rear of the 
speed brake. For the flight shown, the speed brake was deflected 350 
at a time 80 seconds, which was just prior to burnout. Model data indi-
cated that with the speed brake deflected, the heat transfer could be 
closely estimated if the flow length was chosen from the hinge line. 
The calculation labeled xl is based on this assumption and is seen to 
overestimate the maximum measured temperature about 1000 • For compari-
son, temperatures have been calculated based on the flow length from 
the leading edge and the values labeled x2 are seen to estimate the 
measured values more closely. The ratio of these two lengths would 
indicate a 25-percent reduction in the level of heat transfer when the 
distance from the leading edge is used. As a matter of interest, a 
calculation is shown for the case of the speed brake undeflected, which 
when compared with the measured data, indicates a 5000 temperature rise 
on the speed brake due to its use during the flight. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Heat-transfer data have been obtained on the X-15 in flight to 
speeds near free-stream Mach numbers of 3, 4, and 5, and at relatively 
low angles of attack. Turbulent heat-transfer methods are reviewed and 
compared with the X-15 fli~~t data. The level of heat transfer pre-
dicted by the reference-temperature method, which accounts for the effect 
of heating rate, is from 15 to 60 percent higher than the measured data, 
depending upon the assumed total-pressure level. Closer agreement with 
the measured data was obtained when the effect of heating rate was neg-
lected and attached-shock total-pressure levels were used. Some evidence 
of the manner in which boundary-layer transition takes place on the air-
plane in flight has been shown and the results suggest the advisability 
of continuing to use conservative estimates for the transition location. 
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The expected structural temperatures and their effect ~rl the devel-
opment and design of the X-15 airplane structure have been described 
in previous conferences, and Banner, Kuhl, and Quinn (paper no. 2) have 
discussed in detail the many factors affecting the heat input to the 
structure. The purpose of the present paper is to show the magnitude 
of structural temperatures measured during the flight program and to 
describe structural problems that have developed due to structural 
heating. 
The entire airplane is designed as a hot structure and is baSically 
monocoque or semimonocoque as indicated in figures I and 2. The exter-
nal surface is Inconel X, and titanium is used extenSively for the inter-
nal structure. The forward fuselage section contains the double-walled 
pressure compartments for the pilot and instruments. The center fuse-
lage section is formed by the oxidizer tank ahead of the wing and the 
fuel tank with frames for supporting the wing. The rearward fuselage 
structure supports the empennage, main landing gear, and engine. The 
wing is of multispar construction of taper-milled Inconel X skin with 
titanium substructure. The horizontal and vertical tails are two-cell 
box structures with stabilizing ribs. The wing, horizontal tail, and 
vertical tail have segmented leading-edge heat sinks of Inconel X. A 
tunnel along each side of the fuselage for housing control cables, 
hydraulic lines, and instrument wiring is formed by removable panels. 
Throughout the structure, extensive use has been made of corrugations 
and beading to minimize thermal stress. 
The thermocouple instrumentation on the X-15 was shown by Banner, 
Kuhl, and Quinn (paper no. 2). Many areas of the X-15 airplane do not 
contain thermocouples and in the areas where thermocouples are avail-
able, the spacing and location do not permit detection of local hot 
spots and severe gradients that may develop. A method that has been 
successful in obtaining qualitative measurements of maximum temperature 
distribution in conjunction with thermocouple measurements is the use 
of temperature-sensitive paints. 
As is well known, the X-15 flight program has proceeded toward 
the design speed and altitude mission in small increments. For example, 
the speed increments have been accomplished by flying along a 
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trajectory similar to the mission trajectory and programming engine 
shutdown to give the desired Mach num~er. For all speed f~ights the 
eak Mach """"'"ber occur .... at p1'"\.9'.:in-= shutdown. Recovery port~ons of each 
~1 ....... ~" ol:1.ve beel, used to obtain stability data and evaluate handling 
qualities; and hence the recovery was different for each flight. The 
differences in the flight profiles make it almost impossible to obtain 
systematic research data on structural heating; therefore, this paper 
will present only examples of temperature levels and distribution 
experienced during this program. From consideration of structural 
safety, the present program has pointed out structural problems while 
they are still minor. 
First to be discussed are the maximum structural temperature level 
and the distribution measured on the fuselage and the wing. The maxi-
mum skin temperature distribution measured on the flight to maximum 
speed is presented in figure 3. These temperatures occurred during the 
recovery portion of the flight several minutes after engine shutdown and, 
because of the maneuvers performed, cannot be attributed entirely to peak 
Mach number. The sketches on the left for the forward fuselage and on 
the right for wing midsemispan show the thermocouple locations by the 
solid points and the measured temperatures by the open symbols. The 
solid curves, included for reference, are for the calculated maximum 
temperature distribution for a design speed mission. The dip in the 
curves near the 5 percent fuselage station is attributable to the thicker 
skin in this region, and the rise is caused by the insulation in the 
cockpit area, which blocks internal radiation. The low temperatures near 
the 40 percent station are caused by the lox tank. On the wing, the 
higher temperatures near the trailing edge are a result of the thinner 
skin. Effects of the heat sink of the internal structure are not shown 
since internal temperature measurements are not adequate. These data 
are the temperatures measured on a speed flight to a Mach number of 6.04 
and are representative of the levels reached during the X-15 program. 
It should be mentioned that on all speed flights above a Mach number of 
4, the maximum temperatures followed the same trends. 
The large gap between measured temperatures and the temperatures 
predicted for design can be attributed to values of heat transfer used 
in the design calculations and differences in the flight profiles. 
With a flight profile chosen to minimize heating effects, the high-
speed flights have been accomplished without extreme structural tem-
peratures. 
The maximum temperatures measured at various points on the X-15 
during the flight program are swmnarized in figure 4. Maximum tempera-
tures are shown for the canopy frame, ball nose, lower fuselage, side 
fairings, lower wing skin, wing leading edge, lower ventral, lower 
speed brake, and horizontal tail. These maximum temperatures did not 
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all occur on the same flight; however, they serve to illustrate the 
highest temperature levels that the structure has experienced up to 
this time, with the exception of local hot spots which are discussed 
subsequently. 
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The temperatures presented thus far do not show variation during 
the flight or the gradient through the structure. In order to illus-
trate these quantities, typical temperature histories for the front 
spar of the wing at the midsemispan are presented in figure 5. These 
temperatures were measured on a flight to a maximum Mach number 
~ of 5.28. 
The sketch gives the thermocouple location on the lower skin, the 
lower spar cap, the web, and the upper skin. The number by each ther-
mocouple is used to identify the curve. Time is measured from launch 
from the B-52 after a "cold soak" at an altitude of 45,000 feet, and the 
time of peak Mach number is given for reference. On this flight the 
lower skin temperature shown by the solid curve increased at 6.250 
per second during powered flight, and the maximum temperature occurred 
about 150 seconds after peak Mach number. This time corresponds to the 
time of maximum temperature difference between the lower skin and the 
spar web of about 5700 F. From the standpoint of thermal stresses 'in 
the structure, the temperature gradient, together with the temperature 
level, defines the most severe condition on each flight. The measured 
data give the temperature levels but, with the limited number of ther-
mocouples on the spar, the complete thermal gradient cannot be deter-
mined from flight measurements and must be obtained from analysis. 
Calculated gradients are compared with flight data for the time of 
maximum gradient in figure 6. The temperature is shown as a function 
of the wing thickness measured from the lower surface. The solid curve 
was obtained from calculations, and the points are from the flight 
measurements at the numbered points shown on the sketch. For these 
calculations, the heat transfer to the external skin was determined 
first on the basis of the time history for the skin temperatures by the 
method described in the previous paper by Banner, Kuhl, and Quinn. 
This heat input was used to compute the thermal gradient through the 
spar and included 4 inches of each cover sheet. The spar cross section 
was divided into 30 elements for the calculations. Good agreement is 
seen to exist between calculated and measured temperatures at the four 
thermocouple locations shown on the sketch. This thermal gradient has 
been used to calculate the thermal stresses in this isolated spar 
element. The stress calculations have neglected the interaction with 
the adjacent structure and are used primarily to monitor the changes in 
the thermal-stress level for various flight conditions. Thermal stresses 
calculated for the gradient shown are presented in figure 7. The curves 
on the right indicate the variation of normal stress through the spar 
and the curves on the lower left show the variation of the normal 
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stress in the lower skin. Included for reference are the thermal 
stresses calculated for a design speed mission. The stress levels for 
the Mach 5.28 flight at 225 seconds are seen to be well below the 
stresses predicted for this design condition, except in the lower skin 
at the spar cap where the compressive stress is higher for the Mach 5·28 
flight. 
Some of the areas of the X-15 where structural problems have devel-
oped on the fuselage and wing as a result of heating or thermal stresses 
are shown in figure 8. They include the side fairings, nose-gear com-
partment, canopy seal, canopy glass, and wing leading edge. The first 
temperature problem occurred on the side-fairing panels along the lox 
tank before the X-15 was first flown. Pronounced elastic buckles 
appeared in the panels as a result of tank contraction when the tank was 
filled for the first time. The buckling was relieved by adding a 
l/8-inch expansion joint to the tunnel fairing near the wing leading 
edge. 
After the flight on March 7, 1961, in which a Mach number of 4.43 
was reached, several permanent buckles were formed in the outer sheet 
of the fairing between the corrugations near the edge of a panel. Since 
these fairing panels are required to carry local air loads only, these 
buckles did not seriously affect the structural integrity. The maximum 
temperatures measured on the side fairing during this flight are shown 
in figure 9 for two fuselage stations in the area of the lox tank. The 
insert is a photograph of a typical buckle in the fairing panel. This 
buckle occurred near the wing leading edge on the left side of the air-
plane. The scales help show the extent of the buckle; the depth of the 
buckle is about 1/4 inch. At station 202, just forward of the tank, 
the temperature was 5900 F on the lower fairing and at station 335, just 
behind the lox tank, the temperature was 4800 F. No measurements were 
available on the lox tank. The temperatures shown occurred after engine 
shutdown, which, on this flight, left about 20 percent of the fuel still 
in the tanks. The cold tank, about -2600 F for liquid oxygen, together 
with the high skin temperatures on the fairings resulted in large gradi-
ents, and hence the buckles. The important results found were that 
these thermal gradients between the lox tank and the fairings were 
actually higher than calculated for the original design. The design 
was based on complete fuel burnout before the maximum skin temperatures 
were encountered. As a result of this experience, four expansion joints 
were installed in the fairing forward of the wing to give a total expan-
sion capacity of slightly over 1 inch. To date, this modification has 
prevented additional permanent buckles in the fairing for similar flights 
to higher temperatures. 
The surface irregularities produced by the buckles were expected 
to cause local hot spots on high-speed flights. As a check on this 
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effect, the buckle areas were painted with temperature-sensitive paint 
for the flight to a Mach number of 4.6. The results showed that the 
maximum temperature in the buckle area was essentially the same as in 
other areas on the panel, and there was no evidence of local hot spots. 
Another heating problem that has developed on the X-15 is due to 
airflow into the interior of the structure. This flow has caused 
unexpected high temperatures around the speed-brake actuators, and loss 
of instrumentation wires at the roots of the wing and tail surfaces. On 
the forward fuselage, the seal of the canopy has been damaged because 
of a slight raising of the front edge by cabin pressure, which allowed 
hot air to flow against the seal. This problem has been solved by 
attaching a shingle-type strip to the fuselage just ahead of the canopy 
joint to prevent airflow under the edge of the canopy. A similar prob-
lem has developed in the nose-gear compartment. The small gap at the 
rear end of the nose-gear door was sufficiently large to allow the air-
stream to enter the compartment and strike the bulkhead between the 
nose-gear compartment and the cockpit. This stream caused a local hot 
spot. Aluminum tubing, for the pressure-measuring system, is attached 
to this bulkhead in the nose-gear compartment, and during a flight to 
Mach 5.2, portions of this tubing melted away. This damage is shown 
in figure 10. Shown are the aluminum tubing with the damaged area and 
the titanium bulkhead between the nose gear and pilot compartment. The 
bulkhead was heated to about 5300 F, which was suffiCiently high to 
scorch the paint on the bulkhead in the pilot's compartment so that 
smoke was caused in the cockpit. Since this flight, an Inconel com-
pression seal has been added to the rear end of the nose-gear door and 
additional protection has been provided by placing a baffle plate across 
the compartment just behind the door opening. 
The windshield glass originally installed on the X-15 was soda-
lime tempered plate glass. This choice was based on a predicted maximum 
temperature of 7400 F. Data obtained on early flights indicated that 
outer-face temperatures near 1,0000 F could be expected with a differen-
tial temperature between faces of 7500 F. It was apparent that soda-
lime glass would not withstand these temperatures and that alumino-
silicate glass should be a satisfactory replacement. The alumino-silicate 
glass has higher strength and better thermal properties which redUCe 
the expected temperature and gradients to about 70 percent of those pre-
dicted for soda-lime glass. The alumino-silicate glass withstood ther-
mal tests to temperatures which were about 1.5 times the expected flight 
values. Subsequently, the alumino-silicate glass was installed in all 
three X-15 airplanes; however, one of the soda-lime windshields was 
inadvertently installed at a later date and it fractured during recovery 
from an altitude flight to 217,000 feet. On a speed flight to a Mach 
number of 6.04, one of the alumino-silicate glass panels also fractured. 
In both cases the glass fragments remained in place during the remainder 
of the flight and photographs of the fractured panels are shown in 
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figures II and 12. Figure 11 shows the soda-lime gla3s and figure 12 
is the alumino-silicate glass. The fractur~ pattern in figure 11 is 
not typical of tempered glass, but the one in figure 12 is typical. 
In both cases, the retainer frame buckled near the center of the upper 
edge of the glass and created a local hot spot at this point. Failure 
of both glass panels started adjacent to this buckle. Subsequent to 
the last failure, the retainer has been changed from Inconel X that 
was 0.050 inch thick to titanium that is 0.10 inch thick in order to 
eliminate buckling. 
Structural problems have developed on the wing leading edge because 
of thermal gradients and local hot spots not detected by the thermo-
couples. In order to study the overall temperature levels on the wing 
structure, the temperature-sensitive paint mentioned earlier has been 
used. Paint has been applied to the surface of the wing and tail before 
a flight, and the color changes and patterns examined after the flight 
to determine gross skin temperature. Figure 13 is a photograph showing 
the paint patterns on the bottom wing surface. Figure 13 is from one 
of the early flights. This figure shows the wing lower surface, the 
fuselage with frost on the liquid oxygen tank, the wing leading edge, 
and the wing tip. The "fence" on top of the wing is actually the tip 
of the vertical stabilizer. The light areas on the wing surface reached 
maxinru.m temperatures between 2500 F and 4000 F. The dark areas repre-
sent temperatures above 4000 F. The heat sink of the internal structure 
is clearly seen. Note the wedge-shaped dark areas of high temperature 
that start at four points on the leading edge and extend back over the 
wing. These areas start at the expansion joints in the leading edge 
heat sink. On the first flight above Mach 5 these areas of local heating 
were much more pronounced. The temperature distributions in the vicinity 
of these slots, on a flight to Mach 5.3, are shown in figure 14. These 
data were obtained from the paint pattern since n0 thermocouples were 
located in this region; however, the paint colors obtained were corre-
lated with thermocouple data at other points on the wing. This figure 
shows a segment of the wing leading edge, the expansion jOint, and a 
section of the lower skin. The expansion joints are slots about 
0.080 inch wide cut in the heat sink. The average leading-edge tempera-
ture was 8300 F and just outboard of the slot on the leading edge is a 
small area with temperatures above 1,0000 F. An area between 9700 F 
and 1,0000 F extends rearward on the skin about 8 inches, and the aver-
age skin temperature away from the slot is below 8000 F. On this flight, 
permanent interrivet buckles were formed directly behind the three out-
board slots of the leading edge. The type of buckle and the location 
are illustrated by the upper sketch in figure 15. This sketch shows a 
portion of the leading-edge heat sink, the expansion slot, the external 
skin with the buckle, and the fastener location. Note that the fastener 
spacing directly behind the slot is wider than the spacing along the 
solid portion of the leading edge. Subsequent analysis of the leading-
edge structure has indicated that several factors contributed to the 
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permanent buckling of the skin. One factor is the thermal stresses in 
the skin caused by the high gradients around the local hot spot. Another 
factor is the wide fastener spacing through the leading edge at the slot. 
A third reason for the buckles is the fact that the original segmentation 
of the leading-edge heat sink did not adequately relieve the thermal-
induced compression loads. The skins at the slots acted as a splice 
plate for the heat-sink bar and thus were buckled in compression. In 
order to minimize this buckling problem, three design changes have been 
made. Two of the changes are shown in the lower sketch. An O.OoB-inch-
thick Inconel tab welded along one edge was installed over each slot 
to prevent tripping the boundary layer, and thus to minimize the local 
hot spots, as was explained in the previous paper by Banner, Kuhl, and 
Quinn. A fastener was added at the slot to decrease the fastener 
spacing and to increase the skin buckling allowable. In order to 
reduce the load that the skin splice must carry at each slot, the 
third change was to add expansion slots with cover tabs in three of the 
outboard segments of the leading edge. No additional damage has occurred 
at the original slots; however, the original slots had a shear tie to 
prevent relative displacement of the leading-edge segments, whereas shear 
ties at the new slots could not be provided without costly rework at the 
structure. A structural analysis showed that sufficient shear stiffness 
was present in the leading edge to meet the design requirements without 
shear ties, but relative displacement of the leading-edge segments was 
expected at the new slots. The extent of this relative displacement 
during the last speed flight is shown in figure 16. This photograph 
shows the leading-edge segments and the cover tab at one slot. Exami-
nation of the deformed cover tab and the wing skins indicates the magni-
tude of this displacement, which was over 1/8 inch at this slot. Several 
modifications to the leading-edge structure which are under considera-
tion include the addition of shear ties at the new slots. 
Overall temperature on the wing upper surface obtained during the 
speed flight to a Mach number of 5.30 is shown by the isotherms in 
figure 17. These isotherms were obtained from the color patterns of the 
temperature-sensitive paint. The term "isotherm" is used in a broad 
sense, since all color changes do not occur at exactly the same time. 
It can be seen that the region near the wing root is less than 3800 F 
and along the leading edge several regions are above 7500 F. Small 
areas of high temperature directly behind the expansion joints are 
still present, even with the cover tabs, but the affected area is much 
smaller and does not extend forward to the leading edge. Similar appli-
cations of the temperature-sensitive paint have been used on other areas 
of the X-15 to obtain qualitative measurements of the temperatures. 
These areas include the cockpit canopy, horizontal and vertical tail, 
speed brakes, fuselage nose area, and protuberances such as probes, 
antennas, and vent lines. 
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In conclusion, maximum temperatures measured on the X-15 show that 
speeds in excess of a Mach number of 6 have been accomplished without 
extreme structural temperatures. Comparison of calculated and measured 
internal temperatures has shown that satisfactory thermal gradients 
through the structure can be calculated from known heat input to the 
exposed surfaces. In general, the hot structure concept used for the 
primary structure of the X-15 airplane has proven quite satisfactory. 
However, structural problems have developed during the flight program 
as a result of local hot spots and discontinuities in the structural 
elements. Many of these problems pertain to the X-15 only; however, 
thermal problems with windshield glass, airflow through openings in the 
external structure, and structural discontinuities are expected to 
appear on all hypersonic vehicles until adequate design information is 
available in these problem areas . 
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INTRODUCTION 
The X-15 is the first airplane that has been designed and flight 
tested in which the structure was designed to operate in a high-
temperature enVironment, and it is the first airplane to make exten-
sive use of high-temperature materials. The design, manufacture, and 
flight testing of the X-15 have added impetus to wind-tunnel and ana-
lytical studies that have advanced the state of the art in several 
fields of structural dynamics. 
This paper reviews the structural dynamics problems that influ-
enced the design of the structure and discusses the experiences that 
have been encountered during the flight tests. 
The areas discussed include the noise environment produced by the 
jet engines of the B-52 airplane and the XLR99 rocket engine, the buf-
fet characteristics both of the B-52/X-l5 combination and of the 
X-15 airplane alone, classical flutter, and panel-flutter experiences 
during the flight program. Where problems have been encountered that 
led to structural modifications, the modifications are shown. 
DISCUSSION 
First, the experiences encountered with the B-52/X-15 combination 
and with the ground handling of the X-15 airplane are discussed. 
Noise 
Noise surveys indicated that the B-52 jet engines at lOO-percent 
power would produce a noise environment approaching 158 decibels in the 
area to be occupied by the X-15 tail surfaces. These data were avail-
able at the time the design was fixed, and the fatigue life of the 
horizontal and vertical tails in this environment was questioned. 
Siren tests were initiated to determine the fatigue life of these 
structures, and the results of these tests indicated that the fatigue 
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life was unacceptable. North American Aviation, Inc., tested structural 
modifications that resulted in an appreciable increase in the fatigue 
life and initiated a retrofit of these modifications in the structure. 
Consideration was also given to operating the B-52 jet engines 
next to the X-15 airplane at 50-percent power during take-off to mini-
mize the noise environment. The measured noise levels produced by 
these operating conditions are shown in figure 1. The tip of <the hori-
zontal tail is exposed to a noise level of about 158 decibels and the 
sides of the vertical tail are exposed to a noise level of about 
144 decibels. Increasing the B-52 jet-engine power to 100 percent 
would raise these levels by about 6 to 10 decibels. 
A second noise source that was considered was that of the rocket 
engine during ground runs which was estimated to be higher than that of 
the B-52 jet engines. Measured noise levels produced by the XLR99 
engine with the flame shield in place, shown on the right side of fig-
ure 1, are 148 decibels on the vertical tail and 156 decibels on the 
horizontal tail. 
In order to check further on the fatigue life of the structure, 
additional tests were made with the B-52 jet engines as the source of 
the acoustic load. These tests were made with the B-52 jet engines at 
reduced take-off power, as shown on the left side of figure 1, and no 
failures were found even in the original construction after 20 hours of 
exposure. The results of these tests indicated that the original con-
struction had an acceptable fatigue life in the noise environment of 
the B-52 jet engine at reduced power. Take-off with reduced power on 
the engines next to the X-15 airplane was not desirable, however, from 
an operational standpoint. Calculations indicated that the modified 
structure would have an acceptable fatigue life in the noise environ-
ment produced at 100-percent power; therefore, 100-percent power has 
been used on all engines for take-off throughout the flight program. 
The modifications made to the vertical tail for acoustic fatigue 
are shown in figure 2. On the left is the original construction and on 
the right is the modified construction. The modifications consisted of 
increased rivet diameter, incorporation of dimpled-skin construction 
rather than countersunk rivets, and an increase in the gage of the cor-
rugated ribs along the edge where they are flanged over to attach to 
the cap strip. Modifications to the horizontal tail consisted of 
increased rivet diameter and dimpled construction. 
Initial captive flights were made with the original construction 
before retrofit of the modifications was accomplished and structural 
failures were found in the upper vertical tail after the third captive 
flight. The failures were similar to the failures that occurred during 
the siren tests and consisted of failure of the corrugated ribs where 
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they are flanged over to attach to the cap strip. The most extensive 
failure was a complete separation of the rib from the flange for approx-
imately 18 inches on the side away from the B-52 jet engines. Subse-
quent investigation showed, however, that the failures were largely a 
result of a previously unsuspected source - the turbulence created by 
the X-15 pylon and the B-52 wing cutout. 
Figure 3 shows the upper vertical tail located in the cutout of 
the trailing edge of the B-52 wing. On the left is the upper vertical 
tail in the wing cutout, as viewed over the upper surface of the B-52 
wing. On the right is a rear view of the upper vertical tail in the 
wing cutout. The X-15 pylon and the blunt surface ahead of the X-15 
upper vertical tail should be noted. Pressure measurements were made 
on the sides of the B-52 wing cutout to measure the environment of the 
vertical tail and these results are shown in figure 4. The magnitude 
of the pressure fluctuations 6P plotted against dynamic pressure 
increases with dynamic pressure and has a value of about 40 percent of 
dynamic pressure and a frequency of about 100 cps. These pressures 
converted to equivalent noise levels have a value of about 160 decibels 
at a dynamic pressure of 300 psf and 154 decibels at a dynamic pressure 
of 150 psf. Estimates of the fatigue life of the modified construction 
indicated an acceptable fatigue life in this environment. The modified 
tail is still subjected to the high-turbulence environment during cap-
tive flight and no further difficulty has been experienced to date. 
Buffeting 
Another area in which the B-52jX-15 combination was of concern was 
the effect of the X-15 airplane on the buffet characteristics of the 
B-52 airplane. Wind-tunnel tests indicated that the buffet character-
istics of the B-52 airplane would be essentially unaffected by the addi-
tion of the X-15 airplane and would not be a problem. Flight experience 
has shown this to be true. The B- 52 limit buffet boundary in tenns of 
normal-force coefficient eN plotted against Mach number is shown in 
figure 5. It was originally planned. to launch the X-15 airplane at 
M ~ 0.78 at an altitude of 38,000 feet and initial launches were made 
~~thin the lower shaded area. In order to increase the performance of 
the X-15 airplane and for safety conSiderations, the launch conditions 
have been raised to Mach numbers greater than 0.8 at an altitude of 
45,000 feet, and subsequent launches are within the upper shaded area 
shown in figure 5. The launch conditions currently used are just below 
the flight-determined buffet boundary for the B-52jX-15 combination, and 
no problems due to buffeting have been encountered even though the buf-
fet boundary has been penetrated slightly with the X-15 airplane aboard. 
The remainder of the paper will be devoted to some of the problems 
and experiences with the X-15 airplane alone. The buffet boundary 
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established for the X-15 airplane is shown in figure 6 in terms of 
normal-force coefficient CN plotted against Mach number. The data 
were taken from the normal acceleration at the airplane center of 
gravity and represent the onset of buffeting. 
At subsonic and transonic speeds, the X-15 buffet boundary is 
similar to that of other low-aspect-ratio, thin-winged airplanes. The 
X-15 airplane usually penetrates the buffet boundary slightly during 
round-out after launch before accelerating to supersonic speed and 
usually encounters some mild buffet after completing the supersonic 
portion of the flight. Buffeting has not been a problem in the X-15 
flights, but flight within the buffet region is generally avoided. 
Throughout the flight program the airplane has experienced vibra-
tion from various sources. These vibrations have been felt by the 
pilot and have been referred to as buffeting. The vibration that is 
felt by the pilot has been attributed to causes other than aerodynamic 
buffeting. Early in the flight program, panel flutter of the fuselage 
side fairings caused a heavy vibration throughout the airplane. The 
stability-augmentation system has also been responsible for heavy 
vibration due to structural feedback from the horizontal tails. The 
flight records have also indicated a mild vibration at many regions 
throughout the flight envelope at a frequency which approximately cor-
responds to the horizontal- and vertical-tail natural frequencies. It 
is anticipated that a planned modification to the control system con-
sisting of incorporating a pressure differential feedback valve to the 
control surface actuators will alleviate this problem. 
Classical Flutter 
Classical flutter was discussed in the July 1958 conference on the 
X-15 airplane. The components in which flutter considerations influ-
enced the design are shown as shaded areas in figure 7 and include the 
horizontal and vertical tails and landing flaps. Adequate wind-tunnel 
tests were made on the various components to provide proof tests to 
30 percent above the design dynamic pressure of 2,500 psf. No indica-
tion of flutter has been experienced in flight to date. 
Panel Flutter 
Panel flutter, on the other hand, has occurred in flight and has 
required modification of extensive areas of the fuselage side fairing 
and vertical tails which are shown as shaded areas in figure 8. The 
side-fairing panels consisted of a series of flat rectangular panels 
stiffened by a corrugated inner skin with the corrugations oriented 
normal to the flow. This orientation was chosen to allow thermal 
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buckling and thus mlnlmize thermal stresses, but of course it is not 
desirable from a panel-flutter standpoint. With respect to the verti-
cal tail, the skin panels were unsupported over a length of about 
60 inches with a rib spacing of about 6 inches. This resulted in long 
narrow panels having length-width ratios of about 10. 
At the time that the structural design of the X-15 airplane was 
fixed, some information was available in regard to panel flutter. 
Application of the available results to determine the flutter charac-
teristics of long narrow panels and corrugation-stiffened panels, such 
as those found in the vertical tail and the side fairing of the X-15, 
respectively, was uncertain. Thus, the initial design was not influ-
enced by panel-flutter considerations. 
Panel flutter of the fuselage side-fairing panels was experienced 
early in the flight program, however, and resulted in a severe vibra-
tion felt throughout the airplane. Strain gages were installed on the 
side-fairing panels, and panel flutter was detected at dynamic pressures 
as low as 650 psf and identified as the source of vibration. Wind-
tunnel tests on a full-scale side-fairing panel were initiated in the 
Langley Unitary Plan wind tunnel. During these tests, the panel flutter 
that was measured was in good agreement with the flight measurements. 
At the completion of these tests, cracks were found which originated at 
"drain holes in the corrugations and extended outward to the base of 
the corrugation. Inspection of the airplane revealed several panels 
which had similar fatigue cracks. Previous wind-tunnel and analytical 
studies had indicated that a simple modification would be effective in 
preventing panel flutter on this type of panel. The modification, shown 
in figure 9, consisted of a hat-section stiffener riveted to the corruga-
tions and extending in the streamwise direction. This modification was 
installed on the test specimen and tested in the Langley Unitary Plan 
wind tunnel. These tests served to clear the airplane for flight up 
to dynamic pressures of 2,000 psf. Proof tests were later conducted in 
the Langley 9- by 6-foot thermal structures tunnel under conditions of 
aerodynamic heating at dynamic pressures up to 3,250 psf and cleared 
the airplane for flight to dynamic pressures of 2,500 psf. A total of 
38 side-fairing panels, ranging in size from 12 by 15 inches to 23 by 
Y+ inches, were stiffened in this ma..."l..'1er on each X-15 airplane for 
panel flutter. 
Panel flutter of the vertical tail also became of concern during 
proof tests to clear the airplane for classical flutter. Consequently, 
a second series of tests on the vertical stabilizer was planned to 
investigate panel flutter. Tests were made in the Ames 9- by 7-foot 
tunnel at a Mach number of 1.7 and dynamic pressures up to 1,300 psf. 
Flutter was obtained on the skin panels with a length-width ratio of 10 
and also on the closure rib. As a result of these tests, the affected 
panels were stiffened by North American AViation, Inc., and flights with 
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the stiffened stabilizer were restricted to dynamic pressures no greater 
than 1,500 psf at Mach numbers up to 3.0. 
Additional tests were then conducted on full-scale ventrals in the 
Langley 9- by 6-foot thermal structures tunnel and were to be culminated 
by proof tests. These tests disclosed other areas of the external skin 
also susceptible to panel flutter within the flight environment of the 
X-15 airplane. The additional skin areas included both unstiffened 
panels and corrugation-stiffened panels similar to the side-fairing 
panels. 
Results of these and other investigations have led to the establish-
ment of a panel-flutter envelope shown in figure 10. In this figure the 
flutter parameter (EV~ -1)1/3 1 is plotted as a function of length-
width ratio l/w. The area under the curve is the flutter region and 
the area above the curve is free of flutter. The results of panel-
flutter measurements in flight made on the flat rectangular panels on 
the vertical tail of the X-15 airplane are also shown in the figure. 
It is interesting to note the agreement between the flight data and the 
previously established envelope. 
More recent unpublished experimental data tend to move the flutter 
boundary upward for a wide range of length-width ratios. The flutter 
results for the corrugation-stiffened panels indicate that correlation 
for such orthotropic panels on the basis of equivalent isotropic plates 
is still uncertain. Attempts to correlate the flutter characteristics 
of these orthotropic panels have been made on the basis of an effective 
thickness and width, but correlation has not been satisfactory due to 
the uncertainties in the determination of the effective values. 
The modifications made to the vertical tail for panel flutter are 
shown in figure 11. The modification consists of J-section stiffeners 
riveted longitudinally on the inner surface of the skin at the center 
line of the panel. In addition, lateral stiffeners were riveted to the 
skin near the panel centers and tied into the longitudinal stiffeners. 
Tests have shown that lateral stiffeners are ineffective in preventing 
flutter unless they are firmly restrained against rotation about the 
line of attachment to the panel. Other areas of the vertical tail in 
which panel flutter was experienced were on the corrugation-stiffened 
panels, similar to the side-fairing panels. The fix consisted of a 
single, light-weight hat section riveted to the backs of the corruga-
tions along the longitudinal center line. Proof tests were made on a 
full-scale ventral incorporating all modifications for panel flutter. 
These tests were made at a Mach number of 3.0J a dynamic pressure of 
3,250 psf, and a stagnation temperature of 6600 F, with no evidence of 
flutter. 
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During the remaining flights of the X-15, in which dynamic pres-
sures as high as 1,600 psf have been achieved, no further panel-flutter 
problems have been encountered. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In summary, the structural dynamic problems anticipated during the 
design of the X-15 have been reviewed briefly, and the actual flight 
experiences have been described. 
Considerable time and effort were expended in finding solutions and 
providing modifications to the airplane which alleviated the structural 
dynamic problems encountered. It is of interest to note that the modi-' 
fications have been relatively simple and that a major portion of the 
effort has been required to determine the source of trouble and to 
proof test the modification. 
For future vehicles it is desirable to have theoretical methods 
for prediction of panel flutter or experimental means for defining 
prototype characteristics on the basis of model test results. Theo-
retical prediction of panel flutter is still uncertain, particularly 
for long narrow panels and corrugation-stiffened panels. The flight 
experience of the X-15 airplane and the research work initiated by the 
X-15 program have, however, made a major contribution toward under-
standing the panel-flutter problem. 
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5. LANDING LOADS AND DYNAMICS OF THE X-15 AIRPLANE (U) 
By 
.. ~ -
McKay and Eldon E. Kordes 
t Research Center 
• N71-
INTRODUCTION 
- - -
75448' 
One of the major problems that must be considered in the design of 
glide reentry vehicles is the prov~on for a safe landing on return. 
Landing-gear systems for these vehicles must meet all the usual require-
ments and, in addition, must be able to withstand the temperatures 
resulting from reentry. Also, if adequate ground steering is not pro-
vided, the landing-gear system must give good stability during the run-
out. The X-15 marks the beginning of a class of reentry vehicles with 
a landing gear that is designed to meet these requirements. The X-15 
landing-gear system consists of a main gear with steel skids placed 
well back on the fuselage, along with a conventional, nonsteerable nose 
gear placed well forward. 
Because the landing-gear configuration represents a marked depar-
ture from previously used configurations, the present paper has been 
prepared to report on the landing loads experience of the X-15. A fur-
ther purpose of this paper is to review the dynamics of landing and to 
present results of a recent theoretical study of the effects of various 
parameters on the landing loads. The landing flare maneuver, the slide-
out characteristics, and a more complete description of the design prob-
lems arising during the initial test flights are covered in other papers 
by White, Robinson, and Matranga (paper no. 9) and Greene and Benner 
(paper no. 23). 
DISCUSSION 
Because of the airplane configuration, the landing characteristics 
of the X-15 are somewhat unusual. A trace of a typical landing sequence 
is illustrated in figure 1. The sketch at the top of the figure shows 
that a nose-high attitude is established just prior to main-gear touch-
down. The airplane weight, wing lift, and tail loads are indicated by 
the arrows on each sketch; and the springs represent both the main and 
nose landing gear. During main-gear contact, the airplane rotates and 
impacts on the nose gear, as shown in the second sketch. During nose-
gear compression, a second reaction occurs on the main gear, as indi-
cated in the third sketch. It is significant to mention that this 
second reaction is far greater than the first, as will be shown sub-
sequently. The airplane then rests on both gears for the slideout, as 
shown in the bottom sketch. 
.-
- . 
. -: .... 
•• •• .. .:. 
..... : 
62 
.." « • • ,~ " ~ : :.. .. ,.,.. . - .; 
-: .. - .- ... . -~ 
. .. . .. ..~ .. 
. .. .. : .. :.......,. ... 
• ••• • • 
• 
••• 
••• 
Thus far, 45 landings have been made with the X-15. The first 
four pointed out certain deficiencies in gear design. The principal 
deficiency can be brought out by reference to figure 2, which shows one 
of the main gears of the X-15 and also serves to indicate the unusual 
nature of the gear operation. The gear consists of a steel skid and 
an Inconel X strut which is attached to the fuselage by trunnion fittings 
and through bell crank arms to shock struts inside the fuselage. The 
skids are free in pitch and roll, but are fixed for parallel alinement. 
Drag braces are attached to the fuselage ahead of the trunnion fitting 
and to the skid at the strut-attachment pin. The bungee springs are 
used to keep a nose-up position of the skids just before landing. 
During flight the skids and landing-gear struts are folded forward 
against the outside of the fuselage. After release, they are extended 
simply by gravity and air loads. 
The main changes that were made in this main-gear arrangement were 
simply to replace the shock struts by struts having greater energy-
absorbing characteristics and to "beef up" the gear back-up structure 
somewhat. These changes were brought about mainly because the gross 
weight of the airplane had increased and also because the down-load on 
the elevator during landing was found to be greater than that taken 
into account in design. 
In a discussion such as this, it is, of course, appropriate to 
mention the fourth landing which was an emergency landing made after 
an engine explosion. It is significant to mention that the failure of 
the fuselage which occurred at that time was not attributed to a design 
error; rather, it resulted because the airplane landed in an overweight 
condition because all the fuel could not be jettisoned, and further 
because of a high nose-gear load caused by foaming of the gas and oil 
mixture in the shock strut. A permanent solution to the foaming prob-
lem was achieved by using a floating piston inside the strut to separate 
the gas and oil. With these main changes, the last 41 landings have 
been without major incident. 
Next, some of the loads results are to be discussed. During the 
X-15 program, the airplane has been instrumented to measure gear loads, 
gear travel, and accelerations. Figure 3 shows the main-gear shock-
strut force and travel measured on a typical landing. The upper curve 
is the strut travel and the lower curve is the strut force, measured 
from time after main-gear touchdown. At touchdown, the angle of attack 
ao was 80 , the sinking speed Vv was 3 feet per second, and the 
o 
landing weight was 14,500 pounds. The sketches at the top of this fig-
ure are used to help to identify the landing sequence. The important 
point to notice is that both the shock-strut force and travel are 
appreciably higher during the second reaction on the main gear following 
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the nose-gear touchdown than for the initial portion of the landing. 
These high values are due to several factors, primarily to the main-
gear location well back of the airplane center of gravity and to the 
pronounced aerodynamic down-load on the tail, the negative wing lift 
during this portion of the landing, and the airplane inertia loads. 
The increasing air load on the tail is brought about by two sizable 
increases in angle of attack, namely, the rotation of the airplane onto 
the nose gear, and a change in the wind-flow direction to nearly hor-
izontal. Experience with the X-15 has shown that the horizontal-tail 
angle, and hence the tail loads are also increased by the stability 
augmentation system as the airplane pitches down. For convenience, the 
time history of only one gear is shown since, for all cases, the 
landings have been nearly symmetrical and, in all landings, both skids 
were solidly on the lakebed before nose-gear touchdown occurred. 
The influence of airplane sink speed on main-gear response for 
many landings with the modified gear system is shown in figure 4. Air-
plane vertical travel at the main gear, and shock-strut force for the 
first- and second-peak values are presented in terms of airplane sink 
speed at initial touchdown. Values measured at the first peak are shown 
by circles and at the second peak by squares. These data are for angles 
of attack between 40 and 110 , and ground speeds at touchdown between 
145 and 238 knots. Notice that there is good correlation between sink 
speed and the measured quantities at the first peak. The important 
points to bring out are that the values at the second peak are independ-
ent of sink speed, and as the sink speed increases, the values at the 
first peak approach those of the second. No definite correlation for 
the first peak has been found between vertical travel or shock-strut 
force and angle of attack or forward speed at touchdown. 
The influence of airplane sink speed on nose-gear response is 
shown in figure 5. Nose-gear contact velocity, shock-strut travel, and 
vertical reaction are presented for various airplane sink speeds. The 
results indicate that there is little change in the measured quantities 
with airplane sink speed. The large magnitudes of the quantities are, 
of course, due to the rapid rotation of the airplane after the initial 
touchdown. The loads resulting from the high nose-gear contact veloc-
ities cause high but acceptable accelera.tions on the pilot during this 
phase of the landing. However, the lack of any indicated trend with 
initial sink speed is probably due to the absorption by the main gear 
of a larger portion of the total energy during the first peak at the 
higher airplane sink speeds. 
Experience during the program has shown that the pilots tend to 
land the X-15 in a similar way on each flight. Therefore, the effect 
of many of the variables cannot be determined from the experimental 
data. In order to study the effects of such quantities as horizontal-
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tail loads, skid friction coefficients, gear location, and initial 
touchdown conditions on the gear response, a theoretical study has been 
conducted. This analysis was carried out on an analog computer with 
four degrees of freedom: main-gear motion, nose-gear motion, fuselage 
pitch, and vertical translation. Results from the calculations are 
compared with X-15 data in figure 6, where the time history of the main-
gear-skid vertical reaction is shown for a typical landing. The initial 
conditions are angle of attack no of 80 , airplane sink speed VVO of 
3 feet per second, and airplane landing weight W of 14,500 pounds. 
The method used for obtaining the skid reaction from data of an actual 
landing necessarily resulted in faired values, as indicated by the solid 
line. The dashed curve is used to show the calculated values. Although 
there is a slight time difference at the second peak, the magnitude of 
the maximum first and second reactions are seen to agree extremely well. 
The good agreement between calculated and measured results gives con-
fidence in the ability of the analysis to determine the X-15 landing 
response. 
Attention is next directed to the downward-acting horizontal-tail 
load. This load is sizable and has a marked influence on the vertical 
reaction on the main-gear skid. The analysis has been used to calculate 
its effects and the results are shown in figure 7, where skid vertical 
reaction is given as a function of airplane sink speed for an initial 
angle of attack of 80 . The results, along with some experimental data, 
are shown for both the maximum first reaction and the maximum second 
reaction per skid. The dashed curves apply to the condition where the 
elevator position is held constant at -40 during the landing. The solid 
curves are for the condition where the elevator position varies uni-
formly from the angle of trim of _40 at touchdown to -150 at nose-gear 
contact. The latter condition is one that usually exists for actual 
landings of the X-15 airplanes. The differences between the solid and 
dashed curves are due to the increased tail loads associated with the 
difference in elevator position. Note the large decrease in the magni-
tude of the second reaction obtained by keeping the elevator angle small. 
In fact, a greater reduction in load would be expected with the hori-
zontal tail rotated to a positive angle, leading-edge up, at the instant 
of main-gear contact. These results show the desirability of including 
an automatic system to control the elevator positions after touchdown, 
and hence, to reduce the second reaction on the main-gear system. 
Several different types of skids have been proposed for reentry-
type vehicles, including wire-brush skids. One of the main differences 
in the skids is in the value of the skid coefficient of friction. The 
influence of the skid coefficient of friction on the landing response 
has been calculated and the results are shown in figure 8. The skid 
and the nose-gear vertical reaction are presented as a function of air-
plane sink speed. The solid curve shows the results for a skid friction 
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coefficient of 0.33, which is representative of the skid on the X-15 
airplane. The dashed curve is for a friction coefficient ~ of 0.70, 
which is typical of the values for a wire-brush skid. The results 
indicate that increasing the coefficient of friction tends to reduce 
the vertical skid reaction slightly and, as might be expected, to 
increase the nose-gear vertical reaction. Even though the vertical 
reactions are not appreciably affected by increasing the coefficient 
of friction, the drag loads would be affected to a larger degree. 
Another factor that would be expected to affect the gear loads is 
the location of the main gear with respect to the airplane center of 
gravity. The next results are intended only to show the effect of 
moving the main-gear location and should not be interpreted to imply 
any change to the X-15. This effect has been calculated by using X-15 
parameters, and results are shown in figure 9 for two positions of the 
main gear. The skid and nose-gear vertical reactions are shown again 
ap a function of airplane sink speed. The solid curve is for a gear dis-
tance 1M of 15.9 feet aft of the center of gravity, which is the value 
for the X-15; and the dashed curve represents the results obtained by 
moving the gear to a position one-third of the distance to the center 
of gravity (~ = 11.3 ft). The results indicate that the second reac-
tion on the main gear~is not affected to a great extent; however, the 
effect of moving the gear forward increases the first reaction in such 
a way that, at the higher sink speeds, the values of the first and 
second reaction approach each other. The results do show that moving 
the main gear forward reduces the nose-gear vertical reaction. It can 
be seen that a change in the gear position to a little over 11 feet 
does not have as much effect as might be expected. However, other 
results not shown here indicate that if the gear is moved still closer 
to the center of gravity, there is an appreciable reduction in the 
second main reaction; thus, a configuration representing that of a 
present-day fighter aircraft is approached, wherein the first reaction 
is the one that is critical. The analytical program is being continued 
to study the effects of other parameters on the landing-gear require-
ments for reentry vehicles. 
CONCIlJDlNG REMARKS 
The landings with the X-15 airplane have shown that the main-gear 
loads, measured during the second reaction after nose-gear contact, are 
several times larger than the loads experienced during the initial 
phase of the landing. The large loads during the second main-gear 
reaction are attributed to the main-gear location as well as to the 
large tail loads, the negative wing lift, and the airplane inertial 
loads after nose-gear touchdown. The high nose-gear contact velocities 
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due to the airplane pitching down result in high nose-gear loads, and, 
consequently, in high accelerations on the pilot during this phase of 
the landing. Calculated results are used to show that the main-gear 
reaction can be reduced by proper control of the elevator angle during 
touchdown. Theoretical results show that increasing the skid coeffi-
cient of friction reduces the main-gear reaction slightly, but increases 
the nose-gear reaction. The calculated results also show that moving 
the main gear forward increases the first main-gear reaction but reduces 
the nose-gear reaction, which would be typical of the condition for 
present-day fighter aircraft. Finally, the present gear system of the 
X-15 has proven adequate, in general, and has required very little 
attention. 
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6. AERODYNAMIC FORCES ON COMPONENTS OF THE X-15 (Ll) 
-
• 1-75449' By Earl R. Keener and Chris pemb~ 7 
NASA Flight Research Center 
INTRODUCTION 
In the design of aerospace vehicles which are required to maneuver 
in the atmosphere, prime factors for consideration are the magnitude 
and distribution of aerodynamic forces. The design forces and force 
distributions for the X-15 airplane were obtained from an extensive 
series of wind-tunnel tests in a relatively unexplored region, as 
reported at the July 1958 conference on the X-15 airplane. An attempt 
has been made in the flight research program to verify some of the 
force measurements with both pressure and strain-gage measurements. 
This paper presents a summary of the flight force data obtained to 
date. The data are compared with the wind-tunnel results and with 
some of the more familiar theoretical methods and approximations. 
Before proceeding into the discussion, the flight envelope of the 
X-15 airplane in terms of Reynolds number plotted against Mach number 
is shown in figure 1. The solid line shows the maximum performance 
envelope as determined by a dynamic pressure of 2,500 psf at a maximum 
Mach number and an altitude of 250,000 feet. From this envelope it is 
anticipated that the flight Reynolds numbers (based on the mean aero-
dyanmic chord of the wing) will range from nearly 50 X 106 to below 
10,000 at altitudes above 250,000 feet. The current flight envelope 
extends over a Reynolds number range from about 40 X 106 down to 
60,000. The cross-hatched area shows the flight test area for aero-
dynamic force characteristics. The area is limited by measurement 
accuracy to altitudes below about 100,000 feet, corresponding to 
Reynolds numbers greater than about 5 X 106 . Wind-tunnel measure-
ments of component forces and surface pressures were obtained at the 
Reynolds numbers and Mach numbers shown. The bar on the left repre-
sents tests at six Mach numbers at nearly constant Reynolds number. 
SYMBOLS 
normal-foree-curve slope, OCN/O~ 
wing-fuselage normal-force coefficient 
Pr nk ~ .~ 
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wing-panel normal-force coefficient 
" 
c local wing chord of uncambered section, measured parallel to 
plane of symmetry 
average chord of wing panel 
wing-section normal-force coefficient, 
h geometric altitude 
M free-stream Mach number 
P local static pressure 
P free-stream static pressure 00 
q free-stream dynamic pressure 
Sr planform area of the fuselage 
Sw total area of the wing 
SwP area of the exposed wing panel 
f l p - poo o q ex. 2£ c 
x chordwise distance rearward of leading edge of local chord 
ex. angle of attack 
DISCUSSION 
The normal-force characteristics of the exposed wing panel will be 
discussed first. Pressure measurements are shown for a wing station 
near the midsemispan in figure 2. Flight data are shown for an angle 
of attack of 100 at Mach numbers of 4.7 and 5.4. The wind-tunnel data 
are shown for comparison at a Mach number of 4.7. In addition, the 
figure includes wind-tunnel data for a Mach number of 7.0. A section 
profile is shown for this wing station. The wing section is a modified 
NACA 66-005 airfoil, for which the leading-edge radius was increased 
to 0.375 inch and the trailing-edge thickness was increased to l-percent 
chord. 
• t 27 f' 
••• •• • ••• • • 
•• • • • • • •• • • • • • • • • • • • • •• • • • • • • • • •• •• • •• • • • • • • • • • • • ••• • • 
• • • 
•• 
• ••• 75 
At a Mach number of 4.7, the wind-tunnel data demonstrate that 
generally good agreement has been obtained between flight and wind-
tunnel pressure measurements. At this Mach number it was shown at the 
July 1958 Conference on the X-15 airplane that the fuselage bow shock 
crosses the wing near the midsemispan. The effect of the bow shock may 
be seen on the lower surface by comparing the experimental data with 
shock-expansion theory for the isolated wing. The experimental data 
show a pronounced compression as a result of the presence of the bow 
shock near this station. The data at Mach numbers of 5.4 and 7.0, how-
ever, agree with the theory for the isolated wing; thus, it is indicated 
that the midspan is exposed to the free-stream conditions by the inboard 
movement of the bow shock. 
Figure 3 shows the wing-panel spanwise load distribution at a Mach 
number of 4.7 and angles of attack of 100 and 150 . Both the flight and 
win~tunnel data were obtained from pressure measurements at three span 
stations from which the values of the load parameter cn(cjcav) were 
obtained by integration. The flight and wind-tunnel data are seen to 
be in reasonable agreement. Included in this figure is the linear 
theory for the isolated wing for comparison with the experimental dis-
tributions. The theory is shown by the solid line adjusted in level 
to pass through the data at the midsemispan. The data show that the 
shape of the distribution of loading can be roughly predicted at these 
angles of attack by the linear theory for the isolated wing. 
The wing-panel normal-force-curve slope as a function of Mach 
number for low angles of attack is presented in figure 4. Most of the 
flight data presented were obtained from strain-gage data. Several 
points (square data symbols) are also shown which were obtained from 
flight pressure measurements by integration of span load distributions 
similar to those of figure 3. The data are compared with linear super-
sonic theory for the isolated wing. The reduction in slope at super-
sonic Mach numbers agrees favorably with the linear theory. In addi-
tion, the data indicate that the normal force of the wing is about the 
same as that of an isolated wing for the range of data shown. 
It is of interest to mention that the strain-gage data in figure 4 
were obtained by using the Bakelite type of gage that has been employed 
in previous flight research programs. It had been expected that these 
gages would no longer be useful after the airplane had once exceeded a 
Mach number of about 4, because of the high temperature. However, the 
ground calibrations performed after the last flight, which exceeded a 
Mach number of 6, have shown that the gages still were functioning 
satisfactorily, even though temperatures above 5000 F were experienced 
in the vicinity of some gages. For the data shown, the duration of 
time covered by the angle-of-attack change was short enough that tem-
perature changes were small. 
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Figure 5 summarizes the normal-force-curve slopes for trimmed con-
ditions in the angle-of-attack range from 00 to 50 for the horizontal 
tail, the wing, the wing-fuselage combination, and the complete air-
plane. The wing data are the same as those shown in figure 4; however, 
the coefficients shown in figure 5 are all based on the total wing area 
of 200 square feet. The slopes shown for the horizontal tail are those 
obtained from the variation of the balancing-tail load with angle of 
attack. The balancing-tail loads were obtained from strain-gage meas-
urements during maneuvers, which, in turn, were corrected to zero 
pitching acceleration to obtain the conditions for balance. Figure 5 
can be used to illustrate relative values of component loads for most 
flight conditions, since the airplane is nearly symmetrical about the 
horizontal plane. In general, the horizontal-tail load in trimmed 
flight is about 10 percent of the total airplane load throughout the 
test range of supersonic speeds. For the portion of the flight program 
so far completed, maximum horizontal-tail loads have been well within 
the design limits. 
The normal-force values shown in figure 5 for the wing-fuselage 
combination were obtained by subtracting the values for the horizontal 
tail from those for the total airplane. Note that the normal-force 
slopes for the wing are considerably smaller than those for the wing-
fuselage combination. This probably is due to a large extent to 
effects of the fuselage sidefairings. 
Figure 6 shows the ratio of the wing-panel load to the wing-
fuselage load as a function of Mach number, as determined from the data 
of figure 5. Included in this figure are two approximations based on 
the planform areas shown. The first approximation of 0.54 is the ratio 
of the wing-panel area to the total wing area. This approximation is 
often used at transonic speeds as a rough estimate. The second ratio 
shown of 0.27 is the ratio of the wing-panel area to the total wing-
fuselage planform area. This approximation may be considered to be 
roughly applicable at hypersonic speeds. In spite of the rather large 
scatter in the data, it may be seen that the trend of measured values 
is to decrease with increasing Mach number from a level near the tran-
sonic approximation to a level near the hypersonic approximation. 
Figure 7 shows the fuselage pressure distributions over the upper 
and lower surface of the airplane. The conditions shown are for a Mach 
number of approximately 4.7 and angles of attack of 00 and 160 • It may 
be seen that the wind-tunnel and flight data are in general agreement 
at both angles of attack. It is of interest to note the usefulness of 
the tangent-cone approximation in predicting the positive pressure 
coefficients. In addition, the two-dimensional Prandtl-Meyer expansion 
is useful at this Mach number in roughly predicting the negative pres-
sure coefficients, approaching a vacuum over the canopy. 
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Figure 8 shows the pressures on the vertical tail caused by 
deflecting the speed brakes 350 • The condition shown is for a Mach 
number of 5.7 at an angle of attack of 00 . Pressures are shown at 
three stations on the upper vertical tail and at one station on the 
lower. Wind-tunnel results at a Mach number of 4.7 are also presented. 
The speed-brake hinge line is located at a value of x/c of 0.65. It 
may be seen that there is general agreement between wind-tunnel and 
flight data. The pressures are about the same on both the upper and 
lower speed brakes. The effect of the speed brakes does not extend 
appreciably forward or outboard, a fact which is attributed to their 
low aspect ratio. 
Similar data for an angle of attack of 150 are shown in figure 9. 
Both flight and wind-tunnel data are for a Mach number of 4.7. At this 
angle of attack the upper speed brake has little effect. This effect 
is associated with the general blanketing of the upper vertical tail by 
the wing-fuselage flow field. In contrast, the lower speed brake 
obtains a higher pressure at an angle of attack of 150 than at an angle 
of attack of 00 • The large pressure rise still does not result in 
extensive flow separation ahead of the brake. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In conclusion, generally good agreement has been obtained between 
the flight and wind-tunnel measurements for the angle-of-attack range 
covered to date. In future flights the pressure and strain-gage meas-
urements will be extended to higher angles of attack, where interfer-
ence and nonlinear effects are the predominant flow characteristics. 
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7. A COMPARISON OF FULL-SCALE X-15 LIFT AND DRAG CHARACTERISTICS 
WITH WIND-TUNNEL RESULTS AND THEORY (LI) 
By Edward J. Hopkins 
NASA Ames Research Center 
David E. Fetterman, Jr. 
NASA Langley Research Center 
and Edwin J. Saltzman 
NASA Flight Research Center 
SUMMARY 
• • 
• • 
•• 
Data on the lift and drag characteristics of the X-15 airplane 
obtained in flight are shown to be in agreement with wind-tunnel-model 
data for Mach numbers up to 5. Existing theoretical methods are indi-
cated to be adequate for estimating the X-15 minimum drag but under-
estimated the drag due to lift and overestimated the maximum lift-drag 
ratio. Two-dimensional theory is shown to be adequate for predicting 
the base pressures behind surfaces having very blunt trailing edges, 
such as those on the vertical tail of the X-15. 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent flights made by the X-15 airplane up to a Mach number of 6 
permit comparisons to be made between flight and wind-tunnel results and 
existing supersonic and hypersonic theories throughout a Mach number 
range not heretofore covered. For aircraft having surfaces with 
extremely blunt trailing edges such as are found on the X-15 airplane, 
the base drag represents a very large portion of the minimum drag. 
Therefore, the base drag measured in flight on the various components 
of the X-15 airplane, including the vertical f'ins, the side fairings, 
and the fuselage, will be compared with the base drag measured on a 
wind-tunnel model. The adequacy of two-dimensional theory for pre-
dicting the base pressures behind surfaces having very blunt trailing 
edges is also shown. 
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SYMBOLS 
lift coefficient 
drag coefficient 
base-drag coefficient 
.-' 
average slope of the drag-due-to-lift factor measured 
between CL = 0 and CL for maximum lift-drag ratio 
speed-brake drag-coefficient increment 
lift-drag ratio 
free-stream Mach number 
Reynolds number based on free-stream conditions and body 
length (49.83 ft, full scale) 
reference temperature 
wall temperature 
adiabatic wall temperature 
base pressure 
base-pressure coefficient 
horizontal-tail deflection 
angle of attack 
Subscripts: 
MIN minimum 
MAX maximum 
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The lift and drag flight data to be shown were obtained during 
power-off gliding flights in which gradual push-down, pull-up maneuvers 
were performed. Examination of the flight records indicated that neg-
ligible or zero pitching acceleration was encountered during this 
flight maneuver. Accelerometers were used to determine the lift and 
the total drag. A more detailed description of the method for obtaining 
flight drag data is given in reference 1. The flight data to be pre-
sented herein include some of the data of reference 2, which were limited 
to Mach numbers below 3.1, and data obtained in recent flights. Full-
scale flight drag measurements should be conducted under prescribed 
conditions which are best suited for the particular airplane and instru-
mentation system. Such conditions did not exist for some of the maneu-
vers included in this paper. For this reason, the X-15 flight drag 
results cannot be considered final until data from such prescribed 
marteuvers have been obtained. 
Typical drag characteristics obtained during power-off flight at 
Mach numbers of 3 and 5 are shown in figure 1. For some of the flight 
results to be presented, it was necessary to extrapolate the drag curves 
to obtain values of the minimum drag since the lift coverage was insuf-
ficient to define the entire drag curve. 
Except for the minimum drag coefficient, the trimmed lift and drag 
characteristics for the wind-tunnel models were derived from reference 3 
and unpublished datal on the O.020-scale model tested in the Langley 
Unitary Plan wind tunnel at Mach numbers of 2.29, 2.98, and 4.65. Also, 
increments of drag for the speed brake were taken from references 4 
and 5. Recent tests have been conducted in the 8- by 7-foot test sec-
tion of the Ames Unitary Plan wind tunnel to measure the minimum drag 
of the o.067-scale model of the X-15 airplane with the boundary layer 
tripped by distributed roughness particles placed a constant distance 
from the leading edge of all wing and tail surfaces. The distance 
selected for fixing transition was 5 percent of the average chord of 
the exposed wing surface, since this distance corresponded approximately 
to the average length of laminar flow as measured in flight at a ~ach 
number of 3. The boundary layer was also tripped on the fuselage and 
the side fairings at this same distance. The drag of the roughness 
particles was evaluated from separate measurements of the drag of the 
model with particles of several different sizes and was subtracted from 
the total drag. This model was also equipped with the nose boom and 
all other protuberances, including the camera fairings, antennas, 
Lrhe pitching-moment results from this investigation on the 
O.020-scale model were confirmed by the results recently obtained on the 
O.067-scale model in the Ames 8- by 7-foot wind tunnel. 
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retracted landing skids, pitot probe, and exhaust vents found on the 
flight airplane. Base pressures were measured on the side fairing, the 
fUselage, and the upper and lower vertical fins to facilitate compari-
sons between the experimental and theoretical values of the minimum 
drag with the base drag removed. The minimum drag is compared on this 
basis since no known methods are available to account for the inter-
ference effects from the wakes of the blunt surfaces on the base drag. 
In order to make a valid comparison between wind-tunnel and flight 
results, it is necessary to adjust the skin-friction drag, which is 
included in the wind-tunnel data, to values corresponding to flight 
Reynolds numbers. The results for extrapolating2 the minimum drag as 
measured in the wind tunnel by the T' method of references 6 and 7 
to flight Reynolds numbers at Mach numbers of 2.5 and 3 are shown in 
figure 2. For this extrapolation, the recovery temperature was assumed 
to be that for an adiabatic smooth flat plate having a turbulent bound-
ary layer and a recovery factor of 0.88. At flight Reynolds number for 
the Mach number of 3, the increment of drag calculated to account for 
the difference between the skin-friction drag of an adiabatic flat plate 
and that for a flat plate having the minimum temperature measured on 
the rearward portion of the fuselage is also shown. A more exact skin-
friction correction to the extrapolated minimum drag for an adiabatic 
flat plate at flight Reynolds number should, of course, take into 
account the different temperatures which would exist on each of the 
components of the X-15. However, because of the relatively small skin-
friction increment shown, which represents a temperature differential 
of 4380 F (Tad = 5380 F, (Tw)MIN = 1000 F), the effect of these dif-
ferent component temperatures does not appear to be too significant at Mach 
numbers of 3 and below. At Mach numbers above 3, however, this increment 
of skin friction would become larger, because of the greater difference 
between the adiabatic wall temperature and the actual temperatures of 
the X-IS surfaces. For the Mach numbers shown, the T' method appears 
to give a satisfactory extrapolation of the minimum drag from wind 
tunnel to flight for the Reynolds numbers considered here. In figure 2 
the flight data have a small increment of drag subtracted because the 
airplane did not have zero horizontal-tail deflection for zero lift 
coefficient. No such adjustment was made to any other data to be 
presented. 
The effect of Mach number on the minimum drag with the base drag 
removed is shown in figure 3. In calculating the skin-friction drag 
by the T' method at the higher Mach numbers and corresponding Reynolds 
2 In the extrapolations to flight conditions shown herein, it was 
assumed that the wave-drag coefficient did not vary with Reynolds num-
ber. This assumption was confirmed by calculations which indicated that 
boundary-layer-displacement effects were negligible on the X-15 con-
figuration at Mach numbers of 3 and below. 
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numbers, the skin temperature was considered to be the maximum which 
would be calculated for the central portion of the wing during a pre-
scribed (not actual) flight maneuver. The effect of heat transfer and 
radiation on the surface temperature was considered. These maximum 
calculated temperatures, together with the flight conditions corre-
sponding to the flight data presented in figure 3, are as follows: 
M R Tw ' OF MAX 
1.1 82 X 106 448 
1.4 115 511 
1.5 115 534 
1.9 80 635 
1.9 63 655 
2.1 62 705 
2·3 118 829 
2·5 62 835 
2.6 95 866 
3·0 57 994 
3·3 58 1,109 
4.0 70 1,267 
4·3 22 1,357 I 5. 0 I 19 1,597 
5·0 
I 
12 1,662 
6.0 33 1,649 
The wave drag of the surfaces and the fuselage for the supersonic theory 
was computed on an electronic computing machine by the method of Holdaway 
and Mersman given in reference 8. This method is based on the theory 
of reference 9. The wave drag of the protuberances such as the camera 
fairings, retracted skids, standard NASA airspeed boom, hypersonic flow-
direction sensor when used, and antennas was estimated separately from 
reference 10 and is included in the wave-drag increments shown. 3 For 
hypersonic theory, the wave drag of the fuselage, the hypersonic-flow-
direction sensor, the blunt leading edges, and the protuberances was 
calculated from Newtonian theory (e.g., ref. 11). At the lowest 
Mach numbers, the sum of the skin-friction and the wave drag from super-
sonic theory shows good agreement with the flight pOints, but at the 
higher Mach numbers this theory underpredicted the flight data. Hyper-
sonic theory shows general agreement with the flight data between Mach 
numbers of 4 and 6. 
3In general the X-15 was equipped with the standard NASA airspeed 
boom at a Mach number of 3 and below and with the hypersonic flow-
direction sensor at higher Mach numbers. 
.e: .... 
•• •• 
• -AA·· • 
.. '-": : 
••• • 
• • 
••• 
• • 
• • 
•• •• 
• • 
.. .- .. 
... :.: 
• ••• 
tg ... 
• •• 
• • 
••• 
The average value of the trimmed drag·~e to lift as measured at 
low lift coefficients is presented for power-off flight as a function 
of Mach number in figure 4. For the wind-tunnel and theoretical values 
of the drag due to lift, the center of gravity was assumed to be located 
at its average position for flight, 22 percent of the mean aerodynamic 
chord. For both the supersonic and hypersonic theories, the mutual 
interference factors for the wing-body and the tail-body combinations 
were estimated from reference 12. The lift-curve slopes for the wing 
and tail alone were calculated by linear theories given in references 13 
and 14 for the supersonic theory. For hypersonic theory, the lift of 
these components was calculated from the shock-expansion theory for two-
dimensional flat plates with a correction applied for the three dimen-
sionality of the flow from the charts in reference 15. The effect of 
the expansion flow field from the wing on the tail lift was accounted 
for in the hypersonic theory by the method described in reference 16. 
Since the negative dihedral placed a large portion of the horizontal 
tail below the wing vortex field, no interference effects from the wing 
vortices on the tail lift were considered for either theory. In both 
theories, the drag due to lift was considered to be equal to the lift 
of the surface times the flow angle relative to the surface; thus, no 
leading-edge thrust was assumed. Up to a Mach number of about 5, the 
wind-tunnel data show excellent agreement with the flight data. This 
result is representative up to an angle of attack for (L!D)MAX, since 
insufficient flight data were available at the higher attitudes. Both 
theories, however, underestimate the flight drag due to lift throughout 
the Mach number range. 
Some insight into the factors that contribute to these low theo-
retical estimates can be gained from figure 5, which shows the trimmed 
lift and horizontal-ta~l deflection as a function of angle of attack 
at a Mach number of about 5 for power-off flight. The wind-tunnel data 
show general agreement with flight data. Both theories give good pre-
dictions of trimmed lift coefficient but considerably underestimate the 
tail deflections for trim; hence the theoretical estimates of the drag 
due to lift are low. (See fig. 4.) The difficulty of predicting the 
tail inputs is believed to be due primarily to the effect of the gap 
between the horizontal tail and the side fairing, which progressively 
increases with tail deflection, and also to the complex flow field 
existing behind the wing. In the theories no gap effects were con-
sidered. However, as mentioned previously in the hypersonic theory, 
downwash and local dynamic-pressure variations on the horizontal tail 
were determined from considerations of the shock-expansion field behind 
the wing. 
The trimmed maximum lift-drag ratio is shown as a function of Mach 
number in figure 6. The theoretical curves are based on the estimated 
values of wave drag, friction drag, and drag due to lift just discussed. 
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In addition, the base dr~g; which must be included, was assumed to be 
the same as that measured in power-off flight. The wind-tunnel data 
show excellent agreement with the flight values. The theories, however, 
overestimated the flight (L/D)MAX' primarily because of the under-
estimated drag due to lift. 
In all the foregoing comparisons either the base drag was removed 
from the total drag, or the base drag measured in power-off flight was 
assumed. The various components of the base drag are now considered. 
It should be noted that all of the full-scale base-drag or base-pressure-
coefficient data which follow (figs. 7 to 10) are for the XLR99 engine 
installation. However, for some of the preceding figures there are 
flight data, at M ~ 3, representing the XLRll or interim rocket engine 
installation. Where this is the case, base drag from the XLRll instal-
lation applies. 
The base-drag coefficients measured on the vertical fins, the side 
fairings, and the fuselage are shown as a function of Mach number both 
for power-on and power-off flight conditions in figure 7. In each 
sketch 'the shaded areas are the areas being considered. It can be seen 
that engine operation significantly affected the pressures on the fuse-
lage and the vertical fins but had a much smaller effect on the pres-
sures for the side fairing. The wind-tunnel data are somewhat below the 
power-off flight results, probably because of the influence of the sting 
support. 
Ratios of base drag to minimum drag as measured on each of the 
base components in power-off flight are shown in figure 8. It can be 
seen that the vertical fin is the largest contributor to the base drag, 
contributing even more than the fuselage. Note that the total base 
drag decreases from about 60 percent of the total minimum drag at a 
Mach number of about 1.5 to about 17 percent at a Mach number of 5.2. 
The average base pressure measured in power-off flight on the 
upper vertical fin is shown as a function of Mach number in figure 9. 
The theoretical curve for the two-dimensional theory of Korst (ref. 17) 
has been verified by past wind-tunnel tests on relatively thin wings 
with blunt trailir~ edges. It is noteworthy that base-pressure charac-
teristics for surfaces as blunt as the vertical fin of the X-15 (ratio 
of chord to thickness of 5.5) were also adequately predicted by two-
dimensional theory. At Mach numbers above 4, the flight base-pressure 
coefficients approach the limiting curve (PB = 0). At Mach numbers 
above 5, the hypersonic approximation of base-pressure coefficient (_11M2) gives reasonable agreement with the flight results. 
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The base pressures measured on the fus~!age and the side fairing 
are compared with values from the two-dimensional theory of Korst and 
with values for a body of revolution (without fins) according to Love 
(ref. 18) in figure 10. It can be seen that the two-dimensional theory, 
particularly at Mach numbers between about 2 and 3, gives a better esti-
mate of the flight base pressures than Love's curve. The fact that the 
fuselage base pressures agree better with the two-dimensional theory 
than with Love's curve is probably associated with the wake interference 
from the blunt vertical fins and the side fairings. 
The increment of drag produced by deflecting the speed brakes 350 
is shown as a function of Mach number in figure 11. The increments of 
drag measured in the wind tunnels show general agreement with those 
measured in flight. Between Mach numbers from about 3 to 5, Newtonian 
theory gives a good estimate of this drag increment. It can be seen 
that the increment of drag from the speed brakes approximately equals 
the minimum drag at the low Mach numbers and is about 35 percent greater 
at a Mach number of 5.5. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Throughout the Mach number range considered, up to a Mach number 
of about 5 and in the low angle-of-attack range, wind-tunnel trimmed 
lift and drag obtained on models showed excellent agreement with flight 
results on the X-15. Furthermore, at least up to a Mach number of 3 
and for the Reynolds number range considered herein, flight data indi-
cate that reasonable values of the full-scale minimum drag can be 
obtained from extrapolations of wind-tunnel results to flight Reynolds 
numbers, provided that the condition of the boundary layer is known 
and that a representative wind-tunnel model is tested, even to the 
extent of including all the protuberances found on the full-scale air-
plane. Existing theoretical methods were adequate for estimating the 
X-15 minimum drag; these theories, however, underestimated the drag due 
to lift and overestimated the maximum lift-drag ratio. This result was 
due primarily to the inability of the theories to predict the control-
surface deflections for trim. It was also shown that two-dimensional 
theory, which has been known to predict the base pressures on relatively 
thin wings with blunt trailing edges, also predicts satisfactorily the 
base pressures behind the extremely blunt vertical surface of the X-15. 
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OF THE X-15 ( u) N71-7545~.1 
B,y Harold J. Walker and Chester H. Wolowicz 
NASA Flight Research Center 
INTRODUCTION 
A thorough knowledge of the stability and control derivative char-
acteristics is, of course, a fundamental requirement in planning the 
first flights of an airplane in new and unfamiliar areas. Although 
wind-tunnel tests normally provide the bulk of this information, a par-
tial in-flight verification of the wind-tunnel data in a known environ-
ment is always desired before proceeding to the more critical areas. 
In keeping with this approach, three basic objectives may be listed for 
the current X-15 derivative program, as follows: 
(1) Establish basic trends for flight planning 
(2) Confirm wind-tunnel results and design criteria 
(3) Clarify troublesome flight-control areas 
The items listed also comprise the main topics for discussion in this 
paper. First to be considered is a step-by-step in-flight buildup of 
the basic stability and control trends necessary in order that the 
highest possible safety and realism can be achieved in projecting each 
follow-on flight. These trends, as indicated in item 2, also serve as 
a basis for confirming many of the original design conSiderations, in-
cluding the wind-tunnel and theoretical studies leading to the present 
configuration. Finally, in item 3, a knowledge of the derivatives 
would certainly be required in clarifying and correcting any trouble-
some flight-control problems, which, of course, are not entirely unex-
pected in a program of this nature. 
DISCUSSION 
It is desirable to call attention to several of the factors which 
were particularly problematical in reaching a finally acceptable con-
figuration and which, therefore, are of immediate concern in the flight 
program. These factors were discussed in some detail at the July 1958 
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conference on the X-15 airplane and, as shown in figure 1, are related 
primarily to the strong shock fields that are generated at high angles 
of attack in the upper speed range. Shown on the left is the marked 
asymmetry in effectiveness that occurs between the upper and lower 
vertical tails as angle of attack is increased. Further information on 
these effects is presented in reference 1. This asymmetry, of course, 
has its source in the high dynamic pressure field surrounding the ven-
tral fin on the lower side, and the highly expanded flow over the dorsal 
on the upper side. The relative effectiveness of the two surfaces, as 
shown, can be approximated from two-dimensional relationships by the 
ratio of the dynamic pressure q times the lift-curve slope C~ for 
the local shock flow to that for the free stream. The combination of 
high ventral effectiveness (shown at the top) and low dorsal effective-
ness (shown at the bottom) can be expected to generate some irregularity -
to be shown subsequently - in the effective dihedral and yaw control 
characteristics. The present tail configuration with approximately 
45 percent of the total exposed area below the fuselage was selected 
as the best compromise for averting an excessive dihedral effect at 
low speeds while at the same time providing adequate directional sta-
bility during powered flight at high Mach numbers and altitudes. The 
adequacy of this arrangement for the entire flight envelope could, of 
course, be proven only under actual flight conditions. 
The second effect, on the right in figure 1, is seen to be the 
rather diverse nature of the downwash € at the horizontal tail. The 
results shown were estimated from two-dimensional shock-flow relation-
ships obtained by David E. Fetterman, Jr., of the Langley Research 
Center, and also originate in the high degree of asymmetry in flow con-
ditions above and below the fuselage at high Mach numbers. The small 
upflow at low angles of attack, followed by an increasing downwash at 
the higher angles of attack, will lead to a nonlinear unstable trend in 
the longitudinal characteristics. This trend is further intensified as 
the leading edges of the horizontal tail at negative trim settings 
gradually penetrate the region of high dynamic pressure due to the wing 
compression shocks. Also, an increased pitch-control effectiveness will 
accompany the rise in dynamic pressure. Some evidence of these effects 
is discussed subsequently, although rather little flight testing has 
thus far been conducted under the conditions where these effects are 
most prevalent. 
A third shock effect, not shown here but discussed in reference 1, 
is the gradual growth of a nonlinear trend in the lift-curve slope for 
the wing and tail surfaces as hypersonic speeds are approached. This 
trend can also be calculated from two-dimensional shock-flow relation-
ships and is such as to compensate for much of the stability loss due 
to the wing downwash and compression effects. 
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An overall survey of the areas in which flight measurements of the 
derivatives have thus far been made is shown in figure 2. The angle-
of-attack and Mach number coverage in relation to the overall flight 
envelope is indicated by the shaded region. Also included as a matter 
of interest, is an outer boundary - the dashed line - representing the 
limits to which the airplane has actually been flown. Although the 
derivative coverage is uniformly shaded, the measurements are actually 
somewhat spotty in many areas and are limited largely to the static 
stability and control effectiveness. In particular, there is'a scarcity 
of data at the higher Mach numbers and angles of attack, where many of 
the basic problem areas lie. This, therefore, is the area in which much 
of our future testing will be focused. 
As to the methods employed in the flight program for extracting 
the derivatives, a somewhat simplified approach in general was taken. 
ApprOXimate relationships based on measurements of the frequency, 
damping ratio, and certain amplitude ratios were found to be adequate 
for control-fixed dynamic responses. Where control inputs were also 
involved, an analog matching technique was applied. These various 
methods are described more fully in reference 2. In general, the body-
axes coordinate system has been employed throughout the analysis. 
Longitudinal Derivatives 
Three representative examples of the longitudinal static stability 
characteristics as derived from gradual pull-up maneuvers are presented 
in figure 3. Shown here are the angle-of-attack variations of normal-
force coefficient ON ru1d stabilizer incidence ~ for approximately 
trimmed flight at a transonic, a supersonic, and a low hypersonic Mach 
number. The wind-tunnel data are also included as represented by the 
faired lines. In general, the trends of the data with increasing Mach 
number are as expected, and the flight and wind-tunnel results are seen 
to be in fairly good agreement. At the sonic Mach number a nonlinear 
trend in the apparent stability, as given by the stabilizer trim varia-
tion, was confirmed in flight. At the highest Mach number (Mach 5) there 
is also some evidence of the previously mentioned nonlinear trend in the 
lift-curve slope. A fair degree of stability is still evident for this 
Mach number, although some tendency toward reduced stability is observed 
in the upper angle-of-attack range. This effect is an example of the 
destabilizing influence of the downwash and dynamic pressure as angle 
of attack is increased at high Mach numbers. 
The effect of Mach number on the lift and stability character-
istics as determined from dynamic (or pulse-type) maneuvers is summa-
rized in figure 4. The slope CN is given at the top, and the sta-
ex. 
bility derivative dCm/dCN' which is also a direct measure of the static 
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margin in terms of the mean aerodynamic chord, is given at the bottom. 
For the angle-of-attack ranges represented, good agreement is noted 
among the various data with the exception of the calculated stability 
in the high angle-of-attack range. A discrepancy is noted here at 
Mach numbers above 3, which is attributed to neglecting the nonlinear 
downwash and dynamic-pressure effects mentioned earlier. The results 
indicate that, in general, the anticipated levels of stability have 
been realized in flight, at least in the regions of the envelope 
covered so far. 
Some typical results for the longitudinal control effectiveness 
are presented in figure 5. Here again, in general, the results from 
wind-tunnel tests and theory agree fairly well with the flight data. 
The peak effectiveness is noted to occur at a slightly lower Mach num-
ber than the peak stability shown in figure 4. The opposing trends in 
the intermediate Mach number range, one rising and the other diminishing, 
produce a noticeable transonic speed instability. 
The trim characteristics for the maximum and two intermediate 
negative stabilizer settings are presented in figure 6. A potential 
trim capability approaching ~IM of 300 is noted at peak speeds, 
although, in general, very little flight data have been obtained so far 
in the high angle-of-attack range. The data that are available, how-
ever, seem to be generally in good agreement with the wind-tunnel pre-
dictions. The marked rise in trim capability above Mach number 3 again 
is caused by the nonlinear downwash and wing compression effects at 
high angles of attack. 
The last remaining derivative of interest for the longitudinal 
mode, the damping derivative, is summarized for a moderate angle-of-
attack range in figure 7. The derivative Cmq + Cma is more difficult 
to isolate than the static derivatives, particularly in the supersonic 
range where the natural damping of the airplane is quite low. The 
flight and predicted results, however, are in fair agreement. The 
marked decline in the damping at supersonic speeds is indicated on the 
right-hand plot, where the damping ratios corresponding to the various 
derivative points on the left are shown for a moderate dynamic pressure. 
The damping ratio S is seen to drop well below 0.1 at Mach numbers 
above 2 and some form of damping augmentation must be provided. 
Lateral Directional Derivatives 
As is so often the case, the lateral-directional modes pose the 
greater variety of stability and control problems. The major ones were 
discussed in some detail at the July 1958 conference on the X-15 and 
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were mentioned briefly at the beginning of this paper. The two most 
important derivatives affecting these modes are, of course, the direc-
tional stability and dihedral effect, which are presented in figure 8. 
Representative variations of the two derivatives with angle of attack, 
as determined from both flight and wind-tunnel tests, are presented for 
a low and a high supersonic Mach number. The flight data for Cn~ are 
somewhat low in some areas, but otherwise generally confirm the wind-
tunnel predictions. The results show that distributing a large portion 
of the vertical-tail area below the fuselage allows a relatively low 
dihedral effect to be achieved at the lower Mach number. The static 
directional stability Cn~, however, diminishes substantially with 
increasing angle of attack. At the higher Mach number, the dihedral 
derivative, although still small, is seen to be of opposite sign. This 
unfavorable trend has a very pronounced effect on the closed-loop 
dynamic stability which will be discussed in some detail in a subsequent 
paper. The cause for this positive trend is, of course, the previously 
mentioned asymmetry in effectiveness between the upper and lower verti-
cal tails. As expected, the directional stability is lower at the 
higher Mach number but, due to the high intensity of the wing and bow 
compression shocks, is seen to increase rather than diminish with 
increasing angle of attack. 
The influence of the dihedral derivative on the Dutch roll sta-
bility for the two Mach numbers, 1.9 and 4.0, is illustrated in fig-
ure 9. The Dutch roll stability is represented here by the parameter 
(Cn~)* and is given approximately by the relationship shown in the 
figure. (See refs. 3 and 4.) For comparison, the wind-tunnel values 
for Cn~ (the dashed line) are carried over from figure 8. It is 
especially important to note that the ratio of the moments of inertia 
about the yaw and roll axes in the second term of the equation is a 
large quantity (approximately 22), and thus the influence of the dihe-
dral derivative is seen to be greatly magnified as angle of attack is 
increased. For the lower Mach number, 1.9, the dihedral derivative is 
negative, so that the static stability is augmented. For the higher 
Mach number, 4.0, on the other hand, the positive values of the dihedral 
derivative are seen to detract quite substantially from the basic 
stability. 
One possible method for alleviating the adverse dihedral effect 
at the higher Mach numbers is to remOve the lower rudder. This effect 
for Mach number 4.0 is shown in figure 10. The rudder-off configura-
tion is represented by the dashed lines, which show that the sign of 
C1~ has been reversed in a favorable direction as desired. The direc-
tional stability parameter Cn~' as anticipated, has also been markedly 
. -: ... 
.. .: .. : .... '. 
•• ••• • • .. .. -.. . .- .. 
•••• ••• • •• 104 •••• • •• 
•• • • 
• • 
... ~--
· , . 
• it· . •• 
••••• ••• • ... .. ..: 
••• 
degraded, although much of the loss indicated can be regained by 
opening the speed brakes. The effect of the lower rudder on the Dutch 
roll stability (Cn~)* is shown in the right-hand plot, where a con-
siderable improvement attributable to the favorable dihedral effect is 
indicated at the higher angles of attack even though the speed brakes 
are closed. It should be mentioned that for Mach numbers less than 
about 2.2, the dihedral derivative is normally negative at all angles 
of attack, and the stability of the basic airplane is generally superior 
to that for the rudder-off configuration. 
The directional stability and dihedral effect for the rudder-on 
configuration are summarized in figures 11 and 12. Data are presented 
for both open and closed speed brakes (as indicated by the solid and 
open symbols), and corresponding results from wind-tunnel tests and 
theory are included. The results for the directional stability (fig. 11) 
indicate that the design levels have been essentially realized in 
flight, although the trend of the flight data is somewhat low at super-
sonic Mach numbers. There is also an apparent scatter in the flight 
increment for Cn~ due to speed-brake deflection in the lower angle-
of-attack range. This scatter is believed to be due in large part to 
differences in angle of attack within the range from 20 to 60 , although 
the wind-tunnel data for this increment show relatively little sensi-
tivity to angle of attack. 
The flight data for the dihedral derivative Cl~ in figure 12 
generally appear to confirm the wind-tunnel measurements for both angle-
of-attack ranges. The speed-brake effect for this derivative is seen 
to be relatively small and to lie within the scatter of the data. 
As would be expected, most of the various effects due to shock 
interaction and removal of lower rudder are also reflected in the con-
trol characteristics for the lateral-directional modes. Time does not 
permit a complete review of these effects; however, a summary of the 
results for the basic airplane at low angles of attack is given in fig-
ure 13. The yaw and roll control effectiveness (C
nBv and ClBa)' 
as well as the cross coupling derivatives (C 1Bv and CnBa) are 
included and, except in one area, the flight and predicted results are 
generally in accord. The exception is seen to be the low trend in the 
yaw-control effectiveness at Mach numbers above 2 which appears to 
coincide approximately with the reduced directional stability noted in 
figure l2. 
At this point, only the lateral and directional damping charac-
teristics remain to round out the derivative presentation. The damping 
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trends for this mode, however, are found to be much the same as those 
for the longitudinal mode considered earlier. It suffices therefore 
to point out that the lateral-directional damping also decays to very 
lov levels at supersonic speeds and that damping augmentation must be 
provided. 
CONCllJDING REMARKS 
It can be stated that the X-IS flight program thus far has estab-
lished fairly well-defined derivative trends for Mach numbers approaching 
the design limit. With few exceptions, these trends have agreed well 
with the wind-tunnel predictions. Also, many of the basic stability 
and control design parameters have been confirmed in a substantial por-
tion of the overall flight envelope. The gradual development of these 
basic trends from one flight to the next has, in fact, generated a high 
level of confidence in proceeding to the more critical flight areas 
during the past several months. No serious flight-control problems 
have thus far been encountered in the longitudinal mode; however, one 
serious deficiency in the lateral-directional mode has been observed in 
the form of an adverse dihedral effect at high Mach numbers and angles 
of attack. Further studies and tests are, of course, planned for the 
high Mach number and angle-of-attack ranges to reveal any further 
flight-control problems that may exist in these more critical areas 
and to fill out the remainder of the flight envelope. 
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9. RESUME OF X-15 HANDLING QUALITIES (LI) 
By Robert M. White 
Air Force Flight Test Center 
Glenn H. Robinson, and Gene J. Matranga 
NASA Flight Research Center 
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The handling qualities of the X-15 research airplane have been 
assessed from pilots' opinions, with verification in many cases by 
data acquired during flights. Areas of interest covered are the launch, 
climbout, ballistic, reentry, and landing phases of flights made to date. 
INTRODUCTION 
The concept of aircraft handling qualities has been specified since 
World War II to provide certain performance features, such as rolling 
velocity and stall warning, and a desired level of static and dynamic 
stability to allow the pilot to fly the aircraft with relative ease. 
Although great efforts have been made to assign quantitative values to 
these parameters, many of the results on how the airplane flies are 
assessed through pilot opinion. Both pilots and engineering analysts 
might do well to accept this thesiS, for to quote one well-used text 
book (ref. 1) on the subject: "The desired magnitude of dihedral effect 
has never been very successfully determined. From the analysis of many 
stability and control flight tests, it has become apparent the pilot 
likes to have some dihedral effect, but not too much." 
This resume covers in broad aspects many of the handling features 
of the X-15 from its launch to landing. Some conclusions can be drawn, 
but many comments regarding handling-quality specifications for hyper-
sonic and high-altitude flight must wait until future flights are made 
and their data are thoroughly examined. 
SYMBOLS 
longitudinal acceleration, g units 
normal acceleration, g units 
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acceleration due to gravity 
lift-drag ratio 
Mach number 
• •• 
• •• 
• • 
••• 
••• 
maximum angular rolling velocity, deg/sec 
angular pitching acceleration, deg/sec2 
dynamic pressure, lb/sq ft 
maximum dynamic pressure, lb/sq ft 
average wing loading, lb/sq ft 
angle of attack, deg 
trim angle of attack, deg 
angle of sideslip, deg 
horizontal tail deflection, deg 
damping ratio 
pitch angle, deg 
maximum roll angle increment, deg 
natural frequency in pitch, radians/sec 
THE X-15 COCKPIT 
Since frequent reference will be made to the pilot's cockpit, some 
of the salient items used for display and control can be examined by 
reference to figure 1. 
The display is conventional in that it shows in standard fashion 
the operating level of many of the aircraft and engine systems. The 
flight phase is monitored chiefly from the inertial system which pro-
vides readout in altitude, velocity, and aircraft attitude. Additions 
from the "q" sensor ball nose provide pointers and cross bars that 
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allow the pilot a reading of angle of attack and vernier indications 
of angle of attack and sideslip. A prime reliance is placed on the 
attitude indicator in three axes, inasmuch as the earth's horizon is 
quickly lost as an outside reference during the high pitch angle climb 
experienced on all flights. Simplicity is the key, and many small 
changes have been made continually to improve display, as requested by 
the pilots, to give a readable display in the rapid cross checks that 
a pilot makes in a fast-moving situation. 
Control is afforded in several ways. Aerodynamic control is pro-
vided by a conventional center stick or by an interconnected side stick 
so positioned as to allow pilot control without inadvertent or adverse 
inputs from acceleration forces. Reaction control for attitude control 
at low dynamic pressure is given by a simple controller on the left 
side of the cockpit that allows inputs in roll, pitch, and yaw. 
LAUNCH A.ND CLIMBOur 
Two areas common to all flights, the launch and initial climbout, 
have been studied in detail. The launch is characterized by two prom-
inent features, first a sudden departure from the B-52 pylon, yielding 
a zero g peak normal acceleration, and second an abrupt rolloff to the 
right that rarely exceeds a 100 to 150 change in bank angle. The 
release is what might be expected and, after the very first experience, 
is of no concern to the pilot as normal 1. 0 g flight is regained within 
2 seconds. The rolloff at launch stops as the X-15 emerges from the 
B-52 flow field. Since the bank-angle change is small, it is easily 
and quickly corrected. Launch has been made by using either the center 
or side aerodynamic control stick with equal satisfaction in both cases. 
In addition, launch has been made with the control neutral, correcting 
the rolloff as it occurred, and with small lateral-control input to 
counteract the roll before it could develop. Both cases have been 
acceptable and resolve into individual pilot's technique and preference. 
Immediately after launch the engine is fired and the climbout 
begins. AssThue for a moment that a long delay occurs before engine 
ignition, which has been true on several occasions. The pilot glides 
at an angle of attack of 80 , which is near the best lift-drag ratio for 
glide; the aircraft responds well and is free of buffet. If angle of 
attack is increased to 100 , a mild buffet onset is immediately detected, 
which allows the pilot to make corrections well in advance of a stall 
condition. The aerodynamic qualities, then, at 45,000 feet, Mach num-
ber 0.8, and at maximum weight are considered excellent. Very quickly 
after engine light-off, supersonic speed is reached and an angle of 
attack of 100 is maintained to rotate the airplane to a climbout pitch 
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angle that is established by the mission requirement. Buffet is absent 
above Mach 1.0, but a nosedown trim change occurs between Mach numbers 
1.1 and 1.4. Figure 2 illustrates this trim change. Note that the 
piloting task in the low-supersonic-speed range calls for constant angle 
of attack. It is seen that in order to maintain constant ~ the pilot 
must trim in substantial up stabilizer. Frequently, the speed change 
is so rapid (approximately 6 seconds from Mach numbers 1.1 to 1.4) that 
the pilot has difficulty keeping up with the trim change and as a result 
the angle of attack in this speed range is usually lower than desired. 
The trim change is mild, however, and has not received the objections 
from pilots that have often been given to the more abrupt trim change 
in the transonic region below Mach number 1.0 that occurs on many jet 
aircraft. 
CONTROL CHARACTERISTICS 
Figure 3 presents the details of an altitude mission which reached 
217,000 feet and which enables many comments to be made pertinent to 
X-15 flight control characteristics. After initial rotation at an angle 
of attack of 100 , a constant pitch angle of 320 is established and main-
tained to burnout where the acceleration along the longitudinal axis a2 
reached 3.6g. From engine burnout until the reentry the aircraft fol-
lows a ballistic trajectory, and two unique features that occurred are 
weightlessness experienced by the pilot for about 2 minutes and the 
requirement that reaction controls be used since dynamic pressures have 
decreased to a minimum of 3 pounds per square foot at peak altitude. 
This part of the flight is followed by the reentry maneuver, which ter-
minates when the aircraft rotates to level flight after experiencing, 
as in this case, normal acceleration an of 3.8g, longitudinal accel-
eration of -2.2g, and peak dynamic pressure in excess of 1,400 pounds 
per square foot. 
The portion of the profile during exit is particularly pleasing 
to the pilot since the airplane is very stable and the damping appears 
adequate, even with roll and yaw dampers failed. The increase in accel-
eration along the longitudinal axis during the thrust period reaches a 
maximum of 3.6g at burnout. The g-level, although certainly noticeable 
to the pilot, has not been high enough to provide any adverse comment 
in regard to impairing the pilot's ability to perform his essential 
tasks. Thrust termination during flight occurs when the pilot stops 
the engine or when burnout results from propellant exhaustion. In all 
cases there have been no transient aircraft motions, and thrust mis-
alinement has not been a factor of concern. The stabilizer is trimmed 
to maintain an angle of attack of 00 • This change in trim is complete 
at approximately 145,000 feet, where q has decreased to 26 pounds 
~ 
I 
•• ••• • •• 
• •• • 
••• ••• • ~.. 
• ••• 
. - .... 
• • ••• . ._. . .
•• •• • • •• 
• ••• • . : .... 
••• 
.... : .. 
.. _ . 
••• •• : : .... 
117 
per square foot. At this point a decay in response to aerodynamic con-
trol is easily noted by the pilot, and reaction controls are then 
employed. The reaction controls proved to be very effective, aircraft 
response to inputs in roll and yaw were good, and the response in pitch 
was more than desired and caused some difficulty in damping the pitch 
oscillations. 
Ballistic Control Characteristics 
The motions in the ballistic flight region can best be illustrated 
by the time history shown in figure 4, which includes that part of 
flight at dynamic pressures of less than 10 pounds per square foot. 
Plotted are the angle of attack and airplane pitching acceleration q 
which developed as a result of the reaction-control use. All reaction-
control inputs were essentially in the proper direction to damp the 
airplane motion except at one point where the angle-of-attack oscilla-
tion experienced its largest excursion. At this point an input was 
made that reinforced the increase in angle of attack, but immediately 
afterward the pilot was able to damp the oscillation adequately to 
maintain the desired angle of attack. Although the longitudinal con-
trol task was complicated by the presence of an out-of-trim stabilizer 
condition, the results are indicative of control difficulties that can 
be encountered with an acceleration-command reaction-control system. 
Since this figure presents results of the first and only significant 
reaction-control experience with the X-15, proper longitudinal control 
trim and pilot experience are expected to yield an improvement in air-
plane attitude control at low dynamic pressure. The excursions in side-
slip were contained to acceptable limits by using reaction control. 
Similar results were evident in bank-angle control. Lateral-aerodynamic-
control inputs were used at low dynamic pressure with no apparent 
response compared with the good response and control afforded by reac-
tion control. Pilot technique in this region was use of reaction con-
trol in one axis at a time. 
Zero g, while apparently an interesting area to consider, has had 
no noticeable effect on the pilot control task for the approximate 
2 minute period during which the weightless state was experienced. 
The presentation for control is provided by cross bars shown in 
figure 5 to allow flying at prescribed values of angles of attack and 
sideslip. As can be seen, these bars are incorporated within the face 
of the attitude indicator which additionally provides roll information 
for control inputs. Inasmuch as the pilot is presently manually con-
trolling attitude about three axes without any damping system, the 
instrument presentation is considered adequate since all information is 
displayed centrally and minimizes scanning and instrument cross-check. 
.. : .... 
•• •• 
•• • •• 
.. .. : : 
118 
••• • 
. - .. .. 
-:: .-
-. . .. 
• 
.. .. -
. .. : 
.. :-: . 
••• 
• •• 
• 
•• 
•• 
• 
Control During Reentry 
The reentry maneuver is perhaps the most interesting from the 
pilot's standpoint, since it is flown at relatively higher angles of 
attack and under the rapidly changing conditions of dynamic pressure, 
temperature, velocity, with the associated changes in aircraft stability 
and responses. The maneuver actually begins as the aircraft passes 
through 180,000 feet (see fig. 3) where the stabilizer is trimmed to 
a value that will maintain reentry normal acceleration. The reaction 
control is used to establish the reentry angle of attack. 
The time history shown in figure 6 begins immediately after the 
stabilizer has been trimmed for reentry. With the stabilizer constant 
and the angle of attack raised to 100 , the normal acceleration an 
increases to approximately 2g as the dynamic pressure q increases. 
The angle-of-attack decrease results from a repOSitioning of the sta-
bilizer to maintain the reentry acceleration until level flight is 
regained at just above 60,000 feet. Returning to the point where 
reentry angle of attack was reached, but just prior to significant 
change in dynamic pressure, a sideslip oscillation developed but was 
low enough in magnitude and fre~uency to be disregarded by the pilot, 
particularly since it damped ade~uately as q increased. Before 
leaving this area, it is interesting to point out that the static simu-
lations and the Johnsville centrifuge program contributed to very good 
training for these conditions so that the ac~ual reentry did not result 
in a completely new or unexpected flight experience. 
other Control Features 
Several features, common to all flights, can be noted prior to a 
discussion of the terminal and landing phase of the X-15. 
The speed brakes have been used in a large number of areas through-
out the speed and altitude range, under thrust, and after engine shut-
down. Except for incremental use in the landing pattern, they have 
always been extended symmetrically, that is, with e~ual brake deflection 
for the segments both above and below the fuselage, and opened to full 
deflection. During extension there is a mild trim change. Aside from 
the trim change, no undesirable aircraft motions have been experienced 
with speed-brake use; they are extremely effective, and there has never 
been a report of buffet due to speed-brake deflection. 
Lateral control of the aircraft has been effected by differential 
deflection of the horizontal stabilizer, that is, the so-called "rolling 
tail. " This method of lateral control has been excellent on the X-15. 
The pilot is not aware of what specific type of lateral control is 
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allowing the roll motion. His only concern is in being able to get the 
aircraft response he calls for when deflecting the control stick. Fig-
ure 7 contains many representative points obtained in flight and illus-
trates the comparatively low roll rates and moderate barili-angle changes 
associated with performing the X-15 mission. From experience to date, 
the rolling tail has provided a good rolling control for the X-15, and 
there have been no undesirable aircraft motions coupled in any axis 
because of lateral-control deflection. It is true that inertial cou-
pling is a factor under specific conditions of dynamic pressure, angle 
of attack, and rolling velocity, but no attempt has been made to verify 
such predictions by specific roll-performance flight tests, aside from 
determining lateral effectiveness and using roll control only as 
required on any particular flight. 
The stability augmentation system which provides rate damping 
about all axes has had significant effect on pilot opinion. During 
early flights below a Mach number of 3.5, moderate gains were used. 
Pilot opinion expressed a desire for a stiffer aircraft, particularly 
in pitch and roll and flights above M = 3.5 have used considerably 
higher gains. In general, pilot opinion of the augmented handling 
qualities in the Mach number range from 2.5 to 6.0 has been q~ite favor-
able. It is interesting to note that at angle of attack of 8 and above 
with low damper gain and particularly with roll or roll and yaw dampers 
off, the pilot has great difficulty in controlling the 'lateral and 
directional motions to prevent divergence. The primary cause of the 
control difficulty is due to an adverse dihedral effect which is pres-
ent at Mach numbers above 2.3. This problem area has received a great 
deal of attention, and the paper by Petersen, Rediess, and Weil (paper 
no. 10) completely summarizes the area of unaugmented X-15 lateral and 
directional characteristics. With dampers set at high gain, however, 
the lateral and directional characteristics have been acceptable to the 
highest angle of attack explored thus far (approximately 170 ). 
The pilot ratings (P.R.) for longitudinal controllability are sum-
marized in figure 8 as a function of frequency run and damping ratio 
t, and these results are compared with criteria developed by the ft_~es 
Research Center (ref. 2) from simulator studies conducteo. on reentry 
vehicles. The X-15 flight data obtained during powered and unpowered 
flight are shown by circular symbols (according to pilot rating) whereas 
the comparative Ames results are indicated by the lines. Most of the 
X-15 points have satisfactory ratings including one of the two points 
representing damper-off conditions. In general, the correlation between 
the X-15 flight points and the Ames criteria are good. It appears how-
ever, that the damper-off points were rated in flight more favorably 
than would be predicted from simulator results. 
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The side aerodynamic control stick designed for the X-15 has 
received the usual critical analysis associated with a departure from 
the conventional control. The following list includes most of the 
factors considered: 
Force gradients - sensitivity 
Dead band - centering 
Control harmony 
Utility at high acceleration 
Controller geometry and location 
Trim control 
As experience using the side stick was gained and modifications were 
attempted to make each factor fully acceptable to the pilot, most fea-
tures included in the initial design were found to be satisfactory. 
All pilots agree to its utility value at high acceleration; however, 
the location of the control in relation to the pilot', s arm position 
proved most critical. A modification allowed the selection of five 
different positions, which provided for adjustment of the control stick, 
fore or aft prior to flight, to satisfy an individual pilot's desire. 
The trim control remains controversial, and further evaluations will 
seek the best compromise between a wheel or button control and its best 
location on the stick. In general, the control has been most desirable 
on many occasions and has been used entirely on some flights from launch 
to landing. 
LANDING TECHNIQUES 
The final phase of each flight is, of course, the landing. This 
area has progressed from one receiving a great deal of concern and 
attention in the first flights to routine operation based on the expe-
rience, procedures, and techniques developed. 
Prior to and during the X-15 flight program, landing simulations 
have been made using the F-104 airplane. With predetermined settings 
of the lift and drag devices and the engine thrust, the lift-drag ratio 
is established to match that of the X-15. This experience allowed the 
pilots to establish geographic checkpoints and key altitudes around the 
landing pattern; pilots thus become familiar with the position and 
timing required in the pattern by the low lift-drag ratio. At present, 
prior to each X-15 flight, the pilot devotes an entire F-104 flight to 
approaches and landings in what is considered satisfactory preparation 
and practice for the landing maneuver. 
~ 
I 
•• 
• • ••• : .. .. 
. :-: .. 
••• 
• ••• 
•• • • 
• • •• 
•• • • 
•• •• 
.... :- . 
•• • • 
••• • • : : .... 
121 
As concerns the space positioning of the X-15 for a landing pat-
tern, figure 9 illustrates a wide range of conditions in altitude at the 
high key and lateral dispersion from the touchdown point. This figure 
indicates the flexibility allowed the pilot in maneuvering to a desig-
nated touchdown point. This flexibility is primarily attributed to 
several factors. The pattern is normally flown at an indicated air-
speed of 300 knots, and the handling ~ualities, including the control-
system use and the airplane responses, are considered excellent. If 
less sink rate is desired, the aircraft can be flown at an indicated 
airspeed of 240 knots for best LID; and if necessary, excess altitude 
can be lost at constant airspeed by use of the speed brakes. Although 
rates of sink average 250 feet per second and have been as high as 
475 feet per second prior to landing flare, none of the pilots have 
considered these values to be a limiting factor in the pattern. 
A summary of flare characteristics is shown in figures 10 and 11. 
Note once again the wide range of conditions that a pilot can choose to 
arrive at a similar landing. The flare-initiation altitude shown in 
figure 10 has generally averaged less than 1,000 feet but covers a wide 
range of airspeeds. 
In figure 11, the average vertical velocity at the flare runs 
between 100 and ISO feet per second, which is usually at a lower rate 
of sink than that for steady glide. This reduction is generally a 
result of deceleration during the approach. Aside from airspeed con-
trol, the cues that a pilot uses are all external. A landing point is 
chosen and the flare point is selected so that the remalnlng energy 
will carry the aircraft to the intended touchdown spot. The flare alti-
tude is not selected from the altimeter, but from the pilot's own esti-
mate of the height necessary to reduce the sink rate and arrive level 
in close proximity to the ground. It is significant that as flight pro-
gressed, the flare speeds increased, not to seek better handling quali-
ties, which are good throughout, but to gain more time after the flare 
to make configuration changes, correct trim changes, and then execute 
the landing at acceptable values of angle of attack, sink rate, and 
proximity to the intended landing point. 
Pertillent tOUC11dowil par8Jlleters are presented .LJ.J. figu.rcs 12 &'1d 13-
As is shown in figure 12, most landings have been accomplished with 
vertical velocities of less than -5 feet per second at angles of attack 
between 60 and So. Ground effect, while noted in some cases, has not 
been a significant factor in the pilot's analysiS of the landing. In 
each of the last 20 landings a specific spot has been used for the 
intended touchdown point. In figure 13, all but four landings have 
been grouped within ±1,200 feet of that spot. This degree of precision 
is considered to be very good. The landing summary shown reveals an 
average slideout distance from touchdown of 5,000 to 6,000 feet. The 
.. : .... 
•• •• 
•• • •• 
.... : : 
]22 
••• • 
• • •• 
••• • 
•• • 
• • • •• 
•• 
... -- . . 
- -. . - - ... -. 
-. :-:: ..... IIP··· ••• !!I ••• 
- .. ~. . . 
.--'.. . ... 
••• 
shortest distance can be achieved by using full aft longitudinal con-
trol and flap retraction to place the greatest load on the skids, and 
full deflection with speed brakes for added drag. In addition to good 
inherent directional characteristics on the ground, the pilot has used 
lateral-control inputs to provide greater load on one skid and achieve 
some measure of directional control. 
In summary of the landing information, it is considered important 
to indicate that the pilot, provided an aircraft with good control and 
handling ~ualities as represented in the X-15 in the landing pattern, 
can intercept the pattern at anyone of its key positions, can make 
adjustments based on his experience, judgment, and reactions to the 
many cues available, and can complete a satisfactory landing in close 
proximity to a designated landing spot with the power off, low LID 
airplane. Experience with the X-15 has included landings with various 
dampers inoperative, a few recent landings using only the side arm con-
troller, and one recent landing with one wind-shield outer panel shat-
tered to the point of being opaque, with an attendent compromise in 
the pilot's visibility and the landing task. These landings have been 
e~ually satisfactory and are grouped with the other data presented. 
CONCWSIONS 
This summary of X-15 handling qualities has been, in general, an 
expression of pilot opinion, verified in many cases by the data acquired, 
rather than an attempt to compare with specifications. Obviously the 
main concern in expanding the flight envelope to design speed and alti-
tude has been a detailed analysis of each forward step taken so that it 
could be achieved safely. With these missions completed, flights can 
now be performed within the flight envelope with an aim to gathering 
handling-~uality data as it compares or relates to formulating detail 
specifications. 
Concerning the question as to whether there have been new regions 
in which the X-15 has been flown that have indicated a significant 
change in handling-quality specification as they are known today, the 
answer, as might be suspected, is no. In this sense the performance 
of the X-15 can still be related with that of certain of the century-
series fighters, despite their vast performance differences. The pilot 
still desires an excellent control system, insists on the aircraft 
responding to his inputs at the rates he desires, and is quite dis-
pleased with undamped oscillations about any axis. Certain differences 
as to what the pilot desires may show up whether he is flying an X-15 
or an operational fighter. When proceeding in unexplored regions in an 
X-15, pilots prefer having damping in roll and a high longitudinal 
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damping, probably because it gives a feeling of security to have a solid 
airplane. In the fighter excessive damping might inhibit the ease with 
which a pilot can track a traget. In the past, the impression of what 
the pilot prefers has been translated into design specifications 
regarding handling qualities, and from pilot experience in the X-15 pro-
gram it seems apparent that much of the same procedures will be used for 
hypersonic and aerodynamic reentry vehicles in the future. 
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10. LATERAL DIRECTIONAL CONTROL CHARACTERISTICS 
By Forrest S. Petersen, Herman A. Rediess, and Joseph Weil 
NASA Flight Research Center 
SUMMARY 
• t3l 
The deterioration of lateral directional controllability with roll 
damper off and the pilot performing a lateral control task is explained. 
The problem area was defined by fixed-base and airborne simulators and 
verified by closed-loop analysis in which a human transfer function 
represents the pilot. A parameter which will predict the problem area 
for the X-15 airplane is developed. The means considered to alleviate 
the control problem in the X-15 airplane ~ also discussed. 
INTRODUCTION 
As indicated in reference 1, a primary area of concern has been the 
lateral directional dynamic instability with roll damper off. This con-
dition corresponds to the potential emergency situation created by a 
stability-augmentation-system failure since the X-15 airplane is intended 
to perform all its missions with the stability-augmentation system in 
operation. 
Considerable effort has been expended in the investigation of the 
control problem which might follow a roll-damper failure. These inves-
tigations have utilized both fixed and airborne simulators, closed-loop 
theoretical analysis, and actual flight tests of the X-15 airplane. It 
is the purpose of this paper to review the results of these efforts as 
well as the courses of action considered to alleviate the problem. 
STI·mOLS 
b wing span, ft 
cycles to double amplitude 
cycles to one-half amplitude 
constants of a general third-order equation 
•• 
• • :: ... 
•• •• • 
···1,2 . 
C~ 
Cn 
Cl 13 
= 
dC~ 
dl3 
Cn 
dCn 
= 
13 dl3 
IX 
I Z 
Kp 
Kp , = KpL°a 
L 
L:p dL =-d:p 
Lf3 
dL 
=-
dl3 
Lo 
dL 
= dOa a 
M 
m 
N 
• • .. F 
• 
• 
, .. 
• • 
• • • 
• • 
.. : .... 
.: .. 
..... : • .. : .. -
Rolling moment 
qSb 
Yawing moment 
qSb 
moment of inertia 
moment of inertia 
:pilot gain 
about :princi:pal 
about :princi:pal 
Rolling moment, :per sec2 
IX 
Mach number 
mass, slugs 
Yawing moment, :per sec2 
I Z 
.' 
X-axis, slug-ft 2 
Z-axis, slug-ft 2 
em 
= dr 
, 
~ 
I 
= 
2m 
I 
p 
q 
r 
S 
s 
t 
v 
y 
a. 
• • 
••• 
••• 
roll rate, deg/sec or radians/sec 
dynamic pressure, lb/sq ft 
yaw rate, radians/sec 
wing area, sq ft 
Laplace transform variable 
• • 
• • • 
• • 
• • 
•• ••• 
• 
• • 
•• 
• 
• 
• • • • •• 
• ••• 
roots of transfer function (i = 1,2,3, ••• ) 
time, sec 
forward velocity, ft/sec 
Side force 
mV ' per sec 
angle of attack, deg or radians 
trim angle of attack of principal axis, radians 
angle of sideslip, deg or radians 
--
•• 
• 
• 
• 
•• 
• ••• 
• • 
• •• 
• • 
• • 
.... -:-. 
•• • • 
••• • • 1:35·· .. 
.-: ... - ... 
. - . - . 
.. --. .:. 
- .. . 
· ···l~ : : 
cp 
•• 
• 
• 
• 
•• 
Subscripts: 
e 
ref 
p 
•• • 
• 
• • • • • • 
••• •• • • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
••• •• 
••• 
• • 
••• 
••• 
aileron deflection, deg or radians 
damping ratio of the numerator of the airplane transfer 
function in roll 
damping ratio of short-period Dutch roll mode 
pilot time constant, sec 
time constant in roll, sec 
bank angle, deg or radians 
pole angle or zero angle (i = 1,2,3, ••• ) 
undamped natural frequency of the numerator of the airplane 
transfer function in roll, radians/sec 
undamped natural frequncy of short-period Dutch roll mode, 
radians/sec 
error 
reference 
pilot 
GENERAL REMARKS 
It became apparent early in six-degree-of-freedom simulations of 
reentries from altitude missions with the roll damper off that uncon-
trollable combinations of Mach number and angle of attack were frequently 
encountered. Stick-fixed stability analysis had not indicated that these 
uncontrollable conditions would be encountered. Figure 1 shows the 
uncontrollable area with the roll damper off in terms of angle of attack 
plotted against Mach number as determined from extensive fixed-base 
simulator work. The criteria used in defining the uncontrollable area 
was actual loss of control. As a result, no fine line of demarcation 
between controllable and uncontrollable is implied or shown. The lighter 
shaded area indicates that the pilot was able to fly for longer periods 
of time before loss of control occurred. In the darker shaded areas 
loss of control is very rapid. Since the airplane is uncontrollable in 
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the shaded area, no data with the stability-augmentation system of the 
X-15 airplane off were anticipated in this area. However, by using 
T-33 and F-100C variable-stability airplanes as in flight simulators, 
several points within this area have been extensively evaluated. 
To obtain flight verification in the X-15 airplane, pilots were 
instructed on several flights to explore the fringes of the predicted 
uncontrollable region. Figure 2 shows the flight conditions on one 
such flight in relation to the uncontrollable area. Figure 3 shows the 
airplane motions which occurred along thi s flight path. At the begin-
ning of the flight path and time history, the airplane was at an angle 
of attack of approximately ~ and the pilot turned the roll and yaw 
dampers off. Lateral motions immediately began to build up, so he 
reduced the angle of attack. The motions subsided and angle of attack 
was again increased. Once again the motions began to build up, and the 
angle of attack had to be reduced. Although the pilot was holding on 
to the center stick, he was not consciously making any lateral-control 
inputs. However, there were lateral-control inputs as shown in the 
figure. 
Figure 4 shows the destabilizing effect of two types of pilot inputs 
in a time history for an F-100C variable-stability airplane. In the 
first portion of the time history, the pilot attempted to hold the stick 
fixed as in the previous time history. As in the time history with the 
X-15 airplane (fig. 3), there is a definite lateral-control input and a 
resultant divergent oscillation. During the center portion of the time 
history, the pilot released the stick and the oscillations were obviously 
damped. In the last portion the pilot attempted to control bank angle 
in a conventional manner; that is, lateral-control inputs are generally 
proportional to bank angle and in a direction to keep bank-angle excur-
sions low. The similarity of the inadvertent lateral inputs and diver-
gent oscillation in the first part of the time history to those in the 
last portion should be noted. 
ANALYSIS OF THE LATERAL CONTROL PROBLEM 
AnalytiC closed-loop investigations of the X-15 (see fig. 5) have 
been conducted and indicate that the uncontrollable region can be pre-
dicted. The following transfer function, developed in reference 2 and 
used in reference 3, closely approximates the control inputs of a 
pilot applying lateral control proportional to bank angle plus a lead: 
Kp(l+ 0.57s) (1) 
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No directional control is considered during reentry conditions of rapidly 
changing dynamic pressure, angle of s.ttack, and Mach number. The rolling 
moments resulting from directional control vary greatly in magnitude and 
even change sign. This precludes effective use of directional control 
during reentry. 
It is shown in reference 3 that the characteristic equation of the 
pilot airplane system (see fig. 5) is obtained by combining the pilot 
transfer function with the transfer function for roll response to lateral-
control inputs as follows: 
KpLoa(1. + 0.576 )[s2 + (-Nr - Y~)s + N~ - LI3 ::: + NrY13] 
~--------------------~~------------------~--~~---------= -1. 
6
4 
+ (-Yj3 - Nr - Lp)s3 + (Nj3 - ~LI3 + YI3Nr + Y13Lp + Nh)s + (-LJi~ + ~L~r - YI3NrLp)s 
(2) 
which is of the form, 
Kp'(l + 0.578)(s2 + 2~~s + ~2) 
s 0 + ;~)(s2 + 2~~ws + Wnw 2) = -1 
The closed-loop stability of the system is then determined by solving 
for the roots of equation (2). In figure 6 the neutral stability of 
the X-15 airplane defined by the roots of equation (2) is compared with 
the uncontrollability envelope previously shown. The area within this 
boundary is predicted to be unstable with the pilot in the loop and is in 
reasonable correlation with the simulator results. 
An analysis of this general type of control problem has been per-
formed in reference 4 by using root locus methods, and the specific 
control problem of the X-l5 airplane has been analyzed in reference 3 
with the same methods. A portion of the analysis of reference 3 is 
briefly repeated herein to describe a useful parameter which relates 
the severity of the control problem to familiar aerodynamic derivatives 
and provides a better understanding of the problem. 
Figures 7(a) and 7(b) present typical root loci of the pilot-
airplane transfer function in roll (the left-hand side of equation (3)) 
for controllable and uncontrollable Situations, respectively. The 
complex poles represent the stick-fixed Dutch roll stability. The line 
drawn from the complex pole to the complex zero (locus of the roots) 
represents the changing stability of the pilot-airplane system with 
increasing pilot gain. In figure 7(a), the pole is above the zero and, 
therefore, the locus closes in the controllable direction; however, 
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when the zero is above the p01e-the locus closes in the uncontrollable 
direction and may cross over into the unstable right half of the plane. 
The difference between the distances of the zero and pole from the 
origin ~ - an~ is suggested as an indication of the possibility of 
an uncontrollable condition. For aircraft with low lateral-directional 
damping, as in case of the X-15 airplane, this difference can be closely 
approximated by the following equation: 
( 4) 
When ~ - an. is negative, as in figure 7(a), this control 
problem does not exist; however, other types of lateral-control problems 
mayor may not exist. If it is positive, as in figure 7(b), this type 
of control problem will exist if the value of Wn~ - anv is sufficiently 
large and the basic airplane damping is low enough. 
It is shown in the appendix that the maximum decrement of damping 
which the pilot might provide when ~ - an~ is positive is approxi-
mately proportional to ~ - an", for the X-15 airplane. An increasing 
positive value of this parameter represents an increasing decrement in 
the damping of the closed-loop pilot-airplane system. A cumbersome but 
more exact expression is given in the appendix (eq. (A9»). 
In a paper by Walker and Wolowicz (paper no. 8) it was shown 
that the X-15 airplane above a Mach number of 2.3 has undesirable 
Na 
positive values of C~Q. The aileron cross-coupling term ~ of 
tJ Laa 
equation (4) is a small quantity; therefore, the positive product of L13 
and <lo predominates. Figure 8 shows that, whereas in the angle-of-
attack range from 5° to l5°, the X-15 airpla...'1e is predicted to be 
nearly neutrally stable, the addition of the pilot in the loop deteri-
orates the stability markedly so that an oscillation doubles the ampli-
tude in one-half of a cycle at ~ = 12°. The pilot-airplane curve was 
calculated by using equation (A9). 
Simulator studies have shown that this controllability parameter 
(eq. (4)) correlates well with pilot opinion for the X-15 airplane. 
Figure 9 shows the variation of pilot ratings with the values of 
~ - an.. The conditions for the X-15 airplane were selected and flown 
• ••• .. : ..... . 
•• • • •• • 
.. . " .•..... .. : .. !l!8 .: : .. -
•• •• 
. .. : . .., 
. :.: .e: .. ---; ... 
. ..... : . .... . .. 
•• w.: w... • • 
••• in five degrees of freedom which gave t~~·values of an~ - an~ as 
indicated in the figure. It is seen that there is a definite deterio-
ration of pilot opinion with increasing positive values of the parameter. 
This parameter is not presented as a general criterion for all lateral-
directional control problems but rather as a means of explaining the 
type of controllability problem which is discussed in this paper. It 
can be used for indicating the possibility of the specific type of con-
trol problem existing in other aircraft if the assumptions used in its 
derivation are compatible with the particular aircraft. 
POSSIBLE METHODS OF ALLEVIATION OF LATERAL CONTROL PROBLEM 
As soon as it was suspected that a large portion of the flight 
envelope for the X-15 airplane was uncontrollable with lateral-stability 
augmentation off, investigations were initiated to find ways of allevia-
ting the problem. The first method tried, probably because it would 
have been the easiest to implement, was pilot-display quickening. Side-
slip and bank angle presentations were quickened by including yaw rate 
and roll rate, respectively. Various quickening gains were used in the 
investigation on the fixed-base simulator, but no combination which 
significantly improved the pilot's ability to handle the instability 
was found. 
ArthUr F. Tweedie of North American AViation, Inc., and Lawrence 
w. Taylor and Richard E. Day of NASA Flight Research Center independently 
investigated the use of ailerons to control sideslip angle for certain 
types of airplane instabilities. Figure 10 shows a time history illus-
trating the use of a nonconventional control technique which evolved 
from these investigations and showed considerable promise on a fixed-
base simulator. The first part of the time history shows once again 
the destabilizing effect of conventional lateral-control. inputs. In 
the last part of the time history, a method called the ~ technique 
was used. It consists of sharp, lateral-control inputs to the left, 
as the.nose swings left through zero Sideslip, and vice versa. At this 
time ~ is maximum. The pilot flies hands-off except when making the 
lateral pulses. This is desirable in flight because of the instability 
induced by the inadvertent inputs associated with merely holding on to 
the center stick. 
Figure 11 shows a comparison of the effectiveness of the ~ tech-
nique on fixed-base and airborne simulators with the center stick. The 
solid line represents pilot opinion of using conventional lateral-control 
techniques on either simulator. The short dashed line represents pilot 
opinion of using the ~ technique on the fixed-base. simulator. The 
longer dashed lines represent pilot opinion of the ~ technique in 
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••• •• the F-lOOC. Fixed-base rating.·tndicated considerable improvement with 
this technique. However, experience in the F-IOOC indicated that the 
improvement achieved in terms of pilot opinion of the handling qualities 
was greatly reduced as the roll-damper gain was reduced to zero. Use 
of the side-arm controller in the X-15 airplane has provided some relief 
from the destabilizing effect of inadvertent inputs present with the 
center stick and makes the ~ technique more effective. Figure 12 shows 
the uncontrollable area and indicates regions in which pilots have suc-
cessfully flown the X-15 airplane with the side-arm controller by using 
the ~ technique with roll damper intentionally off. Pilots feel that 
they were able to fly sufficiently well in the shaded area of figure 12 
to permit a successful reentry from a flight to an altitude of 
250,000 feet. Previous experience with the center stick indicated the 
controllable angle of attack to be considerably lower. All X-15 pilots 
are well versed in the use of the ~ technique. Its usefulness may, 
however, be even less than was indicated when the pilot has the task of 
maintaining bank-angle excursions from zero to small values as he does 
in a reentry. Furthermore, a lateral input in the wrong direction, 
which is a conceivable mistake with other problems clamoring for the 
pilot's attention, could be disastrous. 
As was indicated in a previous paper by Walker and Wolowicz 
(paper no. 8) recent efforts have been directed toward the evaluation 
of the handling qualities of the X-15 airplane with the lower rudder 
off. Figure 13 shows the variation of C~ i3 and Cn13 with Mach number 
at an angle of attack of 120 with the lower rudder on and off. The 
upper portion of the figure shows that desirable negative values of C1 
are realized throughout the Mach number range at this angle of attack 
with the lower rudder off as contrasted with undesirable positive 
13 
values of Cl
13 
with the lower rudder on at all Mach numbers above about 
This favorable value of is not realized without a reduction 
in Cni3 as is shown in the bottom half of figure 13. However, as was 
pointed out in the derivative paper by Walker and Wolowicz (paper no. 8), 
the Dutch roll stability is increased by negative values of C~I3. 
Figure 14 shows the uncontrollable areas in terms of angle of attack 
and Mach number as predicted by fixed-base simulators with lower rudder 
on. Figure 15 shows the predicted uncontrollable area based on closed-
loop analysis and fixed-base simulator studies for the lower rudder off. 
The solid lines in figures 14 and 15 indicate the conditions followed 
just prior to and during reentry on a typical altitude mission. With 
the lower rudder on, a considerable portion of the reentry from an alti-
tude mission is within the uncontrollable region as shown in figure 14. 
Figure 15 shows that a reentry conducted with the lower rudder off 
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does not penetrate the predicted uncontr~~~able region. The flight con-
ditions flown on the X-15 flight with the lower rudder off are shown as 
dashed lines in figure 15. In the limited area explored on this flight, 
the flying qualities were as good as or better than those predicted by 
the fixed-base and airborne simulators. However, as predicted, the 
flying qualities at low angles of attack were worse with the lower rud-
der off than with the lower rudder on. Additional flights are being 
planned in the X-15 airplane to eValuate further the handling qualities 
with lower rudder off. If these tests continue to indicate favorable 
trends and no severe problem areas are uncovered, the configuration with 
the lower rudder off may offer undeniable advantages for the high angle 
of attack, reentry portion of an altitude mission. 
Since control characteristics are reasonably good with the stability-
augmentation system on, one way in which the potential problem area can 
be improved is by reducing the chance of a critical augmentation failure. 
This is to be accomplished by dualization of certain components in the 
augmentation system. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In conclusion a serious lateral directional control proble~ with 
the lower rudder on and the roll damper off at high angles of attack 
has been uncovered. The problem is caused primarily by negative dihedral 
effect and was not revealed until the inputs of the pilot were used with 
airplane stability to determine closed-loop stability. The use of a 
transfer function which represents the inputs of a pilot performing a 
lateral-control task permits calculation of the degree of pilot-airplane 
instability. Although special control techniques have not completely 
alleviated the problem, they have provided sufficient improvement when 
utilizing the side stick to allow flight in the fringes of the uncon-
trollable region. Removal of the lower rudder appears promising as a 
means of alleviating the lateral directional instability at high angles 
of attack associated with a roll damper failure. Finally additional 
reliability will be obtained by dualization of certain components in 
the stability augmentation system. 
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The controllability parameter developed in reference 2 
will be 
ment in 
control 
L~ to _ ::a) 
, - illn1jr ::::: 2illn1jr a (Al) 
used in the derivation of an expression for the maximum decre-
damping which a pilot might provide while performing a lateral-
task. This derivation assumes the following: 
(1) The damping in roll and the Dutch roll damping are low. 
(3) The pilot-time constant Tl is less than an order of magnitude 
different from the roll-mode time constant. 
These assumptions are compatible with the characteristics of the X-15 
airplane and the derivation of equation (Al). First it is necessary to 
establish that the root locus (see ref. 5) from the complex pole to the 
complex zero is approximately a semicircle, as shown in the follOwing 
sketch, under these assumptions: 
Imaginary axis 
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•••• • •• 
•• •• 
•• • 
• • • 
• • •• 
.. :-: 
• • 
• • • 
• • 
• • 
••• •• 
. . -...... 
.: . . . .. 
• • • • •• 
. .... : :.: 
By definition of root locus at somE! ~oint 
also 
a on the locus, 
L8 = L Pole angles - L Zero angles 
that is, 
Because of assumption l, 
Because of assumption 3, 
Therefore, 
or 
therefore the locus is approximately a semicircle. Note that 8l ~ 900 
and 82 ~ 83 both provide conservative answers because deviations from 
these approximations for the X-l5 airplane are in the direction to 
increase 68; thus, the actual stability will be greater than the semi-
circle approximation. 
The maximum pilot-damping decrement, [~ffinJp' is derived with the 
aid of the following sketch: 
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Simple geometric relations show that 
where 
and 
--
approximation 
to root locus 
(A2) 
(A3) 
(A4) 
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equations (2) and (3) .!~ the discussion it can be 
(A5) 
In order to obtain an expression for S~*' the third-order equa-
tion which is reduced from the denominator of equation (2) must be 
solved. A good approximate solution to a third-order equation of the 
form, 
(A6) 
when c3 « c2' as is the case for the X-15 airplane, is to assume a 
real root to be 
and then solve by synthetic divisiop. This method yields the following 
approximate expressions when small terms are neglected: 
(A7) 
and 
(AS) 
Substituting equations (A5), (A7), and (AS) into equation (A2) 
and reducing to simplest form leads to the following expression for the 
maximum damping decrement the pilot might provide: 
(A9) 
_.--_. 
• •• • 
•• • ••• 
.... :-. 
•• • • 
.....-..... . .. 
~
• • 
• • • 
• • 
• • 
•• ••• 
• • • 
• • • ••• 
• ••• 
. ::. 
• ••• 
•• • • 
::- .. 
1~5··· •• 
:.: : .. : .. 
••• 
For the X-15 airplane at moderate to high angles of attack, the term 
is generally smaller than the remaJ.nJ.ng term and the following can be 
used for a first approximation: 
(AlO) 
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11. X-15 MISSION PLANNING AND OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES (tJ) 
By Robert G. Hoey 
Air Force Flight Test Center 
and Richard E. Day 
NASA Flight Research Center 
INTRODUCTION 
N71~75454 
The philosophy of the X-15 flight-test program thus far has been 
to expand the flight envelope to the maximum speed and design altitude 
as rapidly as practical and simultaneously to obtain as much detailed 
research data on the hypersonic environment as possible. The envelope 
expansion program has been performed on an incremental performance 
basis; that is, each successive flight is designed to go to a slightly 
higher speed or altitude than the previous flight, thus permitting a 
reasonable extrapolation of flight-test data from one flight to the 
next and also building a backlog of pilot experience. The mission 
planning and operational procedures associated with the program are 
discussed in this paper. The effect on flight planning of systems reli-
ability, stability limitations, and ranging considerations are also dis-
cussed. General piloting techniques and pilot training are mentioned. 
DISCUSSION 
First, the tools which are available to perform the flight-planning 
and pilot-training task for the X-15 program are examined. The prime 
tool is a six-degree-of-freedom analog simulator shown in figure 1. 
This simulator was constructed by North American Aviation, Inc., during 
the design and development stage of the X-15 program and was subsequently 
transferred to the NASA Flight Research Center for use during the flight-
test program. This simulator is quite complete including actual hydrau-
lic and control system hardware. Another primary pilot-training tool has 
been the F-I04 airplane which is used by the pilots to practice low LID 
landings. Digi tal computers have been of value in performing temperature-
prediction calculations prior to each flight. Variable-stability air-
planes have also been available during the test program. 
One factor which had a significant effect on flight planning was 
the development status and demonstrated reliability of the subsystems 
on the X-15 airplane. Lack of duality in the stability-augmentation 
system required that flights be performed in such a manner as to pro-
vide for the safe return of the pilot and the aircraft in the event of 
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stability-augmentation malfunction. Inasmuch as the flow direction 
sensor, reaction control system, and inertial platform system were 
newly developed for the X-15 airplane, they could not be relied upon 
as primary flight instruments until reliability had been demonstrated. 
Two flight-envelope expansion programs, one with the XLRll engines 
and another with the XLR99 engine, were to be performed. The predicted 
flight envelope for the two configurations is shown in figure 2. A maxi-
mum velocity of about 3,300 ft/sec and a maximum altitude of 133,000 feet 
were predicted for the XLRll powered configuration. A maximum velocity of 
slightly over 6,000 feet per second was predicted for the XLR99 powered 
configuration; and although the performance capability exceeds the 
design altitude of 250,000 feet, this altitude was chosen as an objec-
tive for completing the envelope expansion program. 
Prior to the delivery of the X-15 airplane, a general handling-
qualities study was performed on the X-15 analog simulator. The results 
of this study are summarized in figure 3. The hatching represents areas 
of instability, and flight in these areas is uncontrollable with or 
without the stability-augmentation system. The shaded area represents 
a region of uncontrollability with the stability-augmentation system (SAS) 
off. The details of this controllability problem have been discussed 
in the previous paper by Petersen, Rediess, and Weil (paper no. 10), and 
the only pertinent comment here is that considerable flight-planning 
effort was expended to insure that these areas could be avoided or 
investigated under controlled conditions on all flights. 
Before the first cross-country flight of the X-15 airplane could 
be attempted, it was recognized that intermediate emergency lakes must 
be provided so that the pilot was always within gliding range of a 
landing site. A study was then performed, again on the analog simu-
lator, to determine the overall range capabilities of the airplane. A 
simultaneous survey was conducted to locate all of the usable dry lakes 
in the area north and east of Edwards Air Force Base along the High 
Range. A summary of this study for the XLR99 powered configuration is 
shown in figure 4. Burning time is plotted against distance from the 
launch pOint. The solid curve represents the position of the airplane 
at any time during the powered portion of the flight. The dashed curve 
on the right represents the maximum forward-range potential of the air-
plane at any instant to a high key altitude of 20,000 feet. The dashed 
curve on the left represents the maximum rearward-range capability after 
performing a 1800 turn, again to an altitude of 20,000 feet. For 
example, for a premature shutdown at 55 seconds the airplane is at the 
point shown in the example plan view and can perform a turn to arrive 
at a point 30 miles from launch, or it can glide straight ahead to a 
point 160 miles from launch; however, it cannot land at the lake which 
it is overflying at that instant. The usable emergency dry lakes were 
then spotted along the abSCissa, and lakes were selected which provided 
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overlap throughout the entire flight. The general shape of these curves 
changes somewhat depending on the type of flight profile flown; however, 
the general spacing of the emergency lakes is not greatly affected. For 
the XLRll powered configuration the range potential increases much more 
slowly than for the XLR99 powered configuration and closer spacing of 
emergency lakes was thereby required. The launch lakes selected and 
intermediate emergency sites are shown in figure 5. All flights with 
the XLRll engine could be made either in the local area around Rogers 
Dry Lake or from the Silver Lake launch site. Envelope expansion 
flights with the XLR99 engine could be flown from Silver, Hidden Hills, 
and Mud Dry Lakes. After the lakes had been selected, the right to use 
the lakes was acquired and runway outlines were marked on the surface 
of each lakebed. 
Once the predicted performance, ranging, and handling qualities of 
the airplane were well understood, the task of defining the piloting 
techniques required to reach the performance objectives was undertaken. 
The intent here was to make the best possible use of the pilot's pres-
entation and to depend heavily on the most reliable information in the 
cockpit using the less dependable indications for cross checks during 
the flight or as. backup information in the event of failure of a prime 
system. The analog simulator was invaluable in determining optimum 
piloting techniques. During most of the program with the XLRll engine 
the airplane was equipped with a standard nose boom which provided 
accurate values of angle of attack, airspeed, and pressure altitude to 
the pilot. Piloting techniques were based on these parameters, and the 
resulting flight profiles were much like those of previous research air-
planes, such as the X-2. The flow-direction sensor was installed for 
the XLR99 powered flights, and the sole source of velocity and altitude 
information to the pilot was then from the inertial platform. It was 
believed that the reliability of these indications from the inertial 
platform had not been adequately demonstrated to allow them to be used 
as prime instruments. Therefore, engine burning time was reverted to 
as the prime reference during the powered portion of the flights with 
the XLR99 motor. 
A typical XLR99 altitude mission is shown in figure 6 The 
technique and pilot cues which have been devised to accomplish this 
mission will be examined next. Immediately after launch the pilot 
rotates to an angle of attack ~ of 10°, lights the engine, and throt-
tles immediately to 100-percent thrust. The angle-of-attack indicator 
as shown in figure 7 is the primary instrument used during this round-
out; however, a successful roundout can also be accomplished by using 
either the accelerometer or the stabilizer position indicator on the 
trim knob. The angle of attack of 100 is maintained until the desired 
exit pitch angle e of the airplane is reached (320 for the flight 
shown). This occurs approximately 28 seconds after engine start. A 
pitch null vernier on the three-axis attitude ball allows the pilot to 
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preselect the desired pitch angle and fly it precisely during the exit 
phase. The pilot then maintains a constant pitch attitude until the 
engine shutdown time is reached. 
At the extreme pitch angles required the pilot cannot see the hori-
zon and, therefore, must rely on the attitude indicator to maintain 
proper heading and to keep wings level, as well as to maintain the 
desired exit pitch angle. A stop watch has been installed in the cock-
pit which is actuated by the main propellant valves to indicate engine 
burning time to the pilot and is used to initiate the engine shutdown. 
Obviously, a constant throttle setting must be used with this technique. 
The inertial platform system indications of velocity and altitude pro-
vide additional cues to the pilot during the powered portion of the 
flight as do radar altitude and time communications from the ground. 
The engine shutdown time and exit pitch angle are the two performance 
items over which the pilot has the most effective control during powered 
flight. These two parameters are adjusted during the planning phase so 
as to attain the desired peak altitude yet still complete the entry 
within a nominal range which corresponds to one of the launch and emer-
gency lake complexes mentioned earlier. After engine shutdown the sta-
bilizer is trimmed to zero and the reaction-control system is used to 
control the vehicle over the top. The prime cues used by the pilot 
during this portion of the flight are the attitudes from the three-axis 
ball and the angle-of-attack a. and angle-of-sideslip 13 cross pointers 
which are also displayed on the same indicator. The entry conditions 
are established by trimming the stabilizer position to the desired value 
as indicated on the trim knob and then by using the reaction-control 
system to set up the desired angle of attack on the angle-of-attack 
gage. This angle of attack is maintained until the normal acceleration 
nz reaches 4.0g and the remainder of the pullup to level flight is per-formed at 4.0g with the accelerometer as the prime indicator. 
A typical speed flight is shown by the dashed curves of figure 6. 
The initial rotation and climb is performed in the same manner as the 
altitude profile. After 39 seconds of burning the pilot pushes over 
to Og and maintains Og until the shutdown time is reached. After engine 
shutdown a rudder pulse is usually performed at low angle of attack 
followed by subsequent data maneuvers at increasing angles of attack 
in order to obtain stability and control data for the complete envelope. 
The angle-of-attack indicator is usually used to establish the trim con-
ditions for these data maneuvers; however, the stabilizer-position indi-
cator can also be used. All speed buildup flights have been flown 
along the same general powered flight profile with higher peak velocities 
being obtained by-either extending the engine burning time slightly or 
extending the speed brakes prior to shutdown. This greatly simplifies 
the temperature-prediction technique since direct extrapolation of 
flight-test data is possible from one flight to the next. 
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The pressure instruments, (pressure-altitude, airspeed, and Mach 
number indicators) are used only after the airplane is subsonic to per-
form the landing pattern and the landing. 
The pilot preparation which is accomplished prior to each flight 
will now be examined. The six-degree-of-freedom analog simulator is 
used to acquaint both the pilot and the ground controller with the 
required piloting technique and general timing of the proposed flight. 
The normal flight profile is generally flown several times and changes 
suggested by the pilot are incorporated into the flight plan. After 
the pilot is familiar with the normal mission, off-design missions are 
flown to acquaint the pilot with the overall effect of variations in 
the critical control parameters. (See fig. 8.) Variations in engine 
thrust or engine shutdown time are simulated. For example, an error in 
total impulse of 120,000 lb-sec, which can result from either a 2-second 
error in burning time or a 1,500-lb error in average thrust, will result 
in a difference in peak altitude of approximately 10,000 feet. An error 
in pitch angle of 20 during the exit phase will result in a peak alti-
tude difference of approximately 12,000 feet. A reduction in angle of 
attack of 10 or 20 during the roundout increases the average dynamic 
pressure during powered flight and, therefore, reduces the overall per-
formance significantly. 
The following simulated emergency conditions are next practiced by 
the pilot: (1) engine failures, (2) inertial-platform failures, 
()) flow-direction-sensor failures, (4) radar and/or radio failures, 
(5) stability variation, and (6) stability-augmentation failures. Pre-
mature engine shutdowns are performed at the critical points in the 
flight to acquaint the pilot with the optimum technique required to 
either return to a lake behind him or to fly to an alternate lake 
ahead of him. Simulated failures of the inertial' platform presenta-
tion are practiced and alternate techniques for either completing the 
normal mission or, at least, for safely returning the vehicle and pilot 
are devised. Normally, failure of the velocity or altitude readout 
does not affect the flight; however, in the event of an attitude pres-
entation failure an immediate pushover must be initiated to a pitch 
angle of approximately 180 where the pilot again has the horizon in 
sight. Simulated flights w~th the flow-direction sensor inoperative 
are also practiced. In general, all missions can be completed without 
the angle-of-attack or sideslip indications by using normal-acceleration, 
attitudes, and stabilizer position indications; however, the pilot does 
not have as precise control of the flight conditions. Radar and com-
munications failures are also practiced to assure that the flight can 
be accomplished with only the information available in the cockpit. 
For flights into critical-stability areas, simulated missions are per-
formed wi th the stability of the analog altered to reflect the most 
pessimistic combination of errors which might exist in the predicted 
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stability derivatives. Last but not least, single- and multiple-channel 
failures of the stability-augmentation system are examined to determine 
the ground rules to be used for each flight. In most cases, a single 
failure of the pitch or yaw channel can be tolerated and the mission can 
be completed in a normal manner. Failure of the roll damper, however, 
creates a critical situation especially for high-altitude flights where 
an entry must be performed. This single item has created by far the 
most concern during the X-15 flight-test program. The controllability 
study in the previous paper by Petersen, Rediess, and Weil (paper no. 10) 
indicated that the airplane could not be controlled above an angle of I 
attack of approximately 70 with the roll damper inoperable. For any ~ 
altitude above 200,000 feet, an angle of attack greater than 70 is ~ 
required during the entry to avoid exceeding the maximum dynamic-
pressure limits of the airplane. Three possibilities have been exam-
ined for successfully accomplishing an entry with the roll, or roll and 
yaw damper inoperable. The first possibility is to jettison the lower 
vertical fin which improves the handling qualities appreciably at high 
angles of attack but at the expense of degraded handling qualities near 
zero angle of attack. The second possibility is the use of the ~ 
technique which has been discussed in the previous paper by Petersen, 
Rediess, and Weil (paper no. 10); and, although all X-15 pilots have 
mastered the technique on simulators, it is not considered a final 
answer to the problem. The third possibility is the dualization of the 
roll damper which is presently being undertaken but will take some time 
to accomplish. Pilot practice is, therefore, concentrated in the first 
two areas. The ~ technique is practiced during entries with the 
stability-augmentation system off, and entries with the lower vertical 
fin off are performed on the simulator. For flights to altitudes below 
200,000 feet, entries at an angle of attack of 70 with the stability-
augmentation system off are also practiced. 
An important pilot-training device for the landing phase of 
X-15 flights is the F-104 airplane. The use of the airplane in pre-
paring for X-15 flights has been covered in a previous paper by White, 
Robinson, and Matranga (paper no. 9). 
In addition to these preparation procedures which are performed 
prior to each and every flight, additional training procedures have also 
been used. A centrifuge program was performed in June 1958 which veri-
fied that the pilot could successfully control the airplane under the 
predicted acceleration environment. Prior to his first flight in the 
airplane, each pilot went through a ground dry run with the X-15 air-
plane mated to, or in the viCinity of, the B-52 airplane. The purpose 
of this dry run was to permit the pilot to become familiar with the 
complete prelaunch check list and cockpit procedures. Engine runs on 
the Propulsion System Test Stand at Flight Research Center were also 
performed by each pilot prior to his first X-15 airplane flight. 
Variable-stability airplanes have been used to simulate the handling 
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qualities of the X-15 airplane at various flight conditions to provide 
more realistic motion cues to the pilot. 
Although the pilot is undeniably in complete control of the flight, 
the ground monitoring station performs an important function in the sup-
port of X-15 flight operations. It is equipped with displays of the 
radar data and selected channels of telemetered data. The primary 
function of the ground-control station are shown as follows: 
(1) 
(2) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
To monitor the subsystems operation during the flight and 
advise the pilot of any discrepancies noted 
To position the B-52 airplane over the desired launch point at 
the desired time by advising the B-52 pilot of course correc-
tions and countdown time corrections prior to launch 
To time the engine operation as a backup for the onboard stop 
watch and to advise the X-15 pilot of heading corrections, 
radar altitudes, and position during the flight 
To monitor and evaluate stability and control parameters 
To monitor the pilot's physiological environment 
To provide the X-15 pilot with energy-management assistance in 
the event of a premature engine shutdown or other off-design 
condition 
To direct air search and rescue operations in the event of an 
emergency 
Normally, all important information in the control room is passed on to 
the pilot through the ground controller; however, other ground-control 
personnel have the capability to transmit directly to the pilot in the 
event of extreme emergency where insufficient time is available to 
relay the information. 
In order to supply energy-management advice to the pilot as rapidly 
as possible, some special techniques and equipment are presently being 
incorporated. The analog simulator was used to define the optimum 
piloting techniques required to obtain the maximum forward and reverse 
range from various flight conditions. These techniques are fairly well 
standardized and understood by the X-15 pilots. A small analog com-
puter has been mechanized to store the precomputed maximum range capa-
bilities as a function of forward velocity, vertical velocity, and alti-
tude. Radar values of these parameters are fed into the system and the 
resulting range footprint to a high key altitude of 20,000 feet is 
displayed on a scope-type map presentation. The ground controller can 
then tell at a glance which lakes are within the range capability at 
any particular instant. Three modes of operation are used. The normal 
mode shows the total attainable ground-area footprint which is essen-
tially a cardiOid in shape. The other two modes indicate the instan-
taneous airplane position or heading by a single dot or line. A 
simplified system by using the same basic principle but with a family 
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of curves drawn on the map instead of the scope presentation has been 
in use on all flights to the present time. 
Some flight results are examined to evaluate the planning and 
pilot training. Figures 9 and 10 show a comparison between the maximum 
altitude and maximum speed profiles as predicted and those actually 
flown with the XLRll engine. The comparison is considered rather good 
and very near optimum, especially since maximum performance for both 
flights were obtained on each pilot's first attempt and on his fourth 
flight in the X-15 airplane. Figures 11 and 12 show comparisons 
between predicted speed and altitude profiles with the XLR99 engine 
and the actual flight profiles. The overshoot in actual velocity and 
altitude flight is a result of a 2-second delay in shutting down the 
engine. It should be understood that the cockpit stop watch did not 
work on this particular flight and that at this point in the trajectory 
the airplane is accelerating at approximately 100 ft/sec2 . The pilot 
was, therefore, relying on a ground time callout to shutdown the engine 
and the resulting delay was responsible for the discrepancy. In general 
it has been found that the control of flight profile is not as precise 
with the XLR99 engine as with the XLRll engine, primarily as a result 
of the larger accelerations. After each flight a performance "match" 
is simulated on the analog computer with the actual angles of attack 
and thrust values which were experienced on the flight. Analog-computer 
matches of these two flights are also shown in figures 11 and 12. The 
overall performance of the simulator is shown to be rather close to that 
of the airplane. The only changes which have been made to the simulator 
as a result of flight-test data have been weight- and burning-time 
alterations. No alterations to the predicted performance and stability 
derivatives have been required. 
Several anticipated malfunctions, such as stability-au0ffientation 
failures, engine failures, stop-watch malfunctions, inertial-system 
malfunctions, and radar and radio malfunctions have occurred during 
the test program thus far. The anticipated controllability problems 
have also been verified in flight. The value of the analog simulator 
in defining techniques and training the pilots to allow completion of 
the missions under these adverse conditions is undeniable. 
Several unexpected incidents have also occurred during the program 
which have justified the decision to perform an incremental-performance 
envelope expansion program. On the maximum speed flight with the 
XLRll engine at a Mach number of 3.3, the cockpit seal was burned 
slightly due to the canopy lifting and allowing hot stagnation air to 
reach the rubber seal. On the first flight with the XLR99 engine to a 
Mach number of 4.2, side-panel buckling was encountered as a result of 
differential heating. Wing leading-edge skin buckling was also encoun-
tered as a result of local aerodynamic heating at Mach numbers on the 
order of 5.0. A poor aerodynamic seal around the nose gear door 
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resulted in some minor internal damage due to aerodynamic heating at a 
Mach number of 5.3. A severe airplane vibration induced by the 
stability-augmentation system was experienced on an interim altitude 
flight at a Mach number of 3.8. Since all of these items were dis-
covered on lower velocity flights under less critical conditions, they 
have been corrected without significantly affecting the test program. 
Any of the incidents listed could have resulted in major damage to the 
airplane if maximum speed or altitude had been attempted on the first 
flight and could possibly have resulted in loss of the airplane. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In conclusion, the expansion of the X-15 flight envelope is being 
performed according to the planned program. All predictions of sta-
bility, performance, and flight trajectories have been within expected 
accuracies. Controllability problems predicted by analog simulator 
data were verified in flight. General piloting techniques developed 
on the analog simulator have proven to be satisfactory in flight. 
Ground-control functions have proven to be of value in assisting the 
~52 and X-15 pilots. Pilot-training procedures have proven to be 
adequate for a program of this type. The use of the analog simulator 
to establish pilot cues and timing and allow the pilot to practice 
until the techniques become routine has considerably eased the total 
piloting task, thereby improving his ability to obtain more precise 
flight data in the time available. Predictable emergency conditions 
or off-design missions have been encountered during the program, and 
in each case simulator training has contributed greatly to the pilots' 
ability to complete the mission. ~ne two most valuable training 
devices have been the fixed-base six-degree-of-freedom analog simulator 
and the F-I04 in-flight landing pattern simulator. Other training 
devices, such as the centrifuge and variable stability airplane, have 
contributed to the overall pilot experience level, but are not con-
sidered necessary for continuous use on a flight-by-flight basis. 
Unexpected problems, primarily in the area of aerodynamic heating, 
have also been encountered; however, neither pilot nor flight vehicle 
safety has been compromised due to the incremental performance philos-
ophy of envelope expansion testing. 
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SUMMARY 
This paper describes the basic damper system currently installed in 
the X-15, discusses some of the problems encountered during its develop-
ment and flight testing, and reviews briefly the system reliability. 
INTRODUCTION 
The proposed performance goals of the X-15 research vehicle made it 
obvious in the early stages of its development that stability augmenta-
tion would be required. In figure 1 the flight envelope of the X-15 is 
compared with that of a typical century series aircraft. Dampers were 
necessary in these military aircraft and it was clear from the estimated 
speed and altitude that the X-15 would have similar requirements. It 
was also believed that any system installed to augment the stability 
should emphasize simplicity and reliability. For these reasons a simple 
three-axis damper system was proposed which would not include multiple 
sensors, complicated automatic gain scheduling, or sophisticated auto-
matic control modes. 
This paper describes the basic damper system currently installed in 
the X-15, discusses same of the problems encountered during its develop-
ment and flight testing, and reviews briefly the system reliability. 
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SYSTEM CONFIGURATION 
A i'unctional diagram of the stability augmentation system (SAS) 
built by Westinghouse is shown in figure 2. The essential components 
of the pitch, roll, and yaw channels of the system are indicated as 
gyros, cockpit gain selectors, electronics, and servos. The outputs of 
the servos go to their respective control surfaces. Unique features of 
the system are cockpit gain selection and the inner connection required 
for operation of the left-hand and right-hand horizontaJ stabilizers, 
which provide both pitch and roll damper input. Also shown is a yaw 
rate input to the roll axis. This interconnection is necessary for 
stability at high angles of attack primarily due to the high roll input 
of the lower rudder. The gain-selector settings of 8, 6, 8, indicated 
for pitch, roll, and yaw, respectively, are the normal settings. 
Positive control of failures is emphasized by providing complete 
fail safety. Figure 3 shows a schematic diagram of the yaw axis moni-
toring arrangement "Which is typical of the pitch and roll channels also. 
A complete duplication from gyro pick-off to servo input is provided in 
a working channel and a monitor channel. Thi s arrangement allows a con-
tinuous comparison of system performance in the two channels. Automatic 
shutoff of the affected channel with rapid servo centering is accom-
plished "When a lO-percent variation exists between the working and 
monitoring channels. Because of the high dynamic performance of the 
servo cylinder, it was not necessary to duplicate its dynamics in the 
monitor channel. A simple, constant gain, aUXiliary SAS is being fabri-
cated for the X-15, "Which will serve as a backup in the event of a 
failure of the primary stability augmentation system. 
RELIABILITY 
Information concerning the failures experienced thus far with the 
stability augmentation system is shown in figure 4. The number of 
accumulated failures is plotted against the total number of hours during 
which the systems have been functioning, both on the ground and in the 
air. There is also a scale showing the total number of flights 
including aborted flights. The lower scale is necessarily nonlinear 
because, for example, more ground hours per flight were put on the 
systems in preparation for the earlier flights than for the later 
flights. The top curve includes all failures accrued during both ground 
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and flight operation and should be used primarily as logistics informa-
tion. Note that the failure rate, given by the slope, has greatly dimin-
ished. The breakdown given by the bar graph on the right shows the 
module failures to be the largest single source of system failures. 
Next is ship's wiring, with miscellaneous other failures accounting for 
the remainder of the total. 
The lower curve represents only the failures 'Which have occurred in 
flight, "in flight" being defined as the time from take-off of the B-52 
to landing of the X-15 or X-15/B-52 combination in case of an abort. 
The in-flight failures breakdown is shown also on a bar graph at the 
right of the figure. These failures resulted from the malfunction of 
one electronic module, three instances of broken ship's wiring, and three 
malfunctioning gain switches. Of these 7, 6 were traceable to human 
error and were damaged on the ground but did not result in failures until 
airborne. Considering only the electronic module failure in 78 flights, 
and no in-flight failures in the last 13 flights, it can be said with 
confidence that SAS has proven to be reliable. 
LIMIT CYCLES 
Some of the development problems are now considered. In the first 
studies using the X-15 flight simulator, unwanted limit cycles or con-
tinuous OSCillations, sustained by SAS, were observed. The limit cycles 
were caused by hysteresis and rate limiting 'Which produce considerable 
phase lag. The phenomenon was later observed in flight though at first 
it was not noticed by the pilots. An illustration of the magnitude of 
the limit cycle is shown in figure 5. The peak-to-peak amplitude of the 
limit cycle is plotted against the roll control power 'Which is propor-
tional to both dynamic pressure and aileron control effectiveness. The 
roll damper gain is 0.3 deg/deg/sec or a setting of 6. The circles 
denote the early flight data. Shown as squares are limit cycles measured 
on the ground by using an analog computer to close the aerodynamic loop 
around the X-15 airplane. The solid line gives the calculated limit-
cycle characteristics. These calculations were made by using a mathe-
matical model of the nonlinear actuator Which included hysteresis, dead 
ba~d, and rate limiting. Notice the extreme increase in the limit-
cycle amplitude predicted at large values of control power. A flight 
was made to verify these limit-cycle characteristics at large values of 
this roll-control parameter. Figure 6 shows a time history of roll rate 
and aileron deflection during the severe roll limit cycle. The fre-
quency of this limit cycle was about 3.2 cps and the amplitude was about 
10 total change in bank angle. This was considered by the pilot to be 
quite objectionable which is due in part to the motion of the control 
stick caused by surface rate limiting. Notice that the amplitude of this 
limit cycle was not constant but changed due to control input and a 
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tendency to beat. Figure 7 shows again a comparison of the limit-cycle 
characteristics obtained in flight and those calculated, the data of the 
special flight having been added. Although the critical value of L6a 
appears to be somewhat higher than that calculated, a drastic increase 
in bank-angle amplitude would result if the control power were allowed 
to increase much further. 
As a means of reducing the limit cycles to an acceptable amplitude, 
the SAS electronic filter was modified, with the result in the limit-
cycle characteristics shown in figure 8. The reduced lag of the modi-
fied filter greatly reduced the amplitudes of the limit cycles so that 
the problem was essentially eliminated. The most extreme values of con-
trol power did not give objectionable limit cycles. 
Although the discussion of the limit cycles thus far has been con-
cerned with roll, the limit cycles also exist at some flight conditions 
in pitch and yaw as well, but to a lesser degree. The limit cycles in 
pitch and yaw occur at frequencies closely related to the natural fre-
quency of the airplane and do not have the critical nature of the roll 
limit cycles. 
VIBRATION 
Although the modified filter greatly improved the problem with 
limit cycles of 1 to 3 cps in roll, a new problem arose. It became 
apparent during tests on the ground that it was possible to excite and 
sustain a system-airplane vibration at 13 cps with the modified filter. 
A breadboard of the modified filter was flown at high damper gains, but 
the pilot failed to excite the vibration. After touchdown, however, 
during the rollout, a severe vibration was encountered and SAS had to be 
turned off. This experience led to the belief that the vibration would 
only occur on the ground. To prevent recurrence on the ground, a switch 
which automatically lowered the gain to a safe level when the landing 
gear was extended was incorporated in the airplane. Five flights later 
the sense of security engendered was shaken, literally. Figure 9 shows 
a portion of a time history during reentry from a 170,OOO-foot-altitude 
mission. It is obvious that a 13-cps vibration is present in all traces 
- left and right SAS links, left and right surface deflections, and roll 
rate. The pilot reported the vibration to be the most severe that he 
had ever encountered or ever wants to. The shaking was triggered by 
pilot inputs at low dynamic pressure (130 Ib/sq ft) and continued until 
the SAS gain was reduced slightly and dynamic pressure had climbed to 
1,000 Ib / sq ft. Fortunately, the amplitude of the shaking was limited 
by rate limiting of the control-surface actuators. An analysis of the 
problem was conducted to find an explanation for this behavior. 
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Figure 10 illustrates the mechanics of the phenomenon. The lightly 
damped horizontal stabilizer surfaces, here represented by the flexible 
beams with masses, were excited at their natural frequency (13 cps) by 
the pilot inputs to the control system. The inertial reaction of the 
fuselage to this vibration was picked up by the gyro, so that the SAS 
was able to sustain the vibration with inputs to the control surfaces. 
Because of the closed-loop nature of the problem, restrictions in 
the allowable gain exist at the structural frequencies as is shown in 
figure 11. Presented is system gain as a function of frequency for 
three filters, all at a SAS gain setting of 6. If the curves intersect 
these boundaries which represent restrictions in gain at the structural 
frequencies of the horizontal tail at 13 cps and 30 cps, then a suffi-
cient condition exists for a sustained oscillation. The modified filter 
used during the previously discussed altitude flight intersects the 
first boundary; a vibration, therefore, would be expected at 13 cps. 
The original filter presently in use is shown to be free of the 13-cps 
vibration but produces unacceptable limit-cycle characteristics at 
critical flight conditions. One way to avoid both problems is to use a 
notch filter. This filter was designed to give a minimum phase lag at 
limit-cycle frequencies and a maximum of filtering at the surface 
resonant frequencies. 
An additional fix is a pressure feedback valve for the surface 
actuator, which would augment the structural damping of the horizontal 
surfaces. Referring again to figure 11, the use of the pressure feed-
back valves would lift the restrictions in gain to values outside the 
range of gain for SAS. Pressure feedback valves would allow further 
improvement of the limit-cycle characteristics because of the reduced 
phase lag associated with removing the notch filter. Both the notch 
filter and pressure-feedback valve are currently being developed for 
use in the X-15. 
SAS EFFECTIVENESS 
A few words pertinent to the effectiveness of SAS are in order. 
Other contributors to this conference have indicated the need for and 
the large improvement in lateral-directional handling qualities produced 
by SASe Figure 12 illustrates the adequacy of the damping of the 
unaugmented and augmented X-15 airplane in pitch. The coordinates are 
velocity and altitude, and the solid lines indicate the boundaries of 
the flight envelope of the X-15 airplane. In this lower region, the 
pitch damping of the unaugmented airplane is acceptable, less than one 
cycle being required to damp to half amplitude (s ~ 0.1). The augmented 
airplane has as much damping over the entire aerodynamic region. In the 
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ballistic region aerodynamic control becomes ineffective and the use of 
reaction controls is required. To provide damping in this region a 
reaction augmentation system or BAS has been designed and is to be 
installed in the airplane. This system uses the reaction control 
rockets to provide damping about all three axes. Although the airplane 
can be and has been flown by the pilot without augmentation in the 
ballistic region, BAS is expected to improve greatly the control charac-
teristics of the airplane. More important, it will provide a good 
backup damping system for SAS during the setup for the reentry portion 
of high-altitude flights. 
A more advanced flight-control system has been developed for evalu-
ation in the X-15 airplane. This system is discussed in the paper by 
Johannes, Armstrong, and Hays (paper no. 13 of this conference). 
CONCLUSIONS 
The design objectives of a simple reliable stability augmentation 
system have been achieved. The reliability of the electronic components 
in flight has been good and approaches the design objective. Limit-
cycle problems predicted on the simulator have been verified in flight. 
A vibration problem not anticipated was encountered in flight with a 
modified shaping and was traceable to structural SAS interaction. Two 
acceptable means of eliminating these problems have been developed for 
incorporation into the X-15 airplane. In short, the overall experience 
with this system has been favorable and the improved vehicle character-
istics available with SAS have enabled the pilots to investigate with 
confidence many areas which without stability augmentation would be 
uncontrollable. 
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13. DEVELOPMENT OF X-15 SELF-ADAPTIVE FLIGHT-CONTROL SYSTEM ( 'J) 
By Robert P. Johannes N 71 : 75456; 7 
Aeronautical Systems Division, U.S. Air Force 
Neil A. Armstrong 
Flight Research Center 
and Thomas C. Hays 
Aeronautical Systems Division, U.S. Air Force 
In-house studies conducted at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in 
1956 convinced the Flight Control Laboratory, Aeronautical Systems 
Division, of the theoretical feasibility of designing a self-adaptive 
flight-control system. As the name implies, such a system would auto-
matically adapt itself in order to provide essentially constant damping 
and frequency of the aircraft in combination with the control system as 
the vehicle encountered flight conditions of varying aerodynamic control-
surface effectiveness. Conventional flight-control systems adjust their 
gains as functions of measured and computed air data; however, these 
functions require extensive flight test to perfect, have to be reestab-
lished for even minor aircraft configuration changes, and result in 
complex and unreliable systems. Since future vehicles will require 
high reliability as well as satisfactory operation on the first flight 
and will be operating where adequate air data will probably not be 
available, a new approach to flight-control-system design was definitely 
needed. To this end a number of study contracts were awarded in 1957 
which soon led to flight-test programs testing adaptive concepts in F-94 
airplanes by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Minneapolis-
Honeywell Regulator Company. Minneapolis-Honeywell continued this effort 
with a company funded flight-test program for testing the system in an 
F-lOlA airplane. 
By 1958 the Flight Control Laboratory was convinced of the potential 
of self-adaptive techniques; however, the flight profiles of the airplanes 
used to test the techniques were so limited that the full capabilities of 
the systems could not be evaluated. In order to demonstrate I"u.lJ.y the 
capabilities of an adaptive system in a true aerospace environment, a 
program was initiated which would result in flight demonstrations in the 
X-15 airplane. The X-15 was selected both as the first such vehicle to 
be available and also as one which would constitute a severe test due to 
its range and rate of change of such parameters as natural frequency, 
damping, and surface effectiveness. 
Although the primary purpose of the program was to test a self-
adaptive technique in a true aerospace environment, it was decided to 
include in the system certain features which had come to be recognized 
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as important by-products of the self-adaptive concept. These features 
include dual redundancy provisions fer reliability, integration of 
reaction and aerodynamic controls, rate command control, and simple 
outer-loop hold modes in attitude and angle of attack. Early in 1959 
competition proposals were evaluated by the Flight Control Laboratory 
and the NASA, and as a result the contract was awarded to Minneapolis-
Honeywell Regulator Company in June 1959. The MH-96 flight-control 
system was flown in prototype form in an F-10lA at Minneapolis and in 
the X-15 simulator both at North American Aviation, Inc., and the NASA 
Flight Research Center; the system is currently installed in the X-15 
airplane number 3. The system is expected to be flown in that aircraft 
this year. 
An indication of the scope of the system is illustrated in figure 1. 
Some of the devices were not supplied under the contract but are standard 
X-15 items which are part of the overall flight-control system. These 
include the q-ball, which supplied angle of attack, and the stable plat-
form, which is used for attitude reference. The heart of the system is 
the adaptive controller, which contains the electronic modules. Two 
separate rate gyro packages are shown; each contains three rate gyros. 
In this system basic damping augmentation is provided by attitude rate 
feedback in all three axes. 
In order to provide a common basis for discussion, consider briefly 
the basic prinCiples of the system operation (fig. 2). Commands are 
introduced to the actuators through conventional mechanical inputs and 
simultaneous electrical inputs proportional to stick displacement which 
are inserted in the pitch and roll channels. The electrical input to 
each axis is shaped by a simple network which has the dynamic response 
that is desired of the aircraft in that axis. In the X-15 airplane these 
networks (called models) are first-order lags with time constants of 
1/2 second in pitch and 1/3 second in roll. Unfortunately, a single 
desirable invariant response is very elusive, since pilot opinion varies 
among pilots, and desirable characteristics for reentry are different 
from those for landing. Some consideration was given to a variable model 
but such a model has not been incorporated at this time. 
If sufficient lead is added and the gain is increased enough, the 
remainder of the loop will have a transfer function which approaches 
"one." When this condition is reached, the response of the aircraft will 
be that of the model. This is the principle of operation of the MH-96. 
The gain is automatically increased until the system begins to oscillate 
at the verge of instability. The gain changer shown in figure 2 operates 
by monitoring the limit-cycle amplitude and adjusting the gain to main-
tain constant amplitude. The limit-cycle frequency is determined by the 
lead compensation and must be higher than the aircraft natural frequency 
but lower than the lowest aircraft structural frequency. On the X-15 
airplane the limit-cycle frequency is approximately 4 cps. Variation in 
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normal yaw-rate gain Kr and associated rudder activity or is shown 
in figure 3. A tendency for the amplitude limit cycle to increase 
results in a gain reduction, whereas loss of the limit cycle initiates 
a gain increase. This characteristic gave rise to a problem which was 
noted during early simulator tests when a rapid decrease in controller 
gain was required by the rapid buildup of surface effectiveness during 
entries. Delays in the gain reduction, partly caused by the hysteresis 
in the control linkages, resulted in temporary oscillations as high as 
30 , peak to peak, at the servo. Modification of the gain computer 
characteristics has improved the situation, but the problem has not been 
completely eliminated. There is a possibility, however, that this prob-
lem will be of no consequence during flight, since this same behavior 
was noted on the F-10l when it was used as a ground Simulator, but during 
flight, air turbulence acted to prevent delays in gain reduction. 
Another related problem on the X-15 simulator was servo motion 
reflected back to the stick. This reflection occurred because the servQ 
velocity capability exceeded that of the actuator, so that feedback to 
the stick occurred and caused oscillations and stick kicks, which were 
particularly severe at the entry condition previously mentioned. In 
order to prevent these motions from closing the loop by putting additional 
inputs to the servos, electrical deadbands were placed in the control 
sticks and the servos were orificed to limit their velocity. Although 
this modification reduced the problem of reflected motion in the stick to 
a great extent, a related problem must be tolerated. In the X-15 airplane, 
it is possible for the servo velocity to exceed that of the actuator and 
thereby to allow the actuator to move at its rate limit. If this is the 
case, the surface is no longer producing the response requested by the 
servo, and the aircraft is unable to maintain the commanded rate (fig. 4). 
The symbols used in figure 4 are defined as follows: 
O¢ control stick deflection in roll axis 
p rolling velocity 
oaL left-aileron deflection 
¢ roll angle 
/3 sideslip angle 
In the small roll step on the left of figure 4, vehicle response follows 
the model very well. In the large roll step, rate limiting occurs as 
evidenced by the slope of the surface position trace, and the response 
deviation from the model is significant. These deviations are reflected 
also in the coupled axes as evidenced by the large sideslip excursion. 
In some critical areas this excursion could result in loss of control. 
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This loss is characteristic of high-gain systems in areas of marginal 
controllability, however, and is best avoided by refraining from abrupt 
control inputs in such areas. 
As was stated in paper no. 12 by Taylor and Merrick, it was found 
that an electronic filter was required in the SAS (stability augmentation 
system) to avoid exciting the lightly damped first bending mode of the 
horizontal stabilizer in flight. It became apparent that a notch filter 
would also be required to prevent a similar occurrence with the adaptive 
flight-control system. A breadboard notch was made on the basis of tests • 
using the BAS and was tested on the X-15 simulator by using strain gages ~ 
on the beams representing the horizontal stabilizers to provide a feed-
back similar to that on the airplane. Subsequent tests with the actual 
airplane made it plain that modes of higher frequency also needed to be 
filtered. The filtering requirements had now become so great that the 
associated phase lag at about 3 cps became a major concern. Insignificant 
limit-cycle oscillations had now become intolerable in all three axes. It 
is believed that significant progress toward the solution of this problem 
has been attained by the use of a higher-order filter and by reducing the 
minimum gains; however, activity in this area is continuing. 
A control problem exists whenever motions about one axis couple into 
another. One solution involves the addition of cross control circuitry. 
Such an interconnect in the MH-96 commands a roll input proportional to 
yaw rate to combat the unfavorable effects of a high negative dihedral 
reported in paper no. 10 by Petersen, Rediess, and Weil. The inverse 
of this interconnect has been studied on the simulator to reduce the 
yaw-due-to-roll input with favorable results, but this installation has 
not yet been made in the X-15 airplane system. 
Rate-command control is a feature of the system which has become 
controversial, particularly in the pitch axis. Rate command is achieved 
at the expense of the vehicle's affinity for a fixed angle of attack and 
dynandc pressure, thereby retracting a number of conventional flying 
qualities. Conventional X-15 trajectories are seldom, if ever, flown 
where pitch rate is maintained at a constant value and pitch rate is 
therefore a particularly vexing parameter to handle. The use of constant 
attitude (pitch rate = 0) or pitch-rate program entries is suggested and 
is currently being studied. In addition, trajectories may be flown by 
using the automatic-pilot assist modes and CSS (control stick steering), 
which are incorporated in the system. 
Rate-command trim is an obvious companion to rate-command control 
and is used in this system. However, this type of trim is considered by 
some to leave something to be desired. Inasmuch as the servo authority 
in pitch is only about half the full surface authority from any trim 
position, automatic trim augments the servo authority by energizing the 
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trim actuator any time the servo is displaced more than 20 from center 
so that the servo is permitted to return to center. This technique, 
which is installed primarily to provide satisfactory outer-loop opera-
tion, permits nearly full servo authority for damping and full surface 
authority for control but invites undesirable cycling. Trim rate has 
been reduced to minimize cycling in the low dynamic-pressure regions. 
This disconcerting phenomenon still exists throughout the envelope, 
however, as is shown in figure 5. 
An angle-of-attack ramp is shown with the servo and surface cycling 
due to trim follow-up. In addition, the control-linkage movement asso-
ciated with trim follow-up causes cockpit stick movement resulting in 
occasional inadvertent pilot inputs. 
In the development of the MH-96, Minneapolis-Honeywell has made con-
siderable advances toward solving the problem of automatic aerodynamic 
and reaction control blending. In its present farm, the system will 
allow operation of the vehicle throughout the complete mission with 
either the right-hand or center stick. The present left-hand stick is 
retained so that the reaction controls may also be fired manually if 
desired. 
The self-adaptive system provides a simple controls blending tech-
nique (fig. 6). The symbols used in figure 6 are defined as follows: 
h altitude 
Kq pitCh-rate gain 
. qRC pitcr~ng acceleration due to reaction control 
~ horizontal-tail angle 
q dynamic pressure 
When the gains in all three axes reach 80 percent of maximum, the 
reaction-control channel is activated. The solenoid valves, which are 
actuated by electrical commands from the pilot, will not, however, fire 
until needed; a deadspot upstream allows the aerodynamic controls to be 
used to the fullest extent to maintain constant response until the pure 
ballistic condition is approached; then, the thrust limitations of the 
reaction jets cause a slower response. Even here, however, the rate 
feedback will provide damping and rate-command operation. On entry, 
when the gains have fallen to 60 percent of maximum, the reaction-control 
channel is deactivated. The lower percentage was selected because simu-
lator experience showed that occasional servo activity in the ballistic 
regime could lower the gain and thereby deactivate the reaction controls. 
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A significant control-system feature is the redundancy configura-
tion selected to provide the generally incompatible objectives of 
reliability and fail safety (fig. 7). Extremely high reliability is a 
requirement because of the low probability of a successful entry from 
high altitude without augmentation. Fail safety is equally important 
since a large transient introduced in a high dynamic-pressure region 
would result in destruction of the vehicle. Completely dual damper 
channels, where either or both channels may control the axis, are pro-
vided. The adaptive feature of the circuitry permits one channel to be 
lost with little or no loss in system performance, since the remaining 
gain changer will attempt to provide the additional gain required for 
limit-cycle appearance. The gain computers are interlocked, when 
operative, to prevent overcritical gain follOwing a limit-cycle circuit 
failure and to provide the desired limiting effect for hard-over failures. 
In the case of model or variable-gain amplifier failure, conventional 
monitor circuits which disengage both channels were required. This 
problem combined with the desire of NASA for increased system flexibility 
led to the addition of parallel fixed gain channels with fail-safe passive 
circuitry. Since these channels operate simultaneously with the adaptive 
channels to avoid the reliability and transient penalties of switching, 
they effectively limit the minimum gain for adaptive operation. These 
gains must be suffiCiently high for satisfactory emergency performance 
throughout the envelope but must be below critical in the high dynamic-
pressure regions. A successful compromise has not been entirely 
achieved, and the expected flight envelope has been somewhat reduced. 
Reliability models indicate a damper mean time between failures (MTBF) 
of 360 hours and a system MTBF of 200 hours. The basic limitation is the 
servos which have no duality. This compares with a stability augmenta-
tion system MTBF of 100 hours. It is interesting to note that the 
adaptive electronics have a predicted MTBF of 100,000 hours. 
The flight-test program is planned so that the MH-96 flight-control 
system can be demonstrated throughout the X-15 flight envelope and 
accepted in the shortest possible time consistent with flight safety. A 
comparison of the handling qualities using the MH-96 flight-control sys-
tem will be made with the handling qualities using the fixed gain of the 
stability augmentation system, wherever possible. The evaluation will 
use many of the same maneuvers performed earlier with the basic control 
system, including SASe Conditions of primary interest will be: high 
dynamic pressure for limit-cycle characteristics, low dynamic pressure 
for reaction-control operation, and rapidly changing dynamic pressure 
for gain-changer operation. The program plans are illustrated in fig-
ure 8, where the flight sequence is indicated by the circled numbers. 
The first two flights are planned to evaluate the basic adaptive inner 
loop and fixed gain operation at moderate dynamic pressures. Outer 
loops and limiting functions will also be investigated. The third flight 
to high speed and high dynamic pressure will investigate high angle-of-
attack stability. Flight 4 is planned to investigate the low dynamic-
pressure region including reaction-control operation. The next flight 
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objective is the completion of two similar high-performance flights 
(5 and 6) to 250,000 feet with all portions of the flight-control system 
operative. Satisfactory system performance on these flights will com-
plete the contractual requirements. The detailed flight research pro-
gram will be conducted so as to provide comparisons with other control 
system concepts and to permit determination of the actual value of such 
concepts as variant response, rate command, and blended controls. Since 
the system theoretically maintains aircraft controllability to higher 
angles of attack than does SAS, flight verification is certainly an 
early objective, since the possibility of extending the altitude capa-
bility of the airplane is thereby introduced. 
Although the flight-control system is "self-adaptive," and much 
speculation and some claims have been made about learning machines and 
self-designing control systems, the system installed in the X-15 by no 
means developed itself. Although the present self-adaptive technique 
obviates the need of air data for gain adjustment, it does not eliminate 
the requirement during design of the system for accurate knowledge of 
the vehicle sensors, control linkages, structural flexibility, and 
aerodynamic parameters. In general, however, the self-adaptive feature 
makes this control system much less sensitive to these factors than con-
ventional systems. The high gain of the system, however, and the 
requirement for making some performance measurement for self-adaptation 
cause problems of their own, particularly When combined with peculiar-
ities, such as linkage slop, of the X-15 airplane. 
Although the self-adaptive system is a considerable advancement and 
is being directly applied with minor changes to Dyna-Soar, it is obvious 
that it is not the last word. This type of system has definite limita-
tions in the amount and type of variation of dynamics it can control, 
and it still requires a knowledge of the form of the system equations 
and of the approximate numerical value of system coefficients. 
In general, future effort will be directed toward providing methods 
of design and techniques of control which will permit the designer to 
build a better control system with less knowledge of the vehicle under 
control. This is not to say that the designer will not use all avail-
able inform~tion (or even that all applications require an adaptive 
system): but it is an attempt to provide systems less dependent on 
a priori knowledge for successful operation. 
In summary, a self-adaptive flight control system is now ready to 
be flight tested in the X-15, an aircraft whose range of stability, 
damping, and surface effectiveness will provide a fair challenge to the 
adaptive concept. A number of problems have been uncovered during the 
development phase, some of Which may be attributed to tailoring the 
system to the eccentricities of the X-15. These problems, in general, 
result in degraded system performance due to inherent system constraints 
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rather than component failure. The reliability analyses appear favorable 
but remain to be verified. The forthcoming flight program. will provide 
a substantial contribution to evaluation of the adaptive concept. 
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14. FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS OF X-15 HYPERSONIC 
FWW-DlRECTION SENSOR [' Ll ) 
By William D. Mace 
NASA Langley Research Center 
and Jon L. Ball 
NASA Flight Researqh Center 
INTRODUCTION 
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i 
The expansion of the X-15 powered flight regime beyond Mach numbers 
of about 3 has required the installation of a specially designed sensor 
to measure the angles of attack and sideslip. The vane-type sensor 
commonly used for this purpose is not suitable because of the high 
temperatures and low pressures encountered by the airplane. Generally 
speaking, these measurements are required to aid the pilot in the con-
duct of the flight, particularly during reentry, and also to provide 
the basic flight data necessary for research purposes. 
Based on the conceptual design work done by the NASA, a contract 
was awarded to the Nortronics Division of the Northrop Aircraft Corpo-
ration for the detail design and construction of a prototype and several 
operational sensors. The characteristics of the prototype model were 
described at the July 1958 conference on the X-15 airplane. The purpose 
of this paper is to discuss the experience that has been obtained through 
the use of this sensor during flight testing of the airplane. 
SYMBQW 
normal-force coefficient 
M Mach number 
specific pressures 
PT total pitot pressure 
T temperature 
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angle of attack 
sideslip angle 
flight-path angle 
e pitch attitude angle 
angular position behind stagnation point 
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The high-temperature flow-direction sensor installed on the nose 
of the X-15 with the afterboqy cover removed is shown in figure 1. The 
physical size of the instrument is about l~ inches long, with a ball 
diameter of ~ inches, and a base diameter of l~ inches. The unit 
weighs about 78 pounds. The internal temperature of the sensor is con-
trolled through the use of liquid nitrogen. The coils through which 
the coolant circulates are visible in the photograph. 
In operation, the sensor is a null-seeking hydraulically actuated, 
electronically controlled servomechanism. A block diagram of the 
mechanization scheme employed for control of the sphere is shown as 
figure 2. Two identical servos are used for independent control in 
each axis. The servo for only one axis is shown in this figure. The 
differential pressure between opposing orifices is measured, and the 
unbalance signal is fed through amplifiers to the hydraulic actuator; 
this actuator then positions the sphere to balance this differential 
pressure. The sphere position then is a direct indication of the 
angle of attack. A synchro transmitter is used to detect the position 
o~ the sphere with respect to the airframe, and this signal is fed 
through an isolation amplifier to the onboard indicating and recording 
instruments and also to the telemetry link. 
Since the qynamic pressure can vary from about 1 pound per square 
foot to 2,500 pounds per square foot, compensation is required in the 
servo loop to maintain stability and accuracy. This compensation is 
provided by measuring the pressure difference between the total-
pressure port and one of the angle-sensing ports; the resulting signal 
is used to adjust the gain in the sphere-positioning servo loop. 
The operating characteristics of the sensor are as follows: Range 
from -100 to 400 in angle of attack, 120b in sideslip, and an accuracy 
based on ground tests within ±o.25°. The unit is capable of continuous 
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operation at a skin temperature of 1,2000 F. The response of the system 
is essentially flat to about 6 cycles per second, with a maximum velocity 
limit of about 850 per second. 
Since the first sensor was delivered in December 1960, one of them 
has been installed on each of the 22 flight attempts. Early flights 
and ground tests indicated several modifications to be desirable to 
increase the reliability of the instrument. Among these have been the 
installation of improved, more reliable liquid nitrogen valves, modifi-
cation of the actuator design to eliminate fluid seepage through a static 
seal, and the addition of a flow-limiting orifice in the liquid nitrogen 
line. 
A summary of the flight test experience is as follows: There have 
been 15 drops in 22 attempts with the sensor mounted on the aircraft. 
Sensor operation has been completely satisfactory on 11 of these drops. 
On three flights, unwanted oscillations occurred; however, usable data 
were obtained. These oscillations were caused by feedback from the 
synchro recorders used initially. Installation of the servo recorders 
originally intended for this purpose has eliminated this trouble area. 
And finally, there has been one case in which the sensor response was 
very poor in one axis. This incident occurred only once during one of 
the early flights and, as yet, the cause has not been determined. The 
flight test envelope encompassed by these flights has been discussed in 
previous papers in this conference. 
Figure 3 is representative of the time history of thermocouples 
located on the sphere. The cooling system provided to maintain the 
interior temperature at 1200 F has not been required on any of the 
flights to date. The cooling system has cycled, however, but this was 
a supply-line cooling cycle that maintains liquid nitrogen at the 
sensor. Maximum temperature measured to date is about 1,1000 F. 
Now that the flight data have been obtained, the question logically 
arises, "How good is it?" Since ground facilities with which to test 
full-scale sensors in the flight environment were not available, other 
methods of assessing its operating characteristics must be relied on. 
These characteristics may be inferred by examining the spread in 
parameters, such as normal-force coefficient, that have been computed 
by using in-flight data. (See fig. 4.) This figure presents a com-
parison between the values of CNA as obtained from vane boom data 
and ball nose data. Wind-tunnel test results are represented by the 
solid line. These flight data are a compilation of these values as ~~ 
computed for the same flight conditions for several flights. The 
spread in the sensor data is less than 1/40 and is in very good agree-
ment with wind-tunnel data at the f'our Mach numbers shown. 
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In the 1958 conference on the X-15 airplane, a figure was presented 
that gave the anticipated accuracy of the sensor for dynamic pressures 
ranging from 1 pound per square foot to 2,500 pounds per square foot. 
(See fig. 5.) This plot was based on analytical work as well as on 
tunnel tests on the prototype sensor. In this figure flight data have 
been superimposed on this plot in the low-dynamic-pressure region. 
These flight data provide a comparison of the angle of attack as meas-
ured by the sensor with the angle of attack as computed by using pitch 
attitude obtained from the inertial platform and the flight-path angle 
as derived from radar information. On this basis the maximum difference 
is less than 3/40 at a dynamic pressure of 3.5 pounds per square foot. 
Since the delivery of five sensors to the NASA Flight Research 
Center, it is estimated that the equivalent of the full time of one 
man has been required to maintain and use them. Much of this time has 
been spent in becoming familiar with the unit. Frequent disassembly 
and inspection operations have been accomplished to ferret out poten-
tially weak areas and to build confidence in its reliability. 
Since the completion of the design effort on this device, some 
attention has been given to the feasibility of incorporating some modi-
fications with the view of increasing the versatility of the system. 
For example, the pressure distributions around the sphere have been 
examined analytically and to some extent experimentally to determine 
whether stream static pressure could be derived from measurements of 
the sphere surface pressures. This work indicates that this approach 
is feasible provided suitable transducers are obtainable. 
These studies are by no means complete and further work in this 
area, particularly in the tunnel testing phase, is anticipated. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In conclusion then, the flow-direction sensor developed for the 
X-15 program has been flight tested and has met the design objectives. 
Although there are some refinements required to optimize the deSign, 
for example, increasing the stability margin in the servo to reduce or 
eliminate limit cycle effects, they are considered to be of a rela-
tively minor nature and do not compromise the sensor operation. Addi-
tional work is being done with the view of increasing both the relia-
bility and the versatility of the instrument. 
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15. FLIGHT EXPERIENCE WITH X-15 INERTIAL DATA SYSTEM (J) 
By Jay V. Christensen 
NASA Ames Research Center N-. 7'" 1 _~ 
754~8' and John A. Dodgen v 
NASA Langley Resegrch Center 
INTRODUCTION 
The X-15 inertial data system was described in some detail in a 
paper by M. L. Lipscomb and J. A. Dodgen presented at the July 1958 
Conference on the X-15 airplane. The primary reasons for selecting the 
inertial data system were discussed in that paper. It will be of value 
to review the system and the more important experience obtained in using 
the inertial data system in the X-15 program. Areas that are reviewed 
include those of system modification, alinement experience, reliability, 
confidence determination, and flight performance. 
DISCUSSION 
The inertial data system was selected to provide the operational 
and research measurements shown in table I. The accuracies selected 
represent a compromise between the data desired, the X-15 weight and 
size restrictions, and the inertial state of the art of the time. The 
measurements required for pilot displays are the attitudes, height, 
total velocity, and vertical velocity. 
Within 300 seconds after launch, pressure instruments are adequate 
for vehicle height- and velocity-control data. This is a short amount 
of time compared with the hour or more that may be required in reaching 
the launch point. An all-inertial operation from take-off to touchdown 
would have required a system too heavy and large to be practical for 
the X-15 operation. An inertial data system with radar damped, in-
flight alinement techniques was selected to provide a capability of 
300 seconds of velocity and height data and 20 minutes of attitude data. 
This approach allowed both performance and equipment weight and size 
to meet the X-15 requirements and was within the state of the art. 
Figure 1 shows the integrated system. The inertial data system is 
basically an earth-slaved, Schuler-tuned, system alined in azimuth to 
an equivalent guidance equator which is coincident with the radar-range 
center line of the X-15 airplane. Attitudes, velocities, and height are 
presented to the pilot with reference to this coordinate system. Major 
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X-15 components include the stabilizer, computer, and pilot's displays. 
The stabilizer utilizes three self-balancing accelerometers and three 
single-degree-of-freedom gyroscopes. A four-gimbal system provides 
complete attitude freedom in all axes. A direct-current analog computer 
is used for computing velocity and position data and the necessary 
acceleration corrections. An AN/APN-81 Doppler radar is used as a 
horizontal velocity reference for alinement to the vertical during 
carried flight. An N-l compass is used during the straight and level 
portions of the carried flight for the heading reference. An NASA pres-
sure instrument is used for the vertical-velocity reference. Position 
data for confidence checks and initial conditions are obtained from 
ground radar and a B-52 pressure altimeter. The control panel provides 
mode control and system performance monitoring and also processes refer-
ence information for use in the computer. The selection of this type 
of inertial system was a joint NASA-U.S. Air Force effort and resulted 
in a contract with Sperry Gyroscope Co. in June 1957 to build the all-
attitude flight data system portion, which included the stabilized ref-
erence package, the computer, the pilot's velocity and position read 
outs, and the B-52 control panel. 
Experience has shown that the initial conditions obtained during 
the in-flight alinement have to be accurate to the design tolerances 
shown in table II if the required flight-data accuracy is to be obtained. 
Also, it is quite evident that the flight-data accuracy is not only a 
function of the X-15 component accuracy and reliability, but it is 
directly dependent on the accuracy and reliability of the carrier-airplane 
reference system. The reference-system accuracy not only depends 
on component design and maintenance, but it is a direct function of the 
dynamics of the flight profile. Because of the dynamic response of the 
reference system, it is difficult to maintain the accuracy during climbs 
and turns. The launch pattern requires a turning climb with a 1800 turn 
just prior to launch. The reduction of adverse effects resulting from 
this profile required considerable flight experience in developing ade-
quate procedures and control techniques. The effort required in solving 
this problem has been greater and more important than was originally 
antiCipated. 
The operational development of the system will now be discussed. 
To date a number of engineering modifications have been made to the 
basic flight data system; however, many of these modifications have 
been minor and the total effort in this area is reasonable considering 
the complexity of the equipment. The two hardware modification areas 
that are discussed are those desired for component improvement and 
those desired to allow changes in operational and alinement techniques. 
In order to provide a more comfortable thermal safety factor in 
the stabilizer, all critical germanium transistor amplifiers were 
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changed to silicon. A gyroscope failure at NASA Flight Research center 
originally required a stabilizer turn-around at the contractor's facility 
that would take the unit off flight status for 3 to 6 weeks. In order 
to insure availability of flight-status units at Flight Research Center, 
a gyroscope of better quality was substituted. In addition, Flight 
Research Center has developed a complete repair capability including 
gyroscope changes. The reference-velocity resolving circuit in the 
B-52 control panel was modified to minimize alinement errors resulting 
from transient errors in the heading reference. The velocity indicators 
were modified to provide a better thermal safety margin with respect to 
summer operating temperatures. 
The more important hardware modifications required by changes in 
operational and alinement techniques are as follows: (1) cooling capa-
bility for ground and taxiing operations, (2) logic circuit for turn-on 
protection, (3) simulated Doppler velocity reference, (4) slaving time-
constant change, (5) ground gyro calibration, (6) ground heading refer-
ence, and (7) independent control of alinement loops. 
Because cooling for ground and taxi operations was not available, 
the B-52 airplanes had to be modified to provide this capability. With-
out cooling and consequently without ground alinement, qualitative eval-
uation of system performance was not possible during the first 9 months 
of flight operations. 
Originally, inadvertent power application during ground operation 
could result in seriously damaged units as a result of the ensuing 
stabilizer tumble and system operation without cooling. A logic cir-
cuit was installed and has provided very valuable system protection. 
As a result of Doppler reliability problems in the X-15 program, 
it was necessary to provide a simulated reference veloCity for in-flight 
alinement in case the Doppler failed. This modification has proved to 
be a very valuable one. When this simulated reference was used, it 
provided inertial attitudes in every case and in some cases the velOCity 
and height data have also been usable. 
Because of transients and dynamics in the reference systems during 
carried flight, the time constants of the alinement loops were changed 
and gyro calibration during flight was discontinued in favor of ground 
gyro calibration prior to taxi. Flight operation is now conducted with 
the ground-derived calibrations. 
The N-l compass system proved inadequate as a heading reference 
during ground operation because of errors induced by moving ground 
equipment and fluctuating electrical loads. Ground heading alinement 
is now determined by using surveying techniques and is set into the 
system by using an adjustable synchro reference. The investigations, 
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modifications, and flight checking of modifications had to be carried 
out on active research flights. Deviations from standard procedures to 
help isolate inertial-system problems have not been possible. In order 
to help isolate system-integration problems, an inertial flight-test 
program utilizing one of the carrier airplanes was initiated in January 
of 1961. This program substitutes a pod containing the flight data 
system instead of the X-15 airplane under the pylon of the B-52 airplane. 
This allowed use of the actual equipment and wiring in the test program. 
This program is seroiactive and has provided worthwhile systems experience. 
The original concept was to control all alinement loops simultane-
ously. Flight experience showed that this concept was not optimum. The 
basic problem was the transient errors introduced in the reference sys-
tems by the B-52 flight profile. These errors resulted in certain peri-
ods during which the flight data system was more accurate than the ref-
erence systems. Modifications now allow independent automatic and manual 
control of each alinement loop. A significant increase in system per-
formance has resulted. 
Figure 2 shows a direct comparison between inertial velocity data 
and radar data which were taken from the nineteenth flight of the num-
ber 2 X-15 airplane. 
Figure 3 illustrates a time history of the mean total velocity dif-
ference between the two measurement systems, and was obtained from five 
flights since July 1961. The smoothed radar data over the X-15 profile 
have an uncertainty figure of about 75 ft/sec. The inertial data 
recording technique has an estimated uncertainty of 60 ft/sec. The 
total root-mean-square measurement uncertainty, shown by the dashed line, 
is approximately 90 ft/sec. Most of the points fall below the uncer-
tainty level and indicate performance approaching the deSign specifica-
tion of 70 ft/sec. This accuracy is well within the X-15 control 
requirement. 
Figure 4 shows a direct comparison of inertial-height data with 
radar data and was taken from the nineteenth flight of the number 2 X-15 
Figure 5 is a time history of the mean height difference between the 
two measurement systems. The data were obtained from five flights since 
July 1961. The smoothed radar data over the X-15 profile has an uncer-
tainty figure of 1,500 feet. The inertial data measurement technique 
has an estimated uncertainty of 1,600 feet. The total root-mean-square 
measurement uncertainty, shown by the dashed line, is approximately 
2,200 feet. These data indicate performance which is approaching design 
specifications and is adequate for aircraft control. 
The height divergence which is a characteristic of the vertical 
loop in all pure inertial systems can be observed in figure 4. The 
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divergent characteristic of a height-measuring loop in a pure inertial 
system will be a limiting factor in advanced vehicle applications. 
Table III summarizes the complete inertial data system experience 
since March and July of 1961. The evaluation criterion used is the 
following: Did the pilot have inertial data presented to him which 
were adequate for vehicle control? The inertial velocity and height 
data reflect component and reference system reliability problems, as 
well as poor initial conditions resulting from operational problems. 
As an example, the inertial height percentage of 64 represents 4 non-
specification flights out of 11, which were the results of an indicator 
failure, a Doppler radar failure, a stabilizer failure, and one bad 
flight resulting from initial conditions being out of design specifi-
cation at the launch point. The velocity percentage of 73 reflects an 
indicator failure and the same Doppler radar and stabilizer failure 
just mentioned. 
On the six flights since July 1961, the system has demonstrated 
control quality measurement capability and has very closely approached 
the design specifications as well. This is illustrated by the second 
column of percentages. These percentages reflect a continuing improve-
ment in accuracy and reliability as operating, calibrating, and main-
tenance procedures are refined and unreliable items are eliminated. 
Table IV illustrates component reliability since March 1961. The 
major components listed were classified as having a malfunction if any 
subcomponent failed in flight in such a manner as to be detected by 
even minor system performance degradation. Personnel experience and 
quality control improvements have been the most important factors in 
improving component reliability. 
The important problem of establishing confidence in the system 
prior to launch and during actual flight will now be considered. At 
the present time, the inertial attitudes have to be usable or the launch 
is cancelled. Also, the inertial velocity and height are so desirable 
that an evaluation of the accuracy of these parameters must be made 
prior to launch. To provide the pilot with this information is a neces-
sity and is the objective of a series of confidence checks. During 
carried flight these checks require a close monitor of system outputs 
in terms of velocity, position, and attitude. For example, inertial 
total velocity is compared with the B-52 Doppler velocity, inertial 
height with pressure altitude, and the inertial positions with ground 
radar positions. 
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The final attitude evaluation is left to the pilot. If the velocity 
and position checks confirm that system operation is good, the attitude 
reference will be accurate to within minutes of arc, but the pilot still 
checks to establish confidence and confirm the indicator operation. 
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After launch the ground controller transmits velocity and height infor-
mation from ground radar read outs, and the X-15 pilot cross-checks the 
inertial indicators to obtain an estimate of system performance in 
terms of the accuracy and the rate of error propagation. Using these 
confidence checks, the pilots have demonstrated that they can correctly 
evaluate the quality of the inertial data. 
The problem of evaluating the condition of an inertial system before 
and during actual flight and determining what data can safely be 
used for vehicle control is one that is not only important to the X-15 
program, but one that will become increasingly important in manned space-
vehicle operation. To provide procedures and read outs that will give 
the pilot confidence in the inertial data is an important part of this 
problem. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In conclUSion, the flight data system can provide the vehicle-
control data for which it was intended, dependent upon the reliabilities 
of the reference and data systems. The accuracies required from the 
in-flight alinement appear to be about the best that can be obtained 
with reasonable operating requirements and procedures. Operational 
experience with the integrated system has been very important because 
the more important modifications and techniques were not developed until 
considerable experience was obtained with the complete system. 
The X-15 airplane needs an inertial system to furnish control data 
as the flight-test envelope continues to expand. It may later be able 
to make a contribution to the inertial technology by serving as a test-
bed for the development of inertial systems for more advanced research 
vehicles. This potential is presently being investigated. The X-15 
airplane is but the first of a number of manned vehicles that will use 
inertial equipment to fulfill control and guidance requirements. 
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TABLE I. - MEASUREMENT SPECIFICATIONS 
[Time duration: 300 second~ 
Measurements Accuracy, 
required Range rms 
Attitude angles, deg . 
· · 
Unlimited 0·5 
Height, ft aO-500,000 5,000 
Velocity: 
Total, ft/sec . . . 
· · 
a±7,000 70 
Down range, ft/sec • 
· · 
a±7,000 50 
Cross range, ft/sec 
· · 
a±3,000 50 
Vertical, ft/sec • • 
· · 
a±5,000 20 
aRequired for pilot displays. 
TABLE II.- INITIAL-CONDITION REQUIREMENTS 
Accuracy Reference 
Height 250 ft Pressure altimeter 
Range velocity 10 ft/sec Doppler radar 
Cross-range velocity 10 ft/sec Doppler radar 
Vertical velocity 2 ft/sec NASA pressure rate of climb 
Azimuth 1/2 deg N:..l compass 
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TABLE III.- INERTIAL FLIGHT-DATA EXPERIENCE 
Acceptable Acceptable 
Initial flight-data flight-data 
measurements percentages percentages 
since March, since July, 
11 flights 6 flights 
Attitude 100 100 
Inertial speed 73 100 
Inertial height 64 83 
TABLE IV. - FLIGHT EXPERIENCE - INERTIAL COMPONENTS RELIABILITY 
Component Reliability percentage, 11 flights since March 1961 
-
Attitude indicator 100 
N-1 compass 100 
Vertical velocity reference 100 
Precision power 100 
Cage control 100 
Computer 100 
Wiring 100 
Total velocity indicator 91 
Height indicator 91 
Control panel 91 
Stabilizer 91 
Doppler radar 82 
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16. XLR99 ENGINE OPERATING EXPERIENCE (J) 
By Richard G. Ieiby N 71 · ~ 
Air Force Flight Test Center .. ,5 45..9 
Donald R. Bellman, and Norman E. DeMar 
NASA Flight Research Center 
INTRODUCTION 
The XLR99-RM-l rocket engine, which was developed specifically for 
the X-15 airplane, is the largest rocket engine designed from the outset 
for use in a manned vehicle to be completely controlled by the crew. In 
order to provide the desired safety and controllability required by the 
X-15 mission, many unique features were included in the design. Delays 
in the development of the engine required that the initial X-15 flights 
be made with an interim engine.~ However, the first flight with the 
XLR99 was made in November 1960, and the engine has been used in govern-
ment flight operations since February 1961. Since the first flight, 
fifteen flights have been made with the XLR99. This paper summarizes 
the XLR99 operating experience during the flight program. 
GENERAL DESCRIPrION 
The procurement specification of the XLR99 presented a number of 
special requirements listed as follows: Minimum hazard, variable 
thrust, multiple restart, prelaunch idle, and long life. These require-
ments are beyond those heretofore normally expected of a rocket engine. 
They resulted in additional complexity but also provide the engine its 
unique capabilities. In defining "minimum hazard," the single malfunc-
tion concept was employed. The XLR99 was designed so that, under any 
single condition of malfunction, the engine would create no hazard to 
the airplane. This safety concept was demonstrated analytically by 
malfunction analysis and empirically through 47 malfunction tests 
during the Preliminary Flight Rating Test (PFRT). 
The XLR99 provides variable thrust over a continuous range from 
50 percent to 100 percent of rated thrust and is capable of more than 
five restarts without servicing. The turbopump and both igniter stages 
are operated as an idle mode before launch, so that an operational check 
of over 90 percent of the engine's components is provided prior to 
commitment of the X-15 to free flight. 
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Of particular interest to the X-15 program is the requirement of 
long life. The engine life requirement is compared in figure 1 with 
that for missile engines. In its application as an aircraft engine, 
the XLR99 was required to accumulate one hour of operation or 100 starts 
without overhaul, far beyond normal rocket engine life. Note that a 
logarithmic scale is used. The top shaded area indicates the spread in 
engine life that is actually being encountered. The design requirement 
is shown by the point. Data on the present engine are as follows: 
Propellants 
Engine - liquid oxygen and ammonia 
Pump - 90 percent hydrogen peroxide 
Dry weight - 910 pounds 
Specific impulse 
Sea level - 230 seconds 
45,000 ft - 265 seconds 
Rated thrust 
Sea level - 50,000 pounds 
45,000 ft - 57,000 pounds 
Expansion ratio (area) - 9.8 
Rated chamber pressure - 600 psia 
Altitude - all altitudes 
Attitude - all attitudes 
The altitude values of thrust and specific impulse are the more signif-
icant since in the research flights the entire period of engine opera-
tion takes place at and above this altitude. Engine starts have been 
demonstrated in the altitude facility of the Arnold Engineering 
Development Center at altitudes up to 70,000 feet; however, the engine 
has been designed to operate at any altitude. In regard to attitude, 
engine operation has been demonstrated at 900 climb, 300 dive, and 450 
left and right roll. The engine is shown in figure 2. A 6-percent 
increase in thrust and efficiency could be achieved through addition 
of a nozzle extension to expand the gases to an altitude equivalent 
pressure of 45,000 feet rather than the present 19,000 feet equivalent 
pressure. However, such a change would result in a significant weight 
increase with concomitant center-of-gravity effects. 
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TESTING BACKGROUND 
The first complete, flight engine configuration was fired in 
February 1958, and the Preliminary Flight Rating Test was completed in 
January 1960. During this program more than 500 minutes of engine 
operation and over 640 starts were accumulated on 14 engines, utilizing 
three test stands at the Reaction Motors Division, Thiokol Chemical 
Corp. The Edwards Propulsion System Test Stand (PSTS), (fig. 3), began 
operations with the XLR99 in June 1959. This test facility consists of 
a complete X-15 propulsion system and provides a capability for engine 
checkout, pilot and maintenance crew familiarization, and limited 
development firings. Tb date, over 300 firings have been made in the 
PSTS. As final confirmation of flight readiness, ground runs in the 
X-15 at the PSTS facility permit an integrated systems checkout . 
. -
PERFORMANCE ACHIEVED 
The XLR99 is now operating successfully in the X-15. However, 
delays in the development program schedule resulted in a decision in 
September 1958 to freeze the design with a reduced performance require-
ment rather than to accept further delays in excess of those which could 
be compensated for by the interim XLRll propulsion system. Table I 
shows the resulting specification changes. In addition to the reduc-
tion in specific impulse, it will be noted that weight has increased 
significantly and throttle range has been reduced. Development tests 
are scheduled for early December 1961 to return the minimum thrust 
point to the 19,500-pound level. 
There is a statistical variation in performance from engine to 
engine and test to test. Figure 4 is a plot of thrust-chamber data 
from four engines during PFRT and is in consonance with the performance 
of flight engines. The present specification specific impulse is 
superimposed upon these points. 
As a part of the P£RT program, two engines were required to accu-
mulate one hour of operation and 100 starts. The requirement was 
exceeded. The two engines accumulated 64 and 65 minutes, 100 and 
137 starts, respectively. Unfortunately, this performance has not 
continued in field operations. Figure 5 depicts engine service life 
at Edwards Air Force Base (EAFB). Listed here are all nine flight 
engines and a ground test engine; Engine serial No. 105 was destroyed 
in the explosion of X-15 No. 3 on June 8, 1960. The arrows indicate 
thrust-chamber replacement. Early in the flight program, operations 
were plagued by several premature chamber failures. These involved 
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failure of cooling tube walls and consequent leakage of fuel into the 
combustion chamber. This problem is discussed in detail in the paper 
by Hjelm and Bornhorst (paper no. 17). In addition to the premature 
failures, three flight engine thrust chamber-injector assemblies have 
been removed for other reasons. Although in these cases the chambers 
are not lost to the program, the engines have become inactive pending 
chamber reinstallation or replacement, seriously impairing the spares 
capability. 
Figure 6 is a plot of throttle actuator position and chamber pres-
sure. Although extremely rapid response is not required by the mission, 
chamber pressure follows the throttle closely. It might be noted that 
the thrust chamber pressure lags the throttle position by 0.2 to 
0.6 seconds. 
Figure 7 is interesting as an indication of the times involved in 
recovery from a malfunction shutdown after launch. These data are 
taken from a flight made by Major Robert W. White in April 1961 in 
which a malfunction shutdown occurred almost immediately after launch. 
Shown are throttle position, fuel-pump pressure, and chamber pressure 
plotted against time. The igniter Idle switch was actuated approxi-
mately 20 seconds before launch and pump discharge is up. The fire 
switch was actuated 1.3 seconds after drop and the throttle was 
advanced. Pump discharge and chamber pressures were rising when mal-
function shutdown occurred. Restart must be delayed to completion of 
the purge and engine reprime. The fire switch was actuated at 
21.9 seconds. When the pilot saw the pump. pressure rise he advanced 
the throttle. It is interesting to note that the throttle motion was 
stopped as the pilot checked his chamber pressure as he neared the 
desired thrust level and the two pressure traces clearly reflect this 
event. The sequence from launch involved approximately 30 seconds and 
an altitude loss of 8,000 feet as against a good start drop of about 
2,000 feet. 
FIELD PROBLEM AREAS 
Although PFRT was completed successfully, field operations differ 
from test-stand conditions, and the PFRT experience did not carry over 
to operations at Edwards. The problem areas which have become prominent 
are as follows: Vibration, premature chamber failures, pump seal leaks, 
corrosion, compatibility, and controls. 
The most pernicious problem encountered has been the 1,600 cps 
vibration. A typical trace of the accelerations at one of the engine 
mounting points is shown in figure 8. The initial accelerations are 
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low and build up. If the vibration does not exceed 100g at the pickup 
location, damping occurs. Between 100 and 200g, either damping or 
divergence can result. Above 200g, divergence always occurs. Therefore, 
a vibration cutoff was installed to shut down the engine in event of 
vibration levels above 120g. Inasmuch as there is the possibility of 
damping in this range, the cutoff includes a 50-millisecond delay to 
permit this damping and avoid unnecessary shutdowns. The mechanics of 
this phenomenon have not been determined; however, the incidence rate 
is known to increase in the higher performing engines and is also 
aggravated by operation at mixture ratios below design. The incidence 
rate has been contained within 2 to 4 percent of start attempts through 
installation of vibration isolators and a quick-change orifice device 
which permits operations at proper mixture ratios at all times. An 
interesting facet of this phenomenon is discussed subsequently with 
regard to compatibility. The vibration situation has not directly 
delayed flight operations, but is the major contributor to the malfunc-
tion shutdown rate during ground operations. A vibration shutdown has 
not yet occurred in flight. 
The premature failure of thrust chambers has produced a direct 
effect upon engine availability for flight. This problem is discussed 
in detail in the paper by Hjelm and Bornhorst (paper no. 17). 
The pump seal leak involved O-ring deterioration at the pump-fuel 
casing joint. However, replacement requires removal of the turbine 
exhaust duct, stator blades, rotor and inlet housing. Thus, O-ring 
replacement requires 2 to 3 shifts. Just to remove the exhaust ducts 
necessitates removal and re-safety wiring of 60 bolts. Thus, although 
the O-ring failure, which results in a steam leak, is not of major sig-
nificance in itself, repair requires removal of the engine from the 
aircraft, and time-consuming engine disassembly, directly contributing 
to flight delays. The deterioration is believed to be due to the longer 
pump runs utilized in field operations; turbine-case temperatures in the 
vicinity of the O-ring have been recorded as high as 6000 F. An inves-
tigation is under way for an improved seal which will withstand higher 
temperatures. In the interim, pump ground runs are being reduced in 
duration in an effort to minimize deterioration of the present seals. 
Corrosion appears to be largely a result of the unusually long 
engine life. With a few exceptions, materials used are those reported 
to be compatible with the propellants. There have been some instances 
of galvanic action between the magnesium pump case and steel parts with 
decomposed peroxide as an electrolyte. As is sometimes said, the only 
thing really compatible with peroxide is more peroxide. 
The necessity for component compatibility is not a new idea. In 
the XLR99 engine, the major component-compatibility requirement has been 
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met; that is, the components work together properly. However, the 
"vernier" mismatch of individual components still occurs. For example, 
minor speed control difficulties have been corrected by matching of 
governor and turbopump. This component match is illustrated again by 
the vibration problem. During initial checkout of engines serial num-
ber 108 and 111 on the PSTS, excessive vibration-incidence rate was 
observed. The igniter in the engine (serial number lo8) was replaced 
and the vibration incidence rate was reduced within acceptable limits. 
The igniter removed from the engine serial number 108 was then installed 
in another (serial number 111) and its incidence rate reduced within 
acceptable limits. Compatibility is not particularly a problem but does 
produce the usual puzzling inconsistencies. 
The difficulties in the control area are primarily in the hydraulic 
governor system. The servicing procedure is somewhat complicated and 
often difficult; production tolerances result in metering-valve binding, 
and the peroxide and hydraulic oil produce some corrosion. The most 
surprising occurrence was a siege of problems due to governor housing 
porosity; however, this problem has been resolved by an epoxy impregna-
tion of the castings. 
There are also random failures of pressure switches, relays, etc. 
These are not unexpected nor is the failure rate high; however, they 
require removal of the control box with resultant delay. 
It might be noted that the premature chamber failures and pump 
seal leaks have contributed directly to flight delays. The problems 
of corrosion, compatibility, and control are usually corrected at the 
PSTS and rarely affect flight engines. 
FLIGHT EXPERIENCE 
Perhaps this discussion of the problem areas and specification 
deviations has presented an overly dreary picture of the XLR99 engine. 
In spite of these troubles and in spite of these delays, the engine 
has performed well in flight and the aircraft has approached its design 
speed. The mission experiences of the X-15 with the XLR99-RM-l engine 
is indicated in the following tabulation: 
Launches Successful Engine abort Malfunction 
prior to launch with restart 
15 15 1 3 
~ 
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The table shows that the X-15 has been launched 15 times with the 
XLR99 aboard and in each case successful engine operation has been 
achieved. On three occasions malfunction shutdowns occurred in flight, 
but each time the first restart attempt was successful and no compromise 
to the mission resulted. It should be borne in mind that the XLR99 has 
been designed to shutdown in event of malfunction. Unlike its predeces-
sors, no explosion, fire, or other hazardous condition has occurred in 
flight. None of the emergency landing areas have been used. On one 
mission only, the engine failed to operate just prior to launch and the 
flight was aborted; but this was just one among many such aborts from 
other causes. (Even this lapse demonstrated the advantage of the pre-
launch idle mode.) 
FUTURE APPLICATIONS 
Other than the previously mentioned increase in range of throttle-
ability, there is no active program at the present time for the advance-
ment of the XLR99 rocket engine. There have been several proposals for 
increasing the performance of the X-15 airplane through injector rede-
sign, addition of a nozzle extension, and conversion to the more dense 
storable propellants. Several firings have been made with present pump 
and chamber assembly with the nitrogen tetroxide-mixed hydrazine propel-
lants. The engine has also been proposed for Dyna-Soar air launch tests. 
However, for the X-15, the research gains must be weighed carefully 
against the additional development cost and the time extension required 
to accomplish the changes. 
Regardless of these proposals it is believed that the XLR99 engine 
has demonstrated valuable new concepts in the application of rocket 
power to manned vehicles. The most significant of these is the "man-
rating" concept evolved. The XLR99 does not depend passively upon 
reliability for pilot safety. An active approach, designed to react to 
malfUnctions, which do occur, was applied. For the X-15, where safety 
takes precedence, this reaction is a shutdown for those cases where the 
malfunction could result in a hazardous condition. (Nonhazardous mal-
fUnctions do not produce a shutdown.) It is recognized that all manned 
rocket-powered vehicles cannot use the shutdown for protection. How-
ever, the principle evolved (extremely detailed malfunction analysis, 
idle modes, continuous igniter operation, selected redundancy) can 
serve to prevent catastrophic malfunction results and allow time for 
some alternate action on the part of the crew. The concepts demon-
strated in the X-15/XLR99 system deserve close study. Their adaptation 
to other aerospace vehicles will enhance operational safety and thus, 
mission success. 
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TABLE 1. - XLR99-RM-l DEVELOPMENT SPECIFICATION CHANGES 
Initial 
proposal Spec. 9lF Spec. 9lM 
Feb. '26 June '')8 March '61 
Maximum thrust (45,000 ft), lb 57,000 57,000 57,000 
Minimum thrust (45,000 ft), lb 19,500 19,500 31,500 
Specific impulse (sea level), sec 241 238 230 
Specific impulse (45,000 ft), sec 278 272 265 
Engine weight (dry), lb 540 856 910 
Engine weight (wet) , lb 625 990 1,025 
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Figure 3 
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17. DEVELOPMENT OF IMPROVED CERAMIC COATTII"GS TO INCREASE 
THE LIFE OF XLR99 THRUST CHAMBEF{ U ') 
By Lawrence N. Hjelm 
Aeronautical Systems Division, U.S. Air Force 
and Bernard R. Bornhorst 
Air Force Flight Test Center 
ABSTRACT 
This report describes the coating development, laboratory testing, 
and engine testing program that was performed to solve the problem of 
premature failure of rocket-engine combustion chambers being experienced 
in operation of the X-15 system. 
BACKGROUND 
The XLR99 engine which powers the X-15 airplane, shown in figure 1 
as viewed from the rear of the vehicle, is a liquid oxygen, anhydrous 
ammonia, regeneratively cooled engine. The combustion chamber or nozzle, 
shown with its characteristic star pattern, is a brazed assembly of 
347 stainless steel tubes, formed to shape, through which the anhydrous 
ammonia flows longitudinally as a coolant. Figure 2 is a photograph of 
this section shOwing its construction. The interior surface of the 
chamber is coated to provide insulation and protection for the tubes fro~ 
the 5,0000 F flame. This coating is generally made up of 0.005 inch of a 
Nichrome flame-sprayed undercoat with 0.010 inch of Rokide Z flame-
sprayed zirconia as an insulating, erosion-resistant top coating. 
In service, the Rokide Z coating bas been spalling or flaking due 
to thermal cycling from the large number of engine starts required or 
from vibration due to an unstable flame. The history of chamber failures 
is included as table I. The loss of the coating exposes the stainless 
steel tubes to the heat and erosive effects of the flame. As this 
exposure occurs, the ammonia within the tubes is overheated locally and 
boils so that the cooling of the tubes is reduced. The ammonia vapors 
then attack the tube, and a very brittle nitrided layer is formed. At 
the same time, the combustion gases begin to melt and erode the tube 
surface. As this condition persists, the effective thickness of the 
tube wall is gradually decreased until it finally bursts from cyclic 
internal pressurization. This situation occurs in the throat of the 
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nozzle and produces a chamber failure with raw fuel leaking into the cham-
ber from the cracked tube. This process is illustrated in figures 3 and 4. 
APPROACH 
In January 1961, Materials Central of the Aeronautical Systems 
Division (ASD) in cooperation with the X-15 Project Office of ASD 
initiated a study to determine the chamber failure mechanisms and to 
outline an approach to improve chamber durability. A program to 
improve the coatings system was developed since the primary cause of 
failure is loss of the coating. The two possible approaches were to 
improve the Rokide coating or to develop an improved coating system. 
Since it was believed that improvements in the Rokide Z coating system 
would be small and perhaps marginal, the emphasis was placed on the 
development of a new coating system. At that time, a program with the 
Plasmakote Corporationl already underway to exploit the concept of gra-
dated coatings was oriented to solve this specific problem. 
A gradated coating is a sprayed coating of metal and ceramic in 
which the composition changes from 100 percent metal at the substrate to 
100 percent ceramic at the surface. In this way the weak, sensitive 
interface between the metal and ceramic layers is removed as illustrated 
in figure 5. These coatings were produced by spraying mixed powders with 
an arc-plasma jet and gradually changing the composition by changing the 
ratio of metal to ceramic powders. Most of the coatings investigated 
were basically combinations of zirconia with Nichrome, molybdenum, and 
tungsten. An existing program with the University of Dayton2 was 
oriented to provide realistic techniques for laboratory evaluation for 
the coatings being developed. Several tests were developed to screen 
for the most promising coatings. A thermal shock test used 3- by 8-inch 
plate sections of actual chambers which had been coated with the 
desired compositions. The ends of this plate were potted in plastic as 
shown in figure 6 and water was run through the tubes as a coolant. The 
plate was then cycled ten times at each of nine levels of gradually 
increasing heat flux produced by the 1/2 inch flame of a nitrogen stabi-
lized, 50 kilowatt arc-plasma jet (3,0000 F - 8,6000 F). The test in 
operation is shown in figure 7. Four to six tests were run on each 
panel and the results were recorded as the number of cycles to fail the 
coating. Single, 1/2-inch-diameter tubes were also coated and tested in 
a manner similar to the panel tests. Although these tests turned out to 
be much less severe than the panel test, these tubes were also used to 
obtain the relative insulating effect of the coatings by using the tube 
as a calorimeter and measuring the heat transferred through the coating. 
lContract AF 33(616)7323. 
2Contract AF 33(616)7838. 
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RESULTS OF LAOORATORY EVALUATION 
Most of the initial studies were concerned with two gradated coating 
systems, as described in table II. A great number of additional systems 
have been evaluated to determine trends or potential of new systems; how-
ever, art insufficient number of tests were run to consider the results 
statistically significant. 
It should be noted that the only difference between the two gradated 
coatings is the primer used over the stainless steel tubes. The thermal 
shock-test results, in which the two gradated coatings were compared with 
Rokide Z, are illustrated in figure 8 as the number of cycles to failure. 
The extreme spread in life of the Rokide Z system and the high con-
centration of early failures agreed with engine experience and perhaps 
indicates nonuniformity in the coating itself. Coating A appears to 
offer some improvement in life. This can be thought of as an improvement 
due to coating technique since the materials are the same. However, with 
coating B a significant improvement is obtained. There were no failures 
below 43 cycles. This improvement over coating A can only be due to the 
use of molybdenum as a primer which apparently results in a more adherent, 
shock-resistant coating. 
These same test results are plotted in figure 9 to indicate proba-
bility of failure at any given number of cycles. 
ENGINE TEST PROGRAM 
An engine test program was undertaken to evaluate the most promising 
coatings under actual engine operating conditions. Coating B, which con-
sists of a molybdenum primer with Nichrome gradated to zirconia, was 
chosen for the first test. 
A mock-up of the combustion chamber illustrated in figure 10 was 
used to detel~ne deposition rates for the spraying process so that the 
desired coating thickness could be obtained on the actual hardware. The 
mock-up was constructed of aluminum with panels cut from an old chamber 
inserted at three positions. This assembly is coated in the same manner 
as an engine and chamber, and coating thicknesses were measured. The 
coating thicknesses on the smooth surface are compared with those on the 
corrugated panels. Proper spraying parameters can then be determined 
for coating a combustion chamber. 
A special fixture was built at NASA Flight Research Center for 
coating a fully assembled engine. This fixture and the coating operation 
on the first test engine are shown in figure 11. This figure shows the 
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engine mounted in rings so that it can be rotated. Figure 12 is a rear 
view of this operation. 
The fixture rotates the engine at various speeds and programs the 
arc spray gun in and out of the engine from a pantograph arrangement. 
This procedure allows control of engine rotation and gun position neces-
sary to provide a uniform coating deposit. 
The chamber available for the first engine test had failed pre-
viously and had one cracked tube, which was welded over. As can be seen 
from the previously mentioned photomicrographs of failed tubes (figs. 3 
and 4), producing a sound, reliable weld in these areas is very difficult 
because of heavily nitrided layers on the internal cracks. 
The gradated coating system applied was chemically similar to the 
original Rokide Z in that its surface was zirconia backed up by Nichrome. 
It was therefore assumed that interaction between the coating and combus-
tion products would be similar. In normal operation of this engine, 
12 "hot streaks" occur longitudinally through the engine, producing the 
star pattern mentioned previously. Characteristically, these hot 
streaks have a White, chalk like surface Which may be due to thermal 
shock of the zirconia particles or hydrogen reduction of the surface 
with subsequent reoxidation. Several "top coats" of various materials 
were applied in two circumferential strips just aft of the throat. 
These were used to determine if the exhaust gases were locally oxidizing 
and if a more erosion resistant material than zirconia could be used in 
the engine. These strips consisted of overcoats of tantalum carbide, 
titanium carbide, titanium nitride, zirconia with lO-percent molybdenum, 
and zirconia with one percent nickel. Figure 13 is a photograph of the 
coated chamber, as viewed from the exi~ cone, showing these test strips. 
Prior to the testing of the gradated coating system, a used chamber 
with a new Rokide Z coating was tested in an old engine to provide 
directly comparable coating life data. The firing procedure designed 
for coating evaluation is included in table III. The test data from 
firing this engine are included in table IV. Loss of the Rokide Z 
coating in the throat was visible after the second run and progressed 
until after the seventh start and a total running time of about ~minutes. 
2 
A total of 25 square inches of coating was lost during the test. This 
progression is illustrated in figures 14 to 16. 
The gradated coating was then tested in a similar manner to produce 
comparable results. The te&t data from the firing of the gradated coating 
system are included in table V. As was mentioned previously, this chamber 
had been leaking and the cracked tubes were welded. After the second run 
two leaks were evident with no coating loss. Subsequent runs produced 
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some coating loss around previously leaking areas but none in nonleaking 
throat areas. After six starts and a total or ~ minutes, 3 square inches 
or coating were lost rrom the leaking areas, slight erosion was evident in 
nonleaking areas, and chipping or coating surrace was evidenced upstream 
or the throat. This progression can be seen in rigures l7 and l8. Due 
to dirriculties, the tests on this engine were stopped. 
Figure 19 shows this engine arter the test series and illustrates 
the blackening or the coating that was initiated during the rirst run. 
This blackening appeared to be Nichrome "bleed through, II since the 
coating was round to be electrically conductive along its surrace. Fig-
ure 19 also shows that one top coat, the titanium nitride, did protect 
the zirconia surrace by stopping the chalking action. 
A metallographic study was made of sections or this chamber to deter-
mine the efrectiveness or the top coats and whether there was metal bleed 
through in the coating. Figure 20 illustrates the character or the origi-
nal two-layer Rokide Z coating rrom an old engine. Figure 2l is a section 
rrom the throat or the test engine showing the molybdenum primer and 
Nichrome gradated to a zirconia surrace. The top coat or zirconia appears 
somewhat thin but there is no evidence or metal bleed through. Figure 22 
shows the gradated systems with a top coat or zirconia and lO-percent 
molybdenum used to determine whether molybdenum would oxidize or react in 
this environment. There is no evidence or attack indicated and the system 
appears compatible. 
Figure 23 shows the gradated system with the titanium nitride top 
coat which appeared to orrer some protection ror the zirconia. It can be 
seen rrom these photomicrographs that the zirconia had turned black, 
including areas under the top coats, with no evidence or metal bleed 
through. It is known, however, that zirconia is easily reduced by hydro-
gen which causes it to turn black. Moreover, zirconia will dissolve up 
to l-percent chromium and in dOing so will turn black and become electri-
cally conductive. This would account for the electrical conductivity or 
the coating and its blackness without any evidence or metal bleed through. 
CONCLUSIONS FROM ENGINE TEST 
The rirst engine ~est has essentially substantiated the results or 
the coating development program, in that the gradated Nichrome zirconia 
coating with a molybdenum primer has been demonstrated to be a signiricant 
improvement over the original Rokide Z coating system. The evaluation or 
the several types or top coats indicated that the combustion products 
were not reactive with the molybdenum zirconia system or the titanium 
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nitride system. These results allow the development of potentially 
improved coating systems by replacillg Nichrome with molybdenum and 
through the use of nonreactive top coats. 
The metallographic study of the coating after test indicated that 
the surface blackening had no apparent effect on the usefulness of the 
coating. Therefore, except for the area of loss, the usefulness of the 
gradated coating was unimpaired except, perhaps, for some slight surface 
loss. Although the bulk-fuel temperature-rise data shown in table IV were 
scanty and will not identify local overheating, there is no indication 
that the insulation provided by the gradated coating is significantly 
different from the original Rokide Z system. 
It is apparent from the early ruptures of fully coated tubes during 
the engine test that it will be extremely difficult or impossible to 
reclaim failed chambers. This fact also points out the importance of 
early replacement of the coating to prevent internal attack of the tubes. 
Repeated exposure of uncoated tubes will produce internal and external 
attack and eventual tube rupture. Therefore, even if a tube is recoated 
before it leaks, it may easily contain sufficient internal attack to 
rupture on subsequent pressurization. 
FUTURE 
The results of the first engine test were encouraging but not com-
pletely convincing since the test time was relatively short and long 
time effects on the coating over a large period of time could not be 
determined. Nevertheless, due to the urgent need for improved chamber 
life and because the gradated coating demonstrated a significant improve-
ment for at least 5 minutes, two new chambers have been coated for use 
in the program. The coating system used is the molybdenum primer and 
Nichrome gradated to zirconia as in the test engine except that the 
zirconia top coat thickness has been increased from 0.004 inch to 
0.006 inch, and 0.002 inch of titanium nitride has been added as a top 
coat. An additional old chamber was stripped and recoated with two 
gradated coating systems and two top coats for the second phase of the 
engine testing. This testing is currently underway. The coatings in 
this chamber are molybdenum gradated to zirconia and tungsten gradated 
to zirconia with top coats of titanium nitride and zirconium diboride. 
Portions of the chamber were covered during spraying so that each of 
the coatings with and without top coats will be exposed in the throat 
area. Longitudinal sections, rather than the circular strips of the 
previous tests were used so that exposure conditions will be as similar 
as possible. The compositions of these coatings were chosen for two 
reasons: First, it was necessary to evaluate quickly the usefulness of 
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top coats in the throat area and to eValuate the effect of replacing 
Nichrome with a refractory metal; and second, it was necessary to vali-
date the laboratory tests before proceeding to coating optimization. 
The result of the first engine test indicated that the use of high 
melting-point compounds as top coats could possibly stop the gradual 
erosion or chalking of the zirconia surface. Titanium nitride stopped 
the chalking in an area where conditions are much less severe than the 
throat, and therefore it must be further evaluated to determine its 
usefulness. Zirconium diboride was also included as typical of another 
family of compounds which may offer this protection. 
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Refractory metals were used instead of Nichrome to determine their 
usefulness under engine conditions. In the first engine test, the top 
coat which contained lO-percent molybdenum showed no apparent attack or 
oxidation. It can, therefore, be assumed that the exhaust products are 
not excessively oxidizing. A refractory metal instead of Nichrome would 
appear desirable since, in the event of erosion or loss of the coating 
surface, a refractory metal would offer some protection to the tubes, 
whereas the Nichrome would very likely melt. By following this reasoning, 
heavy undercoats of O.030-inch molybdenum and tungsten were used in the 
throat of this chamber. 
There is some question as to the validity of the thermal shock test 
for evaluating the top coats or the refractory-metal systems, because the 
flame can be much hotter than that in the engine and there is some oxi-
dation due to entrainment of air in the flame. The first engine test 
confirmed the use of thermal shock as a judge of coating capability for 
the early coatings investigated; however, in subsequent tests on systems 
with top coats all samples performed poorly. This poor performance may 
be a result of an inherent shock sensitivity in the system, or it may 
be that the test is overly severe. The shock-test results on coatings 
containing refractory metals have been very disappointing. The test 
results on samples of zirconia gradated with molybdenum have been scat-
tered with a number of early failures. The few samples tested containing 
tungsten have all shawn early failures. This may be due to the fact that 
the test is somewhat oxidizing because of air entrainment in the nitrogen 
flame. The titanium nitride top coat was used in the two new chambers 
because, although the tests indicated early failures were to be expected, 
they also indicated that only the top coat failed and the failure did not 
affect the performance of the basic coating. Therefore, the laboratory 
thermal-shock test results would indicate that the top coats and the 
coatings themselves that are in the current test engine would all fail 
very quickly. This engine is being run to determine the validity of 
these tests and to avoid overlooking promising coating systems because 
of an overly severe laboratory test. 
-
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The direction for further coating development work, shown schemat-
ically in figure 24, will be dependent upon the outcome to the current 
engine test. If the coatings perform satisfactorily, the laboratory 
tests must be modified to be more realistic, and coating development 
work will be to optimize a system containing molybdenum or tungsten 
gradated to zirconia with a top coat. If the coatings perform very 
poorly the thermal shock test will be considered valid and coating devel-
opment work will be to optimize the earlier type coatings without top 
coats, and the test will be used to choose the best system. The climax 
to this program will be an additional engine test of an optimized 
coating system. This system will then be incorporated into the program 
for new chambers and for maintenance of existing chambers. 
-
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TABLE I 
XLR99 CHAMBER HISTORY 
Serial number Cycles at crack Time to failure, min:sec 
Failed chambers 
102 86 14:00 
42 18:39.7 
29 36:47.6 
il3 85 35:28.5 
120 18:45.1 
28 
Chambers exceeding rated life 
40 117 46:36.0 
116 56 71:52.0 
ill 206 122:51.0 
-
\ 
TABLE II 
IDENTIFICATION OF COATmG SYST.EM.S 
~oating designation Primer Graduation Graduation 1 2 
Rokide Z O.OO4-inch 
Nichrome 
Coating A 0.OO3-inch 0.003-inch 0.OO3-inch 
(Plasmakote) Nichrome 70% Nichrome 30% Nichrome 
30% Zr02 70% Zr02 
Coating B 0.OO3-inch 0.OO3-inch 0.003-inch 
(Plasmakote) Molybdenum 70% Nichrome 30% Nichrome 
30% Zr02 70% Zr02 
--- - -- -- - ----
Graduation Insulating 
3 layer 
O.OlO-inch 
Rokide Z , 
(Zr02) I 
I 
0.003-inch 0.004-inch I 
10% Nichrome zr02 
90% Zr02 
0.OO3-inch 0.OO4-inch : 
10% Nichrome zr02 
9O%Zr02 
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XLR99 COATING TEST PROCEDURE PDR ENGINE SERIAL NUMBERS 101 AND 6 
Run type Throttle setting, Time at throttle setting, percent sec 
Oxygen-fUel ratio calibration 70 Start 
of sea-level orifices 50 5 
90 5 
Off 
Engine calibration and 70 Start 
functional 50 5 
50 5 
70 5 
80 5 
90 5 
100 5 
50 5 
100 5 
50 5 
Off 
Controllability and restart 70 start + 5 
50 5 
Off 10 
70 Restart 
100 5 
50 5 
Off 
Restart series test no. 1 70 Start + 10 
Off 10 
70 Restart 
50 10 
Off 10 
70 Restart 
100 10 
Off 10 
70 Restart + 10 
Off 10 
70 Restart 
50 10 
Off 
Chamber durability 70 start 
(minimum thrust) 50 100 
Off 
Chamber durability 100 Start + 60 
(maximum thrust) Off 
Maximum thrust restart 70 start 
50 10 
I I Off 10 100 Restart + 40 I Off 
Restart series test no. 2 70 Start 
50 5 
Off 10 
70 Restart 
50 
Off 10 
70 Restart 
50 5 
Off 10 
70 Restart 
50 5 
Off 10 
70 Restart 
50 5 
Off 
Run 
m.nnber 
28-101 
29-101 
30-101 
~1-101 
~2-101 
~)-101 
~101 
Oxygen-fuel 
ratio 
1.252 
1.252 
1. 252 
1.252 
1.252 
1.252 
1.252 
Run time, 
min: sec 
0:5.0 
0:7·9 
1:09.5 
0:~~.8 
1:02.~ 
1:15·5 
1:8.7 
TABLE IV 
XLR99 CHAMBER COATING TEST DATA FOR CHAMBER SERIAL NUMBER 40 OF ENGINE 
SERIAL NUMBER 101 RECOATED WITH ROKIDE Z 
[46 min 41 sec operating time before recoating] 
Total time 
on coating, 
min: sec 
0:5·0 
0:12·9 
1:~2.4 
2:06.2 
~:08.5 
4:24.0 
5:~2·7 
Rokide Z 
loss in 
throat area, 
sq in. 
o 
l 
2 
2 
~ 
21 
21 
25 
Run type Remarks 
Oxygen-fuel-ratio calibration I Lost data. 
at sea level 
Oxygen-fuel-ratio calibration I Faint chalky areas formed in hot streaks. 
at sea level 
Calibration and functional 
Controllability and restart 
Restart series no. 1 
Chamber durability 
Chamber durability (maximum 
thrust) 
Chalk growing heavier; 50-percent thrust, 
llfi' = 740 F; 70-percent thrust, 
~ 720 F; lOO-percent thrust, 
fir = 690 F. 
Several tubes in most severe lo~er hot 
streaks are exposed for about 6 inches 
to Nichrome; 70-percent thrust, 
fir 650 F; 100-percent thrust, 
fir=~~ 
Hot streaks no~ very ~ell defined with 
heavy chalk and dark bro~ fringes. 
Chalk extends 12 inches do~stream 
from throat. Rokide erosion visible 
at throat plane over entire circum-
ference. Bro~ hot streaks extend 
all ~y to exit skirt. 
Ammonia exhaustion shutdo~ after 
76 seconds of run. Short fuel supply 
due to improper propulsion-system test 
stand operation; 50-percent thrust, 
fir = 900 F. 
1 fir is the temperature rise bet~een fuel pump discharge and jacket outlet banjo. 
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Run ~gen-fUel Run time, 
number ratio min:aec 
~7-006 1.200 0:24·5 
~006 1·250 1:11.5 
~9-006 1.250 0:~.2 , 
40..006 1.250 1:45.1 
41-006 1.250 1:04.9 
42-006 1.250 0:46.0 
~ 
TABLE V 
XLR99 CI!AIIIIKR COATING TEST = FOR CI!AIIIIKR SIRIAL NUMI!IR 120 OF l!lI'GIn 
SIRIAL NUMI!IR 6 RBCOATED WITlI COATIll'G SYST.BM NUMI!IR 1 
(GRAllAm> Zr02 AND RICIIROO:) 
[18 min 45.1 sec operating time before recoating] 
Coating 
Total time 1068 in 
on coating, throat area, Run type Remarks 
min: sec sq in. 
0:24.5 0 Oxygen-fuel-ratio calibration No coating loss visible. Entl re chamber 
at sea level is blackened by apparent Nichrome 
bleed for about 18 inches downstream 
of throat plane. Blackened areas 
extend to exit in hot- streak zones. 
Chalk has formed in the throat. 
1:~.0 0 Combined oxygen-fuel calibr .... Two chamber leaks detected, one in num-
tion, engine calibration, ber 1 and one in number 9 streak. 
and functional Neither leak is liquid yet. Black-
I 
ening may have receded slightly. 
&laJ.l chips have come off over leaks. 
2:08.2 1 Restart series number Leak in number 1 streak nov liquid. 
Strip loss on tube crowns in loss area 
starting from leak chips; 50_percent 
thrust, 1 LJ.r = 66° F; loOO-percent 
thrust, l!r = 62 F. 
~:5~.3 2 Chamber durability (minimtDl1 Still no loss in areas other than in 
thrust) leak area. Orange tinge on TiN patch 
is ~ue to NH~ leaks; 5Q-percent thrust, 
l!r = 720 F; lOO-percent thrust, 
l!r=6~F. 
4:58·2 2 Chamber durability (maximum Still no noticeable loss 1n areas other 
thrust) than leak areas. Green tinge 1n num-
bers 1 and 9 streaks due to NH( leaks. 
Restart series postponed in in erest 
of safety. Leak appears to have sta-
bilized. Continuity test indicates 
that black chamber discoloration is 
electricaU.y conduct! ve; lOO_percent 
thrust, l!r = 620 F. 
5: 44 . 2 ~ Restart series number for Slight crown erosion in other hot streak. 
three restarts areas beside leak streaks. Restart 
series apparently more severe test 
than durabil1 ty type. Hydrogen peroxide 
drain fire on third restart. Engine 
pulled for chamber replacement and 
propulsion- syst ... - test-stand repair. 
1 lir is the temperatw"e rise between fuel pump discharge and jacket outlet banjo. 
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GRADATED COATING AFTER TEST - SIX STARTS AND 5-3/ 4 MIN 
(3 SQ IN. OF COATING LOST) 
Figure 18 
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18. BIOASTRONAUTICS SUPPORT OF THE X-15 PROGRAM (Ll) 
~ Burt Rowen, Ralph N. Richardson 
Air Force Flight Test Center 
and Garrison P. Layton, Jr. 
NASA Flight Research Center 
: ... 
• 
The techniques of air-to-ground telemetry have been used in research 
aircraft testing since the start of the X-I program in 1946. It became 
apparent during the development of the X-type research aircraft that 
personnel responsible for aerospace medical support of the pilot were 
not taking full advantage of the progress in telemetry systems to monitor 
for medical purposes the pilot and his environment during flight. One 
of the research objectives of the X-15 program is to obtain the pilot's 
physiological response to flight 'at increased speed and altitude. This 
objective is accomplished with the pilot wearing a full pressure suit; 
therefore, this garment and biomedical data acquisition equipment, tech-
niques, and results are discussed in this presentation. 
From March 10, 1959, through November 9, 1961, 85 hours of full 
pressure suit time have been accumulated by pilots who have flown the 
X-15. Sixty-two missions were flown with the original MC-2 garment 
which was characterized by a neck seal separating the breathing oxygen 
in the helmet above the seal from the nitrogen cooling and pressurizing 
gas below the seal. On March 21, 1961, a new-model protective garment 
was used for the first time in the X-15 program. This newer equipment 
is designated the AlP 22S-2 Full Pressure Suit. As of November 9, 1961, 
this garment has been used during 18 X-15 operations. These full pres-
sure suits were evaluated in other aircraft flown at the Air Force 
Flight Test Center for a total flight time of 171 hours and a total 
ground time of 554 hours. This brings the total full pressure suit 
experience in support of the X-15 program to 725 hours. The new 
Alp 228-2 garmet (fig. 1) has several major improvements over the origi-
nal MC-2 Full Pressure Suit (fig. 2) in the following areas: 
(a) Increased visual area - The double curvature face plate in the 
Alp 22S-2 Full Pressure Suit, together with the use of a helmet face 
seal in place of the old neck seal, allows the face to move forward in 
the helmet so that the pilot has a lateral visual field of approxi-
mately 2000 . This is an increase of approximately 400 over the single 
contoured lens of the MC-2 helmet, with an additional increase of 
20 percent in the vertical visual field. 
(b) Ease of donning - The' older MC-2 Full Pressure Suit was put on 
in two sections: the lower rubberized garment and the restraining 
.. 
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coverall, the upper rubberized garment and its restraining coverall. 
This was a rather tedious process and depended on folding the rubber 
top and bottom sections of the suit for retaining pressure. The new 
Alp 22S-2 Full Pressure Suit combines five components of the original 
suit into a one-piece garment with a pressure-proof zipper that runs 
around the back portion of the suit and is zippered closed in one 
operation. It took approximately 30 minutes for the pilot to be prop-
erly fitted into the older garment. Because of garment integration, 
the ease and rapidity of donning the new full pressure suit has improved 
to the point where a pilot can be dressed in a matter of 5 minutes. 
(c) Removable gloves - In the original MC-2 garment, gloves were a 
fixed portion of the upper rubberized garment. The new full pressure 
suit has removable gloves which contribute to pilot comfort and ease of 
suit donning. This also prevents a buildup of excessive moisture from 
the hands during suit checkout and X-15 cockpit checkout prior to take-
off. The removable-gloves feature facilitates dressing and makes it 
simpler for the pilot to get out of the full pressure suit himself, 
should this prove necessary. One other advantage is that, in the event 
of a last minute puncture of a glove, it is now possible simply to 
change gloves rather than to change the entire suit (fig. 3). 
Following postflight oscillograph-data analysis, pilot body temper-
atures are plotted with aircraft cockpit wall temperatures, maximum air-
craft structural temperatures, and ventilating nitrogen gas temperatures. 
To date, the ventilation and cockpit cooling system are adequately pro-
tecting the pilot so that his skin temperature remains at or below 
1000 F in spite of maximum aircraft temperature of over 1,2000 F and 
cockpit outer wall temperature of 7500 F. (See fig. 4.) The cockpit 
ventilating nitrogen gas temperatures range from 360 F to 810 F. 
These suits have a new system of electrical connections installed 
through a pressure seal in the suit. This system facilitates data 
acquisition and avoids the older snap-pad arrangement used in the 
MC-2 suit. The previously used snap pad proved unsatisfactory for 
continual use. After several operations, the snaps either separated 
or failed to make good contact because of metal fatigue which resulted 
in a loss of data. To eliminate this loss of data, a continuous elec-
trical lead from the pilot to the aircraft seat connection was sought. 
The approach was to find a lead that would not be bulky while pene-
trating the suit and would still maintain a satisfactory pressure seal. 
This continuous electrical lead from the pilot's body through the suit 
to the seat connection is now in use and has resulted in greatly 
increased reliability of data acquisition. The new Alp 22S-2 Full 
Pressure Suit has partially inflated on six flights during periods of 
partial cockpit pressurization loss and has proven to be a superior 
garment in terms of reliability and pilot acceptance. On these occa-
sions, when the suit has inflated during flight, loss of cabin pressure 
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and suit inflation have been immediately observable on the real-time 
telemetry recorders at both Beatty, Nev., and Edwards Air Force Base, 
Calif. A schematic diagram of the physiological instrumentation as 
installed in the X-15 is shown in figure 5 and the onboard biological 
recording instrumentation is shown in figure 6. 
Since May 5, 1960, in-flight physiological and environmental data 
have been recorded on 33 occasions. These data are both telemetered in 
real time and recorded by an oscillograph onboard the aircraft. The 
onboard data consist of electrocardiograph, respiratory, and pilot-skin 
and suit temperature information. The telemetered real-time data con-
sist of respiratory rate, suit pressure, helmet pressure, cockpit pres-
sure, normal (Az) and longitudinal (Ax) acceleration data. 
Initially, a signal conditioning package was installed on the 
instrumentation elevator that amplified the millivoltages of the EKG 
system, suit pressure transducers, and pilot body temperature thermis-
tors. This resulted in a rather poorly recorded EKG signal on the air-
craft oscillograph. Prior to the flight of September 12, 1961, a Tabor 
amplifier was installed on the ejection seat. This signal amplifica-
tion close to the pilot resulted in a very much improved clinical-type 
EKG. Two mid-axillary leads and a common ground are used in obtaining 
the EKG data. The three electrodes are fabricated locally and are 
3/4 inch in diameter. A silicone potting compound ring surrounds the 
metal mesh electrode, and a conductive paste is used to assure good 
contact between the skin and the electrode. A plastic cap is placed 
over each lead, and pressure-sensitive adhesive holds it in place. 
Respiratory rate data are obtained by a transducer in the oxygen-supply 
line. A sample of this onboard record showing EKG and respiratory rate 
from a flight of October 17, 1961, is presented as figure 7. Successive 
refinements within the EKG data collection process have led to obtaining 
a preflight and postflight record in the van used for pilot flight prep-
aration. This can then be compared with in-flight data. To date, heart 
rates during flight have usually increased from the normal 70 to 80 per 
minute to 140 to 150 per minute, about double the pilot's resting pre-
flight heart rate. No conductive cardiac abnormalities in the onboard 
EKG tracings have been detected. These rates represent the normal 
response pattern of the pilots who 
Figure 8 shows the heart rate and respiration rate data obtained 
on a recent speed mission. These data are typical of most flights, 
both in magnitude and time variance. Since the heart has a better 
dynamic response to changing conditions, this discussion is concerned 
principally with the variation of heart rate with respect to the flight 
plan. Near launch, a peak in cardiac rate occurs and is apparent in 
all flights. This is a result of the physiological buildup prior to 
launch and engine start. On this particular flight of November 9, 1961, 
a speed of 6,005 fps, or Mach 6.04, was attained. From 314 seconds to 
403 seconds, and from 438 seconds to 458 seconds, the pilot attempted 
to control the aircraft with the Stability Augmentation Syst6n (SAS) 
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turned off in the lateral directional mode. During these intervals, 
the heart rate increased and reached a peak shortly after the SAS-off 
interval. These peaks in heart rate are typical of such maneuvers. 
The windshield shattering between 438 seconds and 458 seconds also 
added to the increased heart rate. Throughout the rest of the flight, 
the heart rate decreased until just prior to landing where it again 
peaks. After landing, the heart rate rapidly decreases to typical 
resting values. Figure 9 is a plot of the heart rate and respiratory 
rate of a flight on March 30, 1961, when an altitude of 169,600 feet 
was attained. It is of interest to note the reduced heart rate during 
the 2-minute interval of 0.5g or less following rocket engine shutdown. 
This reduced heart rate, coincident with reduced normal acceleration, 
has been verified in the Mercury program and in the zero g profiles 
flown in F-100F aircraft. The increased heart rate at 520 seconds is 
the result of a normal acceleration at reentry of 4g and the simul-
taneous onset of aircraft vibration. The lack of data between 600 sec-
onds and 800 seconds is the result of the oscillograph being inten-
tionally turned off to conserve film for landing data. 
The respiration rate also follows similar trends, increasing to 
three or four times the resting rate, but is less meaningful because the 
respirator,y system has a poorer dynamic response and is influenced by 
talking. The large peak during the powered portion of the flight is 
the result of the physiological response during acceleration where 
pilots tend to breathe rapidly and shallowly. 
To date, the data have been useful primarily from the standpoint 
of establishing physiological baselines for pilots of high-performance 
vehicles. These levels have also been confirmed in operational fighter 
aircraft where heart.rates of 150 per minute have been observed during 
landings. 
Since the high heart and respiratory rates recorded appear to be a 
normal response, these data will be useful in connection with future 
manned programs. Work is presently underway to determine more ade-
quately the pilot's response to changing dynamic flight conditions. 
For this purpose, a blood pressure device, supplied by the School of 
Aerospace Medicine (SAM), and a linear pneumotachometer, supplied under 
Air Force contract to measure 02 flow, are being installed. The major 
problem in determining the pilot's physiological condition is that of 
determining what parameters best show a realistic response and are 
still compatible with the pilot-aircraft combination. The School of 
Aerospace Medicine is presently doing much work in this area with two 
instrumented F-100F aircraft, and NASA has plans for obtaining addi-
tional physiological baseline information in their F-100C variable-
stability aircraft. 
••• 
••• 
• • 
••• 
••• 
. ... 
•• • ~ ~ : . 
: ..... 
•• 
• • ••• 
•••• •••• 
. : :-: .. 
• ••••• 
•• 
• 
• 
• 
•• 
• ••• 
• • 
• •• 
• • 
• • 
....... 
•• • • 
••• •• 
: : ••• e o 
259 
On August 3, 1961, the Air Force Special Weapons Center, Kirtland 
AFB, delivered an ionizing radiation-detection device, designed and 
constructed specifical~ for the X-15. The package contains an ion 
chamber, two scintillators, a Geiger tube, and a multiple-channel tape 
recorder. The ion chamber and two scintillators are encased in dif-
ferent thicknesses of human-tissue-equivalent plastic. With the Geiger 
tube acting as a count rate monitor, the other detectors record radia-
tion dose rate on the surface and at one-quarter-inch and one-inch 
depth in tissues. As changes occur in the radiation intensity, the 
change in ratio between count rate and dose rate gives some indication 
of the spectral characteristics of the change. This package, capable 
of recording dose rates from 1 or 2 mil1irad/hour to 100 millirad/hour 
has been installed in aircraft No. 670, and was first flown on 
September 29, 1961. The taped data from each flight are then sent to 
the Air Force Special Weapons Center, Kirtland AFB, for ana~sis. 
Appropriate to the altitudes attained to date, all radiation levels 
encountered have been as expected, or approximate~ 0.5 millirad per 
hour, which is equivalent to normal background radiation scatter. 
This package weighs approximate~ 10 pounds and is located on the 
left side console of the cockpit outboard of the ejection seat. It 
used 28 volts of aircraft power and is actuated by the pilot when the 
main instrumentation data switch is turned on during flight. 
In summa~, a method of providing pilot protection with a full 
pressure suit has been demonstrated during 80 X-15 operations from 
March 10, 1959, through November 9, 1961. The equipment, techniques, 
and results of obtaining real-time life-support data, including 
ionizing radiation, have been described and are receiving increased 
attention in all scheduled operations. The bioastronautics ir~orma­
tion and experience accumulated during the X-15 program have increased 
our understanding of personal equipment and physiological response to 
rocket flight and will be direct~ applicable to current and future 
United States manned space programs. 
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19. X-15 PROPULSION 
N71-7546 2 
StffiSYSTEM COMPONENT DEVELOPMENT (J) 
By Robert L. Wiswell, Phillip Olekszyk 
Air Force Flight Test Center 
and John W. Gibb 
North American Aviation, Inc. 
SUMMARY 
The X-15 rocket-powered research aircraft was developed by the inte-
grated effort of various areas such as aerodynamics, thermodynamics, and 
structures. The propulsion subsystem development at the onset of the 
program was handicapped for varied causes. As a result, early in the 
flight testing phase, many time-consuming and costly del8\Ys were encoun-
tered as a result of individuaJ. component failures. A review of the 
X-15 propulsion subsystem components is presented, with a discussion of 
some of the development problems, how they were alleviated, and how they 
may be reduced or avoided in future programs. In order to avoid these 
problems in the future, a program is recommended in the hope that it 
will increase component reliability commensurate with vehicle objectives. 
INTRODUCTION 
The X-15 research aircraft is a rocket-powered aircraft utilizing 
a liquid oxygen-anhydrous ammonia rocket engine. Several major sub-
systems comprise the X-15 airplane. Among these are the propulsion sys-
tem, auxiliary power units, and ballistic control rockets. 
With the airplane being powered by a liquid rocket engine, it inher-
ently involves numerous components. The propulsion system is manrated, 
and because of its safety requirements, it included redundant components. 
Because of these increased safety requirements and the ability of the 
system to be reused, the components are required to function with 
exact ing reliability and accuracy. The safety, complexity, and the 
extreme combinations of environments of liquid rocket propulsion sys-
tems require that each component undergo a rigorous development program 
to establish the highest possible level of confidence prior to actual 
usage. 
This paper explains the development of the X-15 propulsion subsys-
tem components. The detailed review of the component development phase 
includes some of the development problems which confronted the program, 
how they were alleviated, and how these problems may be reduced or 
avoided in future programs. , 
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The X-15 airplane was developed by the integrated efforts of var-
ious areas, such as aerodynamics, thermodynamics, and structures. At 
the initiation of the program, propulsion subsystem hardware develop-
ment was handicapped by a lack of previous experience, technology, and 
availability of basic hardware elements. These handicaps contributed 
to the fluid component problems resulting in costly delays, failures, 
and a significant expenditure of manpower and resources. In order to 
combat these delays and increase confidence in the X-15 subsystems, 
various methods were employed. 
If future developments of liquid rocket engine vehicles are to 
attain timely reliability, more emphasis must be placed on the devel-
opment of system components. A recommended program is presented in 
the hope that it will stimulate component development to meet future 
needs, reduce the burden of paying for a component many times over, and 
increase component reliability commensurate with vehicle objectives. 
X-15 COMPONENT DEVELOPMENT HISTORY 
The methods used and the steps taken in the development of the 
X-15 propellant system components were very similar to those used on 
any airborne vehicle. The major difference was not in the methods, 
but rather in that the X-15 systems were taking a much larger step 
than usual into areas where too little was known; therefore, the devel-
opment task was proportionately more difficult. The block diagram 
shown in figure 1 outlines the development steps. 
First, by preparation of the propulsion subsystem schematic dia-
grams, the hardware needed was determined. Next, the individual item 
requirements such as fluid size, environment, operating characteristics, 
and expected life were determined or estimated. These requirements were 
subject to continuing change as the airplane design and flight profile 
were determined. With the preliminary establishment of the component 
requirement, a chart listing the items and the requirements in very gen-
eral form was prepared and submitted to component suppliers. It was 
hoped from this survey to determine that the equipment required could 
be essentially "off-the-shelf" or easily developed. The results of the 
survey were rather disappointing in that very few suppliers were inter-
ested. However, from the survey, a limited list of suppliers to whom 
requests for quotations would be made was prepared, and also more rapid 
procurement of substitute hardware for initial test stand operation was 
permitted. Equipment-procurement specifications were being prepared 
concurrently with the initial survey. The major problem was to write 
an equipment specification so that the equipment would be acceptable 
for the task and not too difficult to build or even propose on and still 
attempt to cover future required changes without having to start over. 
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It was necessary to determine which, if any, of the existing military 
specifications were applicable and to what degree. Here again, there 
were some disappointing results. The military specifications were 
adequate for the then current generation of military aircraft, but 
with few exceptions they were not acceptable for the requirements of 
the X-15 airplane. 
In order to get operable equipment in the minimum time, an addi-
tional step was taken; separate relaxed specifications were prepared 
for the initial equipment to be used on the test stands. Generally, 
the basic requirements were similar to those for the airplane equipment. 
However, the required tests were greatly reduced, and the requirements 
for envelope, weight, and environment were much less stringent. The 
reduced requirements were two-fold in purpose: first, to get the test 
·stands in operation early; and second, to make the components function 
properly as soon as possible. Eventually, the flight hardware was also 
to be tested on the stands. 
As each specification became sufficiently definitive, it was 
released to prospective suppliers for bid. As previously noted, the 
list of possible suppliers was very short. Experience compatible with 
X-15 requirements was limited. Additionally, in reviewing the pros-
pective suppliers, it was necessary to determine whether they had the 
organizational capability to complete the job; that is, enough manage-
ment, engineering, manufacturing, testing, and financial depth to 
deliver the specified equipment. 
When the quotations were submitted and reviewed, it became apparent 
that the situation was even worse than the original pessimistic esti-
mates. For the simpler, more routine type of equipment, there was suf-
ficient response from suppliers with adequate experience. More often, 
though, the quotations numbered only two or three, and sometimes one. 
The reasons are simple and understandable - the cryogenic state of the 
art was not sufficiently advanced, the low X-15 airplane production made 
bidding very risky, and the tight delivery schedule permitted little 
time for basic research or to begin again in case the first design did 
not prove to be satisfactory. It is important to note that there never 
will be a program with sufficient time to do adequate basic research 
after that program is contracted and scheduled. 
It became apparent very early that in many cases equipment, even at 
the reduced test stand requirements, would not be available in time. 
The test stands had to be operable in order to proceed with the engine 
development program. In order to assure that the test stands would be 
in operation in time, it was necessary to reengineer and modify the 
stands so that "off-the-shelf" hardware could be used. For example, 
figure 2 illustrates a liquid oxygen (102) tank vent and relief valve 
which was made by combining a pneumatically actuated butterfly valve, 
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a separate relief valve, necessary pneumatic control valves and plumbing, 
and a safety burst disc. It can be seen that this arrangement was some-
what more cumbersome than the final integrated single valve shown in 
figure 3. This same type of temporary design was used for the ammonia 
and hydrogen peroxide tank relief valves, for the propellant feed and 
jettison valves, and for pressure regulators. 
Some of the equipment development programs were proceeding on 
schedule. There were areas in which it was obvious that additional 
measures would be necessary to avoid delays in the flight-test program. 
One possible solution was the establishment of additional sources for 
the critical items. Second, and sometimes, even third sources were 
selected and contracts let. This program was successful to varying 
degrees: from the extremes of the delivery of usable hardware from all 
sources to the failure to procure from any source. In those cases in 
which none of the sources appeared to be destined for success, design 
and development was undertaken by North American Aviation, Inc., first 
by furnishing engineering aid to the suppliers, and then, if required, 
by assuming the entire responsibility, including manufacturing and all 
necessary testing. 
Once again substitute temporary conglomerations of equipment were 
put together to do the job that one piece was supposed to do. As a case 
in point, figure 4 shows a liquid oxygen tank vent and relief valve used 
for initial flights. This consisted of a butterfly valve (an adaptation 
of the qualified liquid oxygen jettison valve), two relief valves, a 
pressure switch, a solenoid valve, and a shuttle valve. It was heavy, 
but it functioned satisfactorily, and it allowed sufficient time to con-
clude the successful development and testing of the final configuration 
valves without flight delays. 
As the test stands were put into use, their operations often dis-
closed the need for design mOdification, which in turn led to specifica-
tion changes. Added information relative to the airplane environment 
and tasks dictated modifications. Whenever possible, the specification 
requirements were relaxed. However, in many instances, changes of the 
opposite nature were necessary. Test stand operation was also put to 
good use in the development of the flight hardware. This equipment was 
installed and tested in actual operational use at the earliest possible 
time. In effect, test stand operation was used for development testing. 
The knowledge thus gained was available earlier than if the complete 
laboratory type of development and qualification testing had preceded 
operational usage. Many equipment malfunctions will not show up except 
during actual system operation. Basic research, development tests, 
qualification tests, and acceptance tests are all important and manda-
tory to obtain usable; reliable hardware. In the final analysis, how-
ever, the integrity of any piece of equipment is never assured until 
it has been used in its ultimate installation. 
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It was discovered during the flight test program that equipment 
which had performed satisfactorily on the test stands would occasionally 
malfunction in flight. The malfunctions were traced to various causes. 
For example, the environment in the airplane was mOre severe than that 
on the stands. Inadvertent flooding with liquid oxygen created tempera-
tures far below those the equipment had been designed to withstand. 
Another example of unforeseen trouble was the ground explosion of air-
plane number 3 under operating conditions which had been accomplished 
many times OLl the test stands. A small change in environment probably 
made the difference. 
In addition to the previously mentioned malfunctions causing speci-
fication modification and updating, the specifications were also modified 
as they were reviewed by the responsible military agencies. The require-
ments of these agencies for specification changes must be incorporated 
by the contractor. In the case of the X-15 airplane, these requirements 
for change were often not known until rather late in the program. This 
del~ was primarily a result of a breakdown in the formal correspondence 
chain. 
Because of this lack in communication, and because certain compon-
ents had created repeated delays in the flight test program, including 
several airborne aborts, in February 1960, by order of Headquarters, 
United States Air Force, a component reliability team was formed. 
The component reliability team, consisting of representatives from 
the Air Force Ballistic Missile Division, Space Technology Laboratories, 
Air Force Flight Test Center, National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, Aeronautical Systems Division (WADD), X-15 Weapons 
System Project Office, and North American Aviation, L~c., vTaS estab-
lished as a means of increasing the confidence and reliability levels 
of the X-15 subsystems. This goal was attained by a careful review of 
the components and their respective specifications. Changes were 
recommended in all cases where applicable. The recommendations 
included the updating of specifications and reviewing component designs 
to reflect more realistic requirements as determined by individual sys-
tem and flight testing. The component reliability team also succeeded 
in unsnarling the correspondence problems and insuring expeditious review 
of specifications and equipment. Table I shows that at the time of the 
formation of the component reliability team, less than 40 percent of the 
specifications and components had been reviewed and approved. It was 
determined that many disapprovals were only the results of minor points 
requiring clarification. The desirability of close personal contact 
between the prime contractor and Air Force technical personnel was well 
demonstrated by the manner in which these points were handled. Formal 
correspondence was thus reduced and the approval process was greatly 
accelerated. A review of the present subsystem status shows that all 
the specifications have been submitted and approved, and that all veri-
fication testing is complete and the reports have been submitted. 
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The following conclusions can be made of the development of the 
X-15 propulsion subsystem components: 
1. Specifications: A portion of the component development problem 
can be attributed to the procurement specifications. Because of the 
lack of rocket systems technology, there were no military specifications 
directly applicable for the contractor to use as a guide in preparing 
detailed component specifications. As a result, the individual com-
ponent specifications were continually being modified as the state-of-
the-art knowledge became available. 
2. Hardware development: Because of the lack of cryogenic fluid 
technology and understanding of rocket systems environments, many prob-
lem areas were underestimated. Also, for the component suppliers to 
make a profit and to meet the delivery schedules, many of the proposed 
components were merely a modification or redesign of an available "shelf''' 
component. This approach was satisfactory in some cases, but for the 
more complicated components, such as regulators and vent and relief 
valves, this method was inadequate. This is evidenced by the fact that 
the development time period for some of the components was approximately 
4 years. 
3. System testing: The major factor in the successful development 
of components was the extensive use of system testing. By actual use 
of' the individual components in the simulated flight environment, state-
of-the-art problems were discovered and solved. 
4. Coordination: Coordination between contractor and Air Force 
technical agencies did not flow smoothly. The components reliability 
team helped resolve this problem by close personal contact. 
~OMMENDATIONS 
If the developments of fUture liquid rocket engine vehicles are to 
attain a high confidence level and timely reliability, a program should 
be instituted to attack component problems. Such a program should stimu-
late component development to meet fUture needs, reduce the tremendous 
burden of paying for a component many times over, and increase component 
reliability. The program outlined in figure 5 shown in its proposed 
sequence with the normal component development program will result in a 
reduced development time cycle. A program to improve components on 
future systems should (1) provide basic specifications, (2) provide 
module development so the programs can take advantage of advancements 
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in the state of the art, and (3) make component design data available to 
industry. 
1. Specifications: It is recommended that a study of future prog-
rams be conducted of both the advanced projects and those in contractual 
stage to determine component requirements, and that general military 
specifications be prepared on basic component types. Six general areas 
can describe the large majority of all fluid system component require-
ments. The general areas would cover: (1) shutoff valves, (2) regula-
tion devices, (3) vent and relief valves, (4) flow control devices, 
(5) disconnect and coupling devices, and (6) actuators. 
2. Design data: Materials information and application data should 
be developed and widely disseminated, in advance of component hardware 
requirements, as new propellant combinations or environmental conditions 
are forecast. Many times, fluid system devices and phenomena have been 
rediscovered and forgotten over and over again. It is, therefore, recom-
mended that a handbook be prepared to assist the designer in keeping up 
with such areas as future propellants, module development techniques, 
and future environmental requirements. Such a handbook would help pre-
vent overdesign and the attendant results of overweight and low 
reliability. 
3. Hardware development: A fluid system component is a package of 
subcomponents or modules such as seats, poppets, orifices, springs, dia-
phragms, and bellows. Usually, in a vehicle development program, time 
is not available for basic module development. Generally, a "newly 
developed valve" consists of reshuffling old modules. It is recommended 
that applied research programs be instituted, by both industry and gov-
ernment agenCies, to develop advanced state-of-the-art module designs so 
that they can be utilized in many specific future components. 
By having advanced state-of-the-art modules developed at the time 
of the program initiation, the component designer will be able to shorten 
the development time by incorporating the modules to meet his specific 
requirements. This will eliminate the need for each contractor to enter 
into a large component development program. 
4. Coordination: In the future, in order to provide a timely dis-
semination of information gained from previous Air Force programs, early 
and close coordination must be maintained between the contractor and Air 
Force technical personnel. This would permit a free exchange of techni-
cal information and expedite the review of specifications and test data. 
Also, coordination between the prime contractor and component supplier 
is of equal importance. 
5. System testing: Implementation of the above recommendations will 
increase the chances of initial component success. System testing will 
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still be required and should be employed; however, the component changes 
resulting from such testing should be greatly reduced, and thus shorten 
the overall development time. 
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FEB 9, OCT 15, 
1960 1961 
TOTAL FLIGHT-COMPONENT TYPES 72 72 
COMPONENTS SUBMITTED 62 72 
COMPONENTS APPROVED BY AIR FORCE 21 50 
CRITICAL COMPONENTS 43 43 
CRITICAL COMPONENTS APPROVED BY 
AIR FORCE 13 29 
TOTAL COMPONENT SPECIFICATIONS 62 62 
SPECIFICATIONS SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL 52 62 
SPECIFICATIONS APPROVED BY AIR FORCE 23 62 
CRITICAL SPECIFICATIONS 34 34 
CRITICAL SPECIFICATIONS APPROVED 
BY AIR FORCE 14 34 
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WITH THE X-15 AIRCRAFT (J) 
By James E. Love and John A. Palmer 
NASA Flight Research Center 
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It is the purpose of this paper to describe a comprehensive picture 
of X-15 operational reliability. The curves and text presented are 
based on actual parts failure records, flight logs, and the daily repair 
work sheets. It is therefore not only a picture of the reliability with 
regard to safety in flight, but also in view of ground preparation time 
and cost. Repeated system and component failures have resulted in many 
costly delays. 
The X-15 airplane has an outstanding record of flight accomplish-
ment and safety. In over 45 powered flights, the manned flight envelope 
has been enlarged beyond that of any other aircraft. This has been done 
without the loss of any aircraft and with no system failures after 
launch that were not readily managed by the pilot. However, due partly 
to the increased number and complexity of systems and partly to other 
problems which will be discussed subsequently, there have been many 
unsuccessful flight attempts and countless schedule delays. It is note-
worthy that the wasted expenditure which occurs with an aborted air-
borne flight is over $100,000. 
GENERAL TRENDS 
The in-flight reliability of the X-15 as a total vehicle has been 
excellent from the beginning. However, the reliability of major systems 
begins to drop noticeably when based on all airborne experience and 
quite drastically when based on all operational experience, both on the 
ground and in the air. An increasingly large amount of ground time has 
been spent and many cancellations have occurred because of parts fail-
ures or hard-to-analyze system malfunctions. As a result, the high 
mission success has been obtained at a disproportionately large cost in 
parts, materials, and technical and engineering man-hours. The same 
amount of preparation and testing is required for a cancelled flight 
as for a successful one. 
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The followi~g·tte~s dr~ d1~cussed in ~nis section in order to pro-
vide an understanding of some of the operational characteristics of the 
program: (1) number of scheduled flights as opposed to successful 
flights, (2) flight-preparation time, (3) system responsibility for 
schedule delays, and (4) system operational experience. Figure 1 shows 
a comparison of the number of successful, unsuccessful, and rescheduled 
flights plotted against calendar time. The lowest curve shows the pro-
gressively accumulated total of successful flights. The middle curve 
includes all successful flights and aborted air attempts, whereas the 
upper curve includes both lower curves plus all scheduled attempts. 
Note that the slope of each curve is greater than the one below it. 
Although the rate of successful flight accumulation has become approxi-
mately constant, the slopes of the other two curves are still increasing. 
Flight-Preparation Time 
Figure 2 depicts average time between successful flights. 
Increasing system complexity raises the amount of ground time required 
between flights and often increases the number of operations a system 
experiences prior to a flight. This increase is due to the fact that 
most ground checkouts are time limited and must be reaccomplished when 
failure of some other system causes delay beyond the period for which 
qualification is acceptable. Such a "snowballing" effect is partly 
responsible for the high rate of schedule cancellations. 
A steady rise in average time between successful flights with pro-
gram progression is evident, and a marked increase has followed XLR99 
engine installation in both aircraft. This can be partially explained 
by the fact that during the interim engine program, ballistic control 
system and inertial system operations were not flight requirements and 
by the fact that the interim engine was more trouble-free. Major delays 
for XLR99 engine installation, the explosion of the X-15 number 3 air-
plane and other similar delays have been omitted for clarity. The curve 
should show a downward trend as all systems reach a greater state of 
maturity. 
System Responsibility for Schedule Delays 
The percentage of all flight schedule delays attributable to each 
major system since the beginning of flight testing is shown in figure 3. 
A great deal of time has been consumed in replacing components with 
repeat failures and in correcting conditions which caused an aborted 
flight. The percent allotted to a given system has been appropriately 
weighted for length of delay to give a truer comparison. Thus, the per-
cent shown for bad weather is 10 percent as compared with an actual 
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20 percent of all delays. The APU and propulsion systems have obviously 
had the greatest growing pains. 
Figure 4 presents the delays by systems for a period covering 
13 recent flights of the XLR99 engine. As would be expected the engine 
problems far outweigh the others, and these have been discussed in pre-
vious papers. Next in importance are problems caused by the remainder 
of the propulsion system. Some new problems in this area were caused 
by the incompatibility of some plastic seal material with the anhydrous 
ammonia fuel, in addition to pressure regulation and relief difficulties 
that also appeared in the earlier program. 
System Operational Experience 
As the X-15 program has progressed, the failure rate of most major 
systems has decreased. The rates based on airborne experience only are 
currently fairly low. However, if failure rates are calculated by 
using all data for both ground and air, the current level for a given 
system is considerably higher. For example, figure 5 shows failure 
experience obtained by both methods for the auxiliary power unit (APU) 
and ballistic control rocket (BCR) system where the number of failures 
is plotted against airborne operations. In this figure and the figures 
that follow, a failure is defined as a system malfunction considered 
unsafe for flight. Since very few major failures have occurred in free 
flight, each point represents a malfunction which resulted in schedule 
delay, flight cancellation, or airborne abort. Note that most of these 
malfunctions occurred very early in the program. 
Figure 6 is a similar plot for the engine and propulsion system 
and shows that malfunctions have been more prevalent for this system. 
The unevenness of the,upper curve is indicative of the fact that pro-
pulsion problems seem to come in groups. The low frequency of airborne 
malfunctions as illustrated on the lower curve indicates a reasonably 
reliable system based upon airborne experience, but the figure shows 
more than five times the airborne failure frequency during ground 
checkouts. 
Figure 7 shows calculations for the heating and ventilation system. 
Unlike the two previous systems, the most serious heat and ventilation 
failures have occurred after launch during the last 6 months, as shown 
by the upward trend at the end of each curve. 
Similar data can be plotted for each of the remaining major systems. 
However, the three most troublesome systems have been discussed. These 
curves illustrate graphically the fact that high flight reliability is 
not a basic quality of the X-15 airplane. Rather, it has been obtained 
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at a high cost in parts, delays, and manpower and only by employing 
lengthy, complicated ground checkouts with the aid of equally compli-
cated equipment. 
Four of the 
are as follows: 
of qualification 
sensitivity, and 
wi th examples. 
CAUSES FOR SYSTEM PROBLEMS 
causes of the systems problems discussed previously 
(1) unexpected environmental conditions, (2) failure 
tests to duplicate true conditions, (3) contamination 
(4) human factors. Each of these causes is discussed 
Unexpected Environmental Conditions 
The first cause of systems problems is unexpected environmental 
conditions which are as follows: (1) extreme cold due to ground holds, 
(2) extreme cold due to air holds, and (3) effects of new system instal-
lations. Since the beginning of actual flight operations a variety of 
last-minute problems, including poor weather conditions, has neces-
sitated extended waiting periods prior to take-off. In the greatest 
proportion of these cases, the airplane has already been serviced with 
liquid nitrogen, oxygen, and chilled gases. As a result both structure 
and components have been cold soaked to extremely low temperatures. 
Since most parts and systems were designed for elevated temperatures, 
such cold-soak conditions have been one of the most aggravating sources 
of trouble encountered. 
As an example, the heating and ventilation system is a heat-
balanced, temperature-controlled design which provides a cryogenically 
cooled nitrogen atmosphere for pilot and equipment cooling. The liquid 
nitrogen injected to cool this atmosphere is enough to provide cockpit 
pressurization also. Recently, a change was made in the system in 
order to improve the cooling of certain components. As a result of 
this change, temperatures throughout the cabin area fell to unusually 
low levelS, especially when long ground or air holds occurred. A 
series of six flights with cabin-pressurization failure followed. The 
cabin atmosphere had become so cold that additional cooling of liquid 
nitrogen was required to maintain pressure. 
Even though all components of the system met rigid specifications, 
they were made to operate under conditions not considered in the origi-
nal design. This environment was provided by a change made without 
full investigation of its effect on other systems. 
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Failure of Qualification Tests To Duplicate True Conditions 
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The second cause is failure of qualification tests to duplicate 
true operating conditions. Specifications covering procurement of a 
part always include a series of tests designed to assure that it will 
be able to withstand the conditions under which it must operate. It is 
impossible, however, to duplicate with such tests all circumstances 
that will occur in service. 
For example, the auxiliary power unit and its fuel system were 
tested for many hours on an exact replica of the aircraft installation. 
Yet the APU system has been the cause of more schedule delays and can-
cellations than any other. 
As an example of a component failure, a critical pressure switch 
in the APU system, although thoroughly qualified by the vendor, has been 
replaced by the dozen and even with improvements still constitutes a 
problem. 
Contamination Sensitivity 
The major sources of contamination sensitivity are as follows: 
(1) residual or built-in debris, (2) oxidation, (3) wear, (4) corrosion, (5) deterioration, (6) decomposition, and (7) airborne particles (silica 
and dust). 
Many parts and systems are made and tested under extremely clean 
conditions with exact tolerances. Qualification tests are conducted in 
a rapid series with special equipment to check the particular component 
or system. 
In the actual aircraft, periods of activity for a system are fol-
lowed by long quiet periods with stagnant fluid in lines. Systems are 
opened and closed many times and at many points. Actual aircraft con-
figurations may contain dead ends or deposit points that did not exist 
in test setups. No matter what steps are taken to reduce it, there is 
bound to be more particle contamination in actual X-15 systems than in 
controlled test equipment. 
That all this is true is borne out by the large number of repeat 
component failures due to contamination. If parts and systems were 
originally designed and tested with the idea in mind that they will be 
subjected to damaging particles, it would save considerable time and 
effort during actual use. 
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The last of these four causes is human factors, and some of the 
items which playa part are as follows: (1) misinterpretation of pro-
cedures, (2) faulty problem diagnosis, (3) use of standard but improper 
test methods on standard parts, (4) insufficient quality control, and 
( 5) breakage or damage. 
Although usually not due to poor design or service life, human 
error plays a large part in parts and system failures. Such occurrences 
would not appear to fall in the category covered by this report. How-
ever, the well-known existence of "Murphy's Law" dictates that human 
errors are a function of the design and procedures employed. Thus, if 
a system presents an opportunity for a mistake, a mistake will be made. 
This is not to say that all such chances of errors can be elimi-
nated through proper design. Actually, the only place where most of 
them can be detected is during actual field operations. However, many 
problems could be prevented by "idiot proofing" procedures and designing 
systems with the field mechanic in mind. A dramatic example occurred 
when shortly before launch a chase pilot reported peroxide flowing from 
the APU shutoff valve drain. Previous experiences indicated recycling 
of the valve would correct the problem and the APU was shut down. 
Restart produced what were described as "serious vibrations" and the 
flight was aborted. 
Examination of the facts proved the drain was improperly identified 
and the leak was actually a small liquid oxygen leak not detrimental to 
flight. The APU restart had been attempted before proper sequencing 
occurred. The serious vibration could be explained only by a coinci-
dental area of rough air. Thus, a series of human errors cost an entire 
flight without the occurrence of any failure. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
There have occurred many conditions, both physical and procedural, 
that could have been prevented had they been anticipated or more thor-
oughly accounted for in design and qualification testing. A greatly 
decreased program cost and increased flight frequency would then have 
been possible with attendant earlier attainment of research objectives. 
This statement is understandably a broad one since it is impossible 
to provide for all contingencies. A research vehicle built in limited 
quantity with limited funds and incorporating untried systems is destined 
to experience many difficulties. Thorough realistic system and component 
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testing should be completed as early in the program as possible. 
Neither component nor system testing can stand by itself. 
It is hoped that many of the lessons learned with the X-15 can be 
applied to later research or operational vehicles so that its flight 
success and safety record can be duplicated or bettered without the 
expenditure of so much "ground time." 
However, it should be pointed out that the reliability is increasing 
for nearly all of the systems, and the time between flights has begun 
to return to a reasonable figure. We are well into the research program 
and have every reason to believe that our future program should proceed 
at an acceptable rate. 
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By Robert G. Nagel 
Ni7 Fir: 7i54 6s~center 
INTRODUCTION 
The value of the human pilot and redundant systems is currently a 
matter of great controversy in the preliminary design of space vehicles. 
Unfortunately, quantitative results with previous aerospace systems have 
not been properly documented to assess directly either their pilot or 
redundancy aspects. Thus it is that much of the consideration in these 
regards is based upon intuitive projections and purely qualitative 
appraisals. The X-15 program, because of its currency and its many sim-
ilarities to the next generation of aerospace craft, yields documented 
facts which lend realism and validity to the current considerations of 
piloted as opposed to unmanned yehicles and redundancy as opposed to 
non redundancy in systems design, particularly for a vehicle develop-
mental phase. (For the purposes of this eValuation "redundancy" is 
defined broadly to include dualized systems, emergency back-up provi-
Sions, and fail-safe devices.) 
A comprehensive evaluation has concluded that the X-15 flights to 
date have greatly benefited from inclusion of a pilot in the control 
loops and from having redundant systems. These benefits have been 
accrued both in terms of mission success and safe recovery of the X-15 
airplane. Figure I illustrates that all but one of the first 44 X-15 
free flights actually resulted in mission success. However, the evalu-
ation shows that with ~ither a pilot-in-the-Ioop nor redundant systems, 
less than one-half of those same 44 missions would have been at all 
successful. Similarly, there have been no losses of X-15 airplanes. 
But for a hypothetically unmanned, nonredundant "X-15," it was found 
that the airplane would have crashed on almost one-third of the flights. 
DISCUSSION 
The basic approach to the X-15 pilot-in-the-Ioop and redundancy 
evaluation was to perform a flight-by-flight detailed engineering anal-
ysis of each individual problem or failure which occurred for all X-15 
launch and aborted flights. Each problem or failure was completely 
described and corrective action by the pilot or redundancy was analyzed. 
The effect and value of the pilot and redundancy were assessed with 
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regard to the impact on mission success and vehicle recovery. Then the 
hypothetical cases of an unmanned and/or nonredundant "X-15" were 
studied to confirm the previous assessment of the pilot and redundancy 
aspects of each in-flight problem or failure. Formalization of these 
procedures resulted in a "Detailed Flight History," which was then <luan-
titatively summarized to serve as the basis for all further analysis. 
(This back-up documentation will be available in an AFFTC technical 
report on this sUbject to be published soon.) 
For the purpose of compiling the Detailed Flight History, numerous 
sources of information were researched, no one of which was complete. 
This information was contributed by the NASA Flight Research Center, the 
Air Force Flight Test Center, and North American Aviation, Inc., and was 
extracted from periodic status reports, flight files, pilot's reports, 
flight failure records, and project engineers' notebooks. 
Several important ground rules were strictly adhered to in the con-
duct of this evaluation, among which comprehensiveness and impartiality 
were basic. All problems or failures were initially documented, whether 
seemingly significant or not. The benefits of the pilot-in-the-loop and 
redundancy were assessed conservatively to avoid any glorification of 
either of these elements. Conjecture was minimized, especially for the 
hypothetical case of the unmanned, non redundant X-15. Several incidents 
involving significant conjecture or uncertainties as to impact were prop-
erly de-emphasized by the introduction of fractional weighting factors. 
The pilot was not credited with detections nor corrective action which 
definitely would have been provided by some other element in his absence. 
Likewise, he was not assessed detrimental effects which would have been 
the same without a pilot. Redundancy was assessed similarly. Finally, 
in the hypothetically unmanned, nonredundant case, it was assumed that 
no system nor component changes were made other than removing all redun-
dancy and substituting relatively simple and reliable present-day guid-
ance and automatic control systems in place of the pilot. 
A practical cut-off point for this evaluation was set at November 1, 
1961. At that point 76 flights of the X-15 had been conducted, the first 
of which was flown on March 3, 1959. Figure 2 illustrates that 44 of 
these were actual free flights, 30 more resulted in launch abort after 
mated B-52/X-15 t~e-off, and the remaining two were intentional captive 
flights. 
In evaluating the 44 free flights, the postlaunch phase was first 
analyzed. "Postlaunch" refers to that time period between physical 
launch separation of the X-15 from the B-52 carrier and contact with 
the ground upon X-15 landing. The postlaunch pilot and redundancy 
aspects as extracted from the Detailed Flight History are treated <luan-
titatively in table I and figure 3. Table I lists the pilot and redun-
dancy benefits in terms of mission success and safe airplane recovery. 
-
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The first row of values show both the problematic flights and the haz-
ardous individual incidents which required only pilot action to prevent 
loss of missions and aircraft. Next, are listed those situations safely 
handled by benefit of redundancy alone. The flights and incidents 
requiring both the pilot and redundancy acting in combination are then 
shown, and finally, these figures are added together on the bottom row 
to give the total pilot and redundancy benefits for the postlaunch 
phase. Examination of table I shows that on a flight basis, primary 
missions successfully completed as a result of pilot only were two; 
redundancy only, one; pilot and redundancy working in combination, 11; 
for a total of 14. On an individual incident basis the pilot and/or 
redundancy benefits are roughly twice as prevalent. Both the flight 
and individual incident bases show alternate missions accomplished as 
a result of pilot alone to be two; redundancy alone, none; pilot and 
redundancy acting together, four; for a total of six. And finally, the 
X-15 was safely recovered on five flights by virtue of pilot action 
only, one flight because of redundancy alone, and 13 flights requiring 
both pilot and redundancy combined, for a total of 19 aircraft saved. 
As can be seen, the pilot and redundancy benefits for aircraft recovery 
are also somewhat greater when appraised on an individual incident basis. 
The apparent dependence of the pilot upon redundancy to cope with in-
flight problems and failures is in part due to the broad definition of 
redundancy as used in this evaluation. As stated earlier, "redundancy" 
is defined to consist of pure redundancy for improving reliability, such 
as dualized auxiliary power units plus emergency provisions for improving 
pilot and aircraft safety, examples of which are back-up flight data 
references and fail-safe propellant tank relief valves. The effect of 
this broad definition of redundancy will also be observed in the results 
being presented later for the prelaunch phase. 
The postlaunch results are summarized in figure 3 to illustrate 
further the net pilot and redundancy effects on a flight basis. This 
diagram. shows that total mission success after launch was 43 in 44 
attempts for the actual X-15 as compared with 27 successful missions 
with pilot only, 24 with redundancy alone, and only 23 with neither 
pilot nor redundancy. The 23 mission successes of the unmanned, non-
red~~dant X-15 would be comprised of 19 flights which were completely 
trouble-free plus four flights which were trouble-free after launch. 
Similarly, for safe aircraft recovery no X-15 airplanes have actually 
been lost, but this eValuation shows that with the pilot alone X-15 
airplanes would have hypothetically been lost 14 times; with no pilot 
but with redundancy retained, 18 aircraft would have crashed; and with 
neither pilot nor redundancy 19 crashes would have resulted. The 
assessment of 14 crashes to a piloted but nonredundant "X-15" issues 
ominous implications in terms of pilot mo rt ali ty rate, and all but the 
actual case figures would spell doom to such a research flight test 
program as the X-15 airplanes are engaged in. A further serious 
-
292 II 2 • ft4. •• ••• •• ••• • .. p" : ••• • •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• • • • • • • •• • •• • • • • • • ••• 
• • • • • • • ••• • • • • • • ••• •• ••• •• ••• • • • •• •• • • ••• •• 
implication of losing aircraft involves repeated failures because of 
the inability to thoroughly analyze initial failures and their causes 
following a crash. 
Next, the prelaunch phase of each X-15 free flight was analyzed. 
"Prelaunch" refers to that time period between mated B-52jx-15 take-off 
and physical separation of the X-15 from the B-52 carrier at launch. 
The prelaunch pilot and redundancy aspects of all the free flights Irere 
extracted from the Detailed Flight History and are presented ~uantita­
tively in table II and figure 4. As illustrated in table II the pilot 
alone was able to avoid four aborted flights and coped with seven indi-
vidual incidents of an abort nature. Redundancy alone avoided two 
aborts and successfully corrected four abort-type individual incidents. 
The pilot and redundancy acting in combination served to avoid six 
aborts and coped with five individual abortive incidents. These bene-
fits were then tallied to give the total pilot and redundancy effects 
in terms of abort avoidance. 
The prelaunch results are summarized by noting in figure 4 that of 
74 total launch attempts there were 44 successful launches of the actual 
X-15 (that is, with a pilot-in-the-loop and redundancy). With the pilot 
only there would hypothetically have been 36 successful launches; with 
redundancy only, 34; and least of all, 32 launches, with neither pilot 
nor redundancy. Another interesting prelaunch ramification is that for 
the hypothetical unmanned, non redundant "X-15," critical problems which 
occurred on four flights may not have been detected from the B-52, chase 
aircraft, or ground monitoring. If, in fact, these problems were not 
detected and corrected, launch would have occurred in each case and 
resulted in probable loss of the aircraft. Because of the conjecture 
involved, these possibilities are not included in the tally of hypo-
thetical aircraft losses. 
The results of the prelaunch and postlaunch analyses for the 44 
free flights were combined to determine the overall pilot-in-the-loop 
and redundancy effects as previewed in figure 1. This consolidation 
compares the actual 43 successful missions in 44 launches with only 
24 successful missions for pilot only, 20 with redundancy only, and 19 
with neither pilot nor redundancy included. These are the 19 flights 
which were totally'trouble-free. Comparison of results in figures 1 
and 4 shows that safe aircraft recovery for the hypothetical cases 
appears to effectively increase from the overall flight standpoint as 
a result of abort preclusion of six hazardous free flights. In other 
words, in the absence of a pilot and redundancy six of the X-15 flights 
would have inadvertently aborted before launch with no knowledge of the 
impending postlaunch hazards thereby avoided. This leaves a net total 
of 13 flights of the unmanned, nonredundant "X-15" which would have 
definitely resulted in crashes with all effects taken into account. 
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There is an obvious trend in these results toward even greater 
interdependence between pilot and redundancy than was seen in either 
the prelaunch or postlaunch phases taken separately. This result is 
attributed to the multiplicity of individual incidents arising over the 
course of anyone typical flight requiring pilot action or redundancy 
for safe solution. This is borne out from tables I and II by observing 
that in 25 flights which were not trouble-free, there occurred 47 indi-
vidual incidents involving pilot-in-the-loop or redundant systems, and 
usually both, to avert mission failure. Since basic vehicle design can 
seldom directly account for greater than single-degree malfunctions, 
the pilot-in-the-loop plays a vital role in safely and flexibly handling 
such multiple failures and compounded problems. In this capacity the 
pilot must be supported by redundant systems, emergency proviSions, and 
flexible control in order to be totally effective. 
Of more than mere academic interest is an available comparison 
between the results just presented and those of a similar pilot-in-the-
loop and redundancy evaluation performed independently by The Boeing 
Company for the first 60 flights of the Bomarc missile. The Bomarc is, 
of course, an unmanned and relatively nonredundant vehicle, and Boeing's 
evaluation consequently involved analytical extrapolation to a hypo-
thetically piloted "Bomarc" having system redundancy comparable to that 
found in the X-15. Thus, the Bomarc results were arrived at by a reverse 
extrapolation to that utilized in the present X-15 study. And yet, as 
shown in figure 5, the results bear resounding similarities with regard 
to the percentage of total missions which were successful. For the 
actual X-15, total mission success was about 98 percent, which compares 
very closely with the 97 percent determined by Boeing for the hypothet-
ically piloted "Bomarc" having redundant systems. Conversely, for both 
the actual Bomarc and the hypothetically unmarJlled, nonredundant "X-15," 
total mission success was found to be identically 43 percent. The 
pilot-only and redundancy-only mission success figures also compare 
quite closely. This comparison lends validity to the extension of such 
evaluations to other aerospace research and development vehicles. 
(Acknowledgement is made to Mr. Thomas K. Jones of The Boeing Company 
for the Bomarc data.) 
After the X-15 free flights were thoroughly analyzed, the 30 aborted 
flights were evaluated. Generally speaking, the pilot-in-the-loop and 
redundancy aspects of the aborted flights are somewhat more elusive than 
was found in the free flights. However, some significant trends are 
still observed. Table III presents a summary of pilot and redundancy 
effects for the aborted flights on an individual incident basis. Pilot-
in-the-loop and redundancy here consist not only of X-15 factors, but 
also the pilot and redundancy aspects of the B-52 and chase airplanes 
which are peculiar to the manned X-15 type of operation. It is seen 
that there were a total of 25 instances where pilot considerations and 
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redundancy either caused abort or provided an additional cause for abort. 
However, there were 14 cases preceding the actual first cause for abort 
where having the pilot and redundancy prevented hardware damage or 
avoided immediate abort. Furthermore, there were 24 instances of pilot 
and redundancy benefit in preventing damage or immediate abort of cap-
tive flight either during or after the actual first causes of aborts. 
Therefore, the pilot and redundancy were beneficial both in allowing 
the flights to progress normally as far as they did and in allowing 
informative and somewhat exploratory captive flights to proceed safel~ 
after the first call for abort. The byproduct in both cases was usually 
the gaining of invaluable systems knowledge and operational experience. 
It is additionally observed from table III that the pilot and redun-
dancy detected a total of 14 problems which otherwise would have gone 
undetected from the B-52, the chase airplanes, or the ground monitor sta-
tions. In all of these cases launch would have occurred and either the 
mission, the X-15, or both would probably have been lost. 
In analyzing the 30 aborted flights on an overall flight basis it 
was determined as illustrated in table IV that pilot considerations and 
redundancy were at least partially the cause for abort on 16 of'the 30 
aborted flights. On the other hand, having a pilot-in-the-loop and 
systems redundancy prevented damage or immediate abort on 20 of the 
flights and on 8 flights provided the sole capability for detecting 
various problems which otherwise would have resulted in launch and prob-
able loss of either the mission or the X-15, or both. A comparison of 
tables III and IV again illustrates the multiplicity of individual inci-
dents ariSing over the course of anyone typical flight, be it an aborted 
one or an actual free flight. 
A comparison of the pilot and redundancy aspects of the X-15 aborted 
and free flights can be achieved on the basis of mission success. It 
has already been determined that 24 of the 44 free flights were depend-
ent upon benefits of a pilot-in-the-loop and redundancy for completing 
successful missions. This number is compared with the 16 flights which 
were aborted either primarily or secondarily due to pilot and redundancy 
detriments; consequently, unsuccessful missions resulted. However, of 
these 16 aborted flights, 10 flights also involved one or more of the 
following type problems or failures in addition to the pilot-or-
redundancy-caused abort incidents: 
(1) A problem requiring a pilot-in-the-loop or systems redundancy 
for correction in order to launch 
(2) A failure related neither to the pilot nor to redundancy 
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(3) A problem or failure which could be detected solely by the 
X-15 pilot or by virtue of X-15 systems redundancy and which 
otherwise would have resulted in launch and a probable 
unsuccessful mission 
In reality, then, having a pilot-in-the-loop and redundant systems 
cost only six unsuccessful X-15 missions through abort as opposed to 
24 successful X-15 free-flight missions made possible only by virtue of 
pilot and redundancy. 
Several qualifying remarks are appropriate at this point for a full 
appreciation of the quantitative results of this evaluation. Included 
in the Detailed Flight History were failures of X-15 subsystems under 
development and for which there were no operational requirements at the 
particular stage of the X-15 program when failure occurred. Examples 
of these are the inertial flight data system and the ballistic control 
system. However, these failures of developmental systems, owing to 
their very nature, were not reflected in assessing pilot and redundancy 
effects nor included in the quantitative results. The benefits of life-
support redundancy (such as the pilot's pressure suit) were also pur-
posely excluded by the rating process and do not reflect in the final 
results. It was believed that if it were not for the pilot's presence 
in the X-15, there would be no need for such life-support redundancy. 
This approach keeps the results conservative with regard to prohibiting 
any distortion of the virtues of redundant systems in general. Con-
servatism in rating the pilot-in-the-loop benefits was achieved by dis-
regarding the inherent "unreliability" of the automatic guidance and 
control systems hypothetically substituted for the pilot in the cases 
of unmanned vehicles. Furthermore, the advantages of the human pilot 
in senSing, evaluating, and reporting qualitative flight test results 
were not included. And finally, it should be noted that no attempt has 
been made to cover the numerous ground aborts which have occurred in 
the course of the X-15 program. 
There are two interesting peripheral aspects of this study which 
it is hoped will be developed in more detail in the forthcoming tech-
nical report mentioned previously. The first of these is systems matu-
rity, and the other involves the effects of the B-52 carrier aircraft 
as a recoverable, "recallable, slow "booster" having maneuver and loiter 
capabilities. In 16 of the aborted X-15 flights the B-52 in its booster 
capacity rendered 35 significant benefits which would not be realized 
with a conventional, nonrecoverable, fast booster. 
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In conclusion, it can be restated and emphasized that the X-15 
flights to date have demonstrated resounding net benefits of the pilot-
in-the-loop and redundant systems in terms of mission success, safe 
aircraft recovery, and the very continuance of the X-15 program. Even 
though the assessment was kept conservative, 24 of the first 44 X-15 
free flights were found to require pilot-in-the-loop and redundant sys-
tems in order to culminate in successful missions. Only six of the 
first 76 flights of the X-15 were aborted because of overall pilot and 
redundancy detriments. The majority of the 24 other aborted flights 
were benefited by both the pilot and redundancy in deferring abort, 
allowing safe continuance of a captive flight after call for abort, or 
preventing launch in the presence of an otherwise undetected and unsafe 
condition. The pilot and redundancy were instrumental in safely handling 
most of the multiple failures and compounded problems which have been 
prevalent in the X-15 flight program to date. The most important pilot 
and redundancy benefit to the X-15 program is graphically demonstrated 
in figure 6. The upper curve is a time plot of the first 44 X-15 free 
flights. The lower curve plots hypothetical aircraft recovery for the 
unmanned, nonredundant vehicle. The shaded area between the two curves 
represents 13 losses of aircraft in the absence of a human pilot and 
systems redundancy. Decisions on preliminary design of future space 
vehicles should find considerable bases in these quantitative results 
and results similarly derived from other current aerospace programs with 
regard to the pilot-in-the-loop and redundancy functions. 
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TABLE I 
PILOT AND REDUNDANCY BENEFITS FOR X-15 FREE FLIGHTS 
POST-LAUNCH PHASE 
PRIMARY ALTERNATE SAFE 
MISSION MISSION AIRCRAFT 
BENEFITS AS RESULT OF COMPLETED ACCOMPLISHED RECOVERY 
INDIVIDUAL INDIVIDUAL INDIVIDUAL 
FLIGHT INCIDENT FLIGHT INCIDENT FLIGHT INCIDENT 
BASIS BASIS BASIS BASIS BASIS BASIS 
PILOT ONLY +2 +7 +2 +2 +5 +B 
REDUNDANCY ONLY +1 +1 0 0 +1 +2 
BOTH PILOT AND 
REDUNDANCY +11 +17 +4 +4 +13 +15 
TOTAL (PILOT AND 
REDUNDANCY) +14 +25 +6 +6 +19 +25 
TABLE II 
PILOT AND REDUNDANCY BENEFITS FOR 
X-15 FREE FLIGHTS 
PRE - LAUNCH PHASE 
ABORTS AVOIDED BY: 
FLIGHT INDIVIDUAL 
BASIS INCIDENT BASIS 
PILOT ONLY + 4 
REDUNDANCY ONLY + 2 
PILOT AND REDUNDANCY + 6 
TOTAL (PILOT ANO/OR REDUNDANCY) +12 
-
+7 
+4 
+5 
+16 
. .. 
297 
298 
•• ••• • • •• • •• •• • • • ••• •• 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
• • •• • •• • • • • • • • •• • • 
• • • • • • • • ••• • • • • • 
•• ••• • • • •• •• • • ••• •• ••• •• 
=----TABLE III 
PILOT AND REDUNDANCY EFFECTS FOR X-15 ABORTED FLIGHTS 
INDIVIDUAL INCIDENT BASIS 
DETRIMENTS BENEFITS 
PROVIDED SOLE 
PREVENTED DAMAGE DETECTION OF PROBLEM RESPONSIBLE AND/OR IMMEDIATE RESULTING OTHERWISE IN FOR- ABORT LOSS OF MISS ION 
AND/OR AIRCRAFT 
ADDITIONAL 
PRIMARY CAUSE FOR BEFORE DURING OR BEFORE DURING OR 
EFFECT OF- CAUSE FOR ABORT AFTER ACTUAL AFTER ACTUAL ACTUAL AFTER ACTUAL ABORT PRIMARY ABORT CAUSE ABORT CAUSE ABORT CAUSE ABORT CAUSE 
ABORT CAUSE 
PILOT-IN-THE-LOOP 4 2 I 9 0 II 
ONLY 
REDUNDANCY ONLY 9 B 8 8 0 2 
BOTH PILOT AND 
REDUNDANCY IN 
COMBINATION 2 0 5 7 0 I 
TOTAL FOR PILOT 
AND/OR REDUNDANCY 15 10 14 24 0 14 
25 38 14 
TABLE IV 
PILOT AND REDUNDANCY EFFECTS 
FOR X-15 ABORTED FLIGHTS 
OVERALL FLIGHT BASIS 
DETRIMENTS BENEFITS 
PROVIDED SOLE 
PROVIDED A PREVENTED DETECTION OF DAMAGE AND/OR PROBLEM RESULTING CAUSE FOR IMMEDIATE OTHERWISE IN LOSS 
EFFECT OF- ABORT ABORT OF MISSION AND/OR 
AIRCRAFT 
PILOT-IN -THE-
LOOP ONLY 3 6 I 
REDUNDANCY 
ONLY II 3 5 
BOTH PILOT AND 
REDUNDANCY IN 
COMBINATION 2. II 2 
---
TOTAL FOR 
PILOT AND/OR 
REDUNDANCY 16 20 8 
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A·PILOOt,~; ;;~;SI:;N OF THE X-15 PROGRAM (0 ) 
By Joseph A. Walker 
NASJ\ Flight Re seaI:.,ch Center 
N71-754G5 
Although the X-15 is an advanced high-performance aerospace craft, 
capable of maneuvering in the atmosphere and of being controlled outside 
of the atmosphere, its stage of development, compared with vehicles of 
the future, is still fairly primitive. On the other hand, even if the 
X-15 were to accomplish no other purpose than that it was built and 
flown, the knowledge gained and technological advancement achieved has 
indeed been worthwhile. It is not the intent of this paper to be criti-
cal of the X-15 because of its deficiencies or problems. It should 
rather be kept in mind that many compromises had to be accepted in the 
design of the X-15 to get on with the job, and rightly so, because there 
are some ~uestions which still have not been resolved. Inasmuch as the 
pilot flies the X-15 from launch to landing, much has been learned about 
his capabilities. It is conse~uently important to consider the program 
from the standpoint of the utilization of the pilot and see what has 
been verified or learned that can be carried forward to more advanced 
vehicles. The use of the word "pilot" in this discussion refers to all 
pilot input. 
As a framework for this discussion, utilization of the pilot is 
considered to include four main categories, as follows: 
(1) Planning 
(2) Supporting research and development 
(3) Operations (4) Analysis and interpretation of results 
How closely these categories are interlocked can be discovered if an 
attempt is made to establish a starting point. Logically this point 
would be the experience the pilot has gained from a recent project. 
This was the basis for initial X-15 pilot selection and participation 
in eValuation and pla~~ing. 
The experience gained by pilots should be brought to bear early in 
planning an advanced project. Planning should include: 
Basic design re~uirements 
Simulation 
Supporting research and development 
Feasibility of design proposals 
Operational concepts 
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From such plans, direct knowledge would be gained of the latest tec~-
ni~ues, feasibility of human control, and operational concepts. From 
combinations of experience and extensive electronic simulation, better 
visualization of the operational problem would result and would aid in 
design specification and determination of required supporting research. 
The combination of knowledge of available equipment and the chance of 
availability for new equipment specified for the job will aid in eval-
uating feasibility of new design proposals. The pilot should be able 
to inject some practical approaches in the program, to avoid the influ-
ence of hobbyists who would unnecessarily complicate or overengineer a 
vehicle, and should draw on his experience to insure that adequate func-
tional crew facilities and capabilities are provided. The pilot is able 
to aid materially in determination of necessary crew size and the dis-
tribution of crew responsibilities as well as in the development of 
operational concepts. 
The real complexity of the problem of equipment for guiding and 
flying the X-15 was not brought out until actual simulationq of design 
flight profiles were flown. Several variations of simulation were par-
ticipated in by the pilots in order to get acquainted with the problems 
involved with attempting to fly anticipated maximum performance X-15 
flight profiles. By this means, also, some appreCiation of the control 
requirements and the pilot presentation requirements was developed. 
Also, dynamic simulation programs allowed a look at the control task 
accomplishment capability and any effects of accelerations expected 
from the X-15. 
Supporting research and development requires the pilot to contribute 
to just about any portion of the job relating to his ability to fly and 
operate the vehicle. Items pertinent to the task include: 
Control systems 
Guidance 
Cockpit presentation 
Propulsion 
Environment 
Simulation 
The items noted are not complete but are suggestive of the magnitude of 
the task. The point to be made here is that an accomplishment of sup-
porting research and development has become an area of acute shortage, 
especially in point of timeliness. There is a need to begin at once to 
consider these items for future projects. Most important, hardware, 
now known to be required, needs to be developed, evaluated on simulators, 
installed in existing aircraft, and flight evaluated. The pilot should 
be active in evaluating progress and results. Items which are now 
extremely deficient are measurement and presentation of altitude or 
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distance from objects, velocity, and thrust. Even when desired infor-
mation can be measured and presented, accuracy is in doubt or can only 
be expected for short periods. 
At the present time with the X-15, mission planning is done on the 
basis of pitch attitude and engine shutdown time assuming that thrust 
is nominally correct for a given throttle setting, and a stopwatch which 
starts with main thrust chamber ignition is utilized for timing flight 
path events and burning time. This stopwatch thus assumes importance 
of first magnitude. 
Figure 1 illustrates the effects of pitch angle 8, thrust time t, 
and shutdown velocity upon the resultant altitude. To reach the intended 
altitude of 250,000 feet, 81 seconds of full thrust burning are utilized 
at a pitch attitude of 370 and shutdown velocity of 5,350 ft/sec. Indi-
cated is the altitude resulting from an error of ±2 seconds burning time 
as well as gross errors in 8 of as much as ±4°. The shaded area indi-
cates the greatest error in 8 which may be expected from flying the 
presentation. Observe that the pilot can run the engine longer to make 
up for low flight profile. Clearly, accuracy is essential to hitting 
objective altitude. Also, shown on the right-hand side of figure 1 are 
the resulting dynamic pressures during reentry as functions of pull-out 
angle of attack a and peak altitude. It can be seen that accuracy 
in the lower angle-of-attack ranges is critical, and these angles must 
be considered for roll-yaw SAS-off reentry. These curves represent 
holding the pull-out angle of attack to a load factor of 5g and then 
holding 5g to level flight. 
The following exa~ples from the X-15 program illustrate the active 
and productive part that the pilot can take in the supporting research 
and development preparatory to a flight project. The three-axis attitude 
presentation was brought into use after dynamic centrifuge simulation 
pointed out the need for presentation improvement. The approach and 
landing technique now utilized was developed by experiments with F-104 
airplanes. Presentation sensing, control stick operation, and thrust 
requirements were developed for reaction controls by ground simulation 
and flight experiments. 
One area where pilots considered the X-15 to be deficient was the 
stability augmentation system (SAS). The problem is, as has been dis-
cussed in the paper by Petersen, Rediess, and Weil (paper no. 10), that 
without roll and yaw damping, control of the X-15 at high angles of 
attack is extremely difficult. Although pilots requested that SAS be 
dualized, the final design had single-axis stabilization, and flight 
planning is restricted to flight profiles from which recovery can be 
made with SAS failed. This results in decreased flight planning 
flexibility and particularly limits peak altitudes. 
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As regards operations, the X-15 program has been successful enough so 
that the pilot would be expected to participate as an active and integral 
part of any advanced flight operation. Crews should still be selected 
from the best qualified experienced test pilots. No improvement in the 
selection process has been apparent by use of special aeromedical and 
psychological testing over the experience approach other than the 
expected medical aspects. However, thinking on the method of control 
has per force been modified. Not that the basic approach that the 
vehicle should be capable of manual operation has changed, but it is 
appreciated that a direct mechanical link to the control system actuator 
is impossible for the whole mission and electrical signals must be sub-
stituted. Also, it is recognized that quite a lot of electronic equip-
ment, accomplishing automatic ~unctions, is necessary. It still appears 
that the simplest arrangement of the pilot-control system-guidance pres-
entation loop that can accomplish the job is the best assurance of suc-
cessful operation. Also, pilots agree that the primary source of infor-
mation required for the operation should be on board the vehicle to 
preclude loss in event of radio or data link failure or interruption. 
Training would be accomplished by active participation in all phases 
as the project develops, as well as specific training required for the 
program. Some of this specific training would be in orbital and space 
mechanics, astronomy, celestial and space navigation, systems maintenance, 
and guidance computer operation. It would be much easier to develop suf-
ficient knowledge and experience for these skills in the experienced pilot 
than to train specialized scientific personnel as capable aircrew members. 
A very important part of pilot training would be simulator and 
flight evaluation of items included under supporting research and devel-
opment. The desirability of flight simulation in the early project 
phases cannot be overemphasized. An effort should also be made to utilize 
existing aircraft for any possible portion of the flight profile demon-
stration. An example of successful use of existing aircraft is the 
experience of utilizing F-I04 aircraft to develop the technique and pro-
vide practice for landing the X-15. An excellent benefit is derived 
from this flight work in maintaining pilot proficiency, alertness, 
response to flight stimuli, and morale. 
The problem of obtaining high-performance aircraft flights at a 
reasonable frequency is becoming so acute as to represent an area where 
the entire space effort could begin to suffer; that is, no amount of 
simulation can completely replace flight experience. If the vehicle 
itself does not fly very often, the next best flight experience perform-
ancewise is better than none; in fact, is essential. 
At this point, it is appropriate to amplify a pressing need in the 
national research effort. If the United States expects to send a 
.-
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vehicle to the moon or to any other planet, it would be best to start 
now to do more than develop boosters and vehicles to do the job. We 
are beginning to try to develop the operation of vehicles so they can be 
handled by the crew which is expected to fly them. Visualize a three man 
crew on the moon attempting to preflight the X-15, or any other manned 
rocket available today, for a return flight. It certainly will not be 
practical to have a lot of test and ground support equipment available 
there or at an orbiting space station. It is now time to start, with a 
selected crew, setting up operational procedures, test procedures, 
repair and replacement requirements, prelaunch procedures, and actually 
attempting the job with the objective that we develop here the knowledge 
and techniques which can be used anywhere. There is too much tendency 
to wear out equipment in making sure it will work and little earnest 
effort to simplify the check and maintenance procedures. One lesson 
that has been learned from the X-15 is that the best way to accomplish 
a job is to go out and do it. 
The pilot's contribution to the analysis and interpretation of 
results includes the following: 
Report flight observations of results 
Specify required improvements 
Establish meaning of recorded results 
Carryover to planning future flights 
Apply knowledge gained to new vehicle designs 
The followup on required improvements has been extremely difficult in 
the past because the pressure of the problems associated with accom-
plishing the operation left little time for reflection-, reconnnendations, 
and design partiCipation. The basic planning for the project should 
establish the means for rapid assimilation of information and imple-
mentation of improvements. We will never start a job if we attempt to 
answer every question before starting! 
Pilots participating in the X-15 program were convinced at the 
beginning that it could be flown. As results have indicated, their con-
fidence has been justified in most areas. They were sometimes wrong, 
and came up short in some areas. Other pilots have presented recorded 
results and have discussed their meaning and impact on future flight 
planning. (See papers no. 9 and 10.) Figure 2 is a tabulation of the 
X-15 mission successes. It includes the number of launches actually 
made, of those launched how many achieved desired performance, and how 
many achieved the prime mission objective. The smaller numbers in the 
latter two categories result from pawerplant and propellant system 
problems and pilot presentation deficiencies from consideration of per-
formance, stability augmentation, and cabin-pressure--pressure-suit-
systems problems in the case of prime objectives. Alternative modes of 
operation were available to obtain increased probability of mission 
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success. For instance, if the attitude-sensor ball nose failed after 
launch the pilot could do a 2g pullup until specified pitch angle was 
achieved. Reentry could be accomplished by reference to pitch on the 
attitude indicator, setting predetermined stabilizer angle, or refer-
ence to the horizon. However, all these resulted in comparatively 
inaccurate flight profiles. Generous tolerances were allowed in perform-
ance when achievement of prime objectives were considered. Even on sev-
eral flights which were successful there were problems similar to those 
mentioned. The significant point in this figure is that the pilot has 
been able to accomplish the task, if not prevented by factors beyond his 
control, and to recover the airplane in all cases. Of course, the flights 
were planned for pilot operation, but the tasks were challenging even so. 
The planning and execution of flights was generally successful and indi-
cates that the initial concepts were correct. On this basis it can be 
recommended that utilization of the pilot in advanced vehicles be accom-
plished similarly to the way it was done for the X-15 but that pilots' 
participation be increased and extended. 
However high the success rate subsequent to launch of the X-15, 
one of the less clearcut aspects of piloting is how to determine the 
workload. Comments such as ''busy,'' ''piece of cake," "no strain," or 
"hardly hacked it" are very descriptive but offer not even a good qual-
itative comparison. There is physical loading as a result of maneuvers, 
thrust and drag, temperature, restraint (straps, pressure suit, reaching), 
and control operation. There is mental loading resulting from observing, 
interpreting, and decision making. There is emotional loading from being 
keyed up, eager to do a good job, and from unknown or unexplained occur-
rences during the flight (limit cycle residual oscillations) or known 
criticality of some emergency conditions. Although pilots are not doc-
tors, they do partiCipate in the medical aspects of the program, and it 
therefore seems worthwhile for pilots to determine whether their efforts 
could be measured. 
Figures 3 and 4 are presented to illustrate some of these points 
and to arrive at an approximate workload, relative to maximum capacity, 
being demanded by an X-15 flight. Figure 3 presents flight time his-
tories of altitude h, velocity V, normal (an) and longitudinal (ax) 
acceleration, breathing rate, and heart rate as measured during an X-15 
flight. Figure 4 shows two quantities, heart rate in beats per minute, 
and work load" measured in meter kilograms per minute plotted against 
time in minutes. These data were obtained from a dynamic ground test 
of the same pilot's physical condition. The work consisted of pedaling 
a bicycle equipped with a Prony brake device which could be tightened 
as indicated by the step increases in the work load while the subject 
was pedaling in rhythm with a metronome. The termination of the work 
load is determined in this case by the heart rate reaching 180 beats per 
minute, which is taken to be the maximum normal output rate. Also the 
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recovery heart rate is shown for 5 minutes while the subject was 
resting after the 19 minutes of work output. This information was fur-
nished through the courtesy of Dr. Ulrich Luft of the Lovelace Foundation 
for Medical Education and Research. Two of the same variables are pres-
ent, the desire to do as well as possible and the work load. In figure 3 
can be seen the general parallel response of breathing and heart rate to 
greater or reduced physical loading caused by maneuvering and thrust and 
drag. The heart rate appears to be the more accurate indicator of work 
load, since breathing can be varied somewhat (holding one's breath at 
high g, for instance). Note that the last 4 minutes (time 400-630 sec) 
have the highest continuous heart rate, coincident with a steep descending 
turn with speed brakes extended, followed by pull-out and landing pattern 
maneuvering. One can also observe the anticipatory "spinup" surges 
before launch and before descent, followed by decrease to required load. 
Recall the previous discussion about the different kinds of loading; 
the heart rate curve here represents the sum of them all. When selected 
points are transferred, using heart rate as the base, it can be seen 
that the workload spread indicated is between 45 percent and 78 percent 
of indicated capacity and more often at 50 percent to 60 percent. 
Although the X-15 pilots are not willing to say "even your grandmother 
could fly it," these indications are consistent with the comments by the 
pilots that they do not feel they are getting behind the aircraft. No 
adverse impact of increase of g loading has yet been noted. 
still hidden, however, is the tendency for the pilot to delete por-
tions of the panel scan when other portions become critical or trouble 
develops in one area. Although this may not be too much, still it is 
one way of reducing the workload. The same results could be brought 
about by better and more centralized information. Also, here is an 
indication that use of another crew member will be advisable for longer 
duration missions. 
Another clue that, although not loaded to physical capacity, the 
pilot is loaded to duty capacity is the often heard remark that 'be 
didn't have time to look out." It should be kept in mind that the man-
ner in which pilots are operating probably parallels that for an emer-
gency operation of a more advanced vehicle. A large part of the envelope 
expansion tests involve testing the aircraft to develop limit conditions 
of controllability in regions from which it can be recovered before the 
aircraft and pilot are committed to a profile where limiting conditions 
may be required. Hence, measurements are being obtained of the pilot's 
physical exertion at the same time as information on just what a pilot 
can accomplish and still get the aircraft through the speed-altitude 
profile. It is admitted that this is a preliminary run at the problem, 
but even so, it does not appear to be insurmountable. 
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It can be concluded that there is a great wealth of experience and 
practical knowledge available in the persons of experienced pilots to 
which more will be added. In order to realize the greatest return from 
our project, this store of pilots' information should be utilized to 
aid in the development of future designs and the planning of future 
operations. In addition, pilots can make direct contributions through 
participation in the operational phase. 
-
••• 
••• 
• • 
••• 
••• 
280 
PEAK 260 
ALTITUDE, 
FT 240 
220 
•• . - • • • •• •• • • • • .. • • • • • • • 
• .. •• • • • • • • 
.. 
• • • • • ••• • • 
•. 
• • ... 
-
• 
EFFECTS OF PRESENTATION ERRORS 
DESIGN ALTITUDE MISSION 
EXIT ENTRY 
••• 
• 
•• 
• 
.. 
200 50 52 54 56xl02 ~'="'-~~""-*""'"'~~~ 
SHUTDOWN VELOCITY, PEAK 
FPS 
Figure 1 
X-15 FLIGHT SUMMARY 
AS OF NOVEMBER I, 1961 
LAUNCHES 
ACHIEVED PLANNED 
PERFORMANCE 
ACHIEVED 
PRIME OBJECTIVE 
• ••• 
• • 
• •• 
• • 
.. ... 
o 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 
FLIGHTS 
Figure 2 
•• 
• • 
• • 
• • 
• • 
311 
•• ••• • 
• • • • 
• • •• • 
• • • • 
•• ..... • 312 
I •• • •• •• • • • -. •• • •• • • • • • • • • .. • • • ••• •• • • • .. • • • • • • • • • • . " • • ••• 
• • 
-
•• • • •• .. ~ • •• 
o 
HEART 
RATE, 
BEATS 
PER 
MINUTE 
WORK, 
mkg 
--r-
min 
FLIGHT TIME HISTORY 
I LANDING 
I .. 
z 
::E 
..... 
en 
:z: 
40!;t 
w 
0::: 
!D 
30 w" ~ 
(!) 
z 
20 :I: 
!;t 
w 
100 200 300 400 500 600 700 ~ 
TIME, SEC 
Figure 3 
DYNAMIC GROUND TEST 
200 
150 
100 
50 
1500~~ 0  
500 ! ! I ! ! 
o 0 5 10 15 19 I 2 3 4 5 
MINUTES 
Figure 4 
••• 
••• 
• • .. ., 
••• 
•• ••• •• • 
• •• ••• •• ~j
•• 
• 
• 
• 
•• 
•• • 
• • 
• • 
• .. 
•• • 
••• • ••• •• 
• • • • 
•• • •• • 
• • • • 
• • 
... , • • 
23. X-15 EXPERIENCE FROM THE DESIGNER'S VIEWPOINT (J ) 
By L. P. Greene and R. L .• Benner 
North American Aviation, Inc. 
~. N 7 1 - 7 5 4 66 INTRODUCTION 
• 
• 
• 
313 
In the introductory remarks at the October 1956 conference on the 
X-15 airplane, Dr. Hugh L. Dryden made the following statement: "First, 
in line with the urgency expressed in the memorandum of understanding, 
the project is proceeding on an expedited basis with the intent of 
realizing flights of a man-carrying aircraft at hypersonic speeds and 
high altitudes as soon as possible for explorations to separate the real 
from the imagined problems and to make known the overlooked and unex-
pected problems." 
The purpose of this paper is to present with due candor some 
explanation of the differentiation of real and imagined problems, as 
well as the overlooked or unexpected problems. 
In the original direction provided the contractor, the X-15 air-
plane was not to be an optimized configuration but was to be as simple 
as possible, and wherever possible conventional designs and methods 
were to be utilized. 
This statement certainly belies the fact. Anyone who has come 
much closer than 1,000 feet to the X-15 airplane will recognize that 
the only thing conventional about the airplane is that it has a wing 
and tail surfaces and generally looks like an airplane. 
LANDING EXPERIENCE 
One of the most unique aspects of the X-15 airplane is recognized 
when consideration is given to the airplane landing characteristics and 
the associated landing-gear configuration. Li1tially, it was decided 
that with a maximum lift-drag ratio LID of approximately 4 in the 
landing approach, acceptable landing characteristics could be provided. 
Figure 1 shows a comparison of the landing-approach lift-drag ratios as 
plotted against lift coefficient CL for several earlier rocket-
powered aircraft and the originally predicted LID for the X-15 air-
plane. As the first flight vas approached and the "adrenalin factor" 
increased, a reevaluation was made. In addition to the analytic studies 
of these flight characteristics, a flight program was conducted by both 
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North American Aviation, Inc., and the U.S. Government utilizing both 
an F-100C airplane and an F-104 airplane with specific drag configura-
tions employed to simulate the X-15 approach LID in order to permit 
actual in-flight assessment of the low LID landing-approach phase. 
As reported upon in the July 1958 conference on the X-15 airplane by 
Finch, Matranga, Walker, and Armstrong, it was decided that the X-15 
airplane was to fly the landing approach in the clean configuration to 
take advantage of the higher lift-drag ratiO, and the flap and gear 
extension was to be delayed until about 15 seconds before touchdown. 
This plan was to allow for greater pilot freedom in approach from high 
key points. Even so, it was recognized that a certain degree of pro-
ficiency would be required in executing the approach and landing maneu-
ver and, for this reason, much effort was expended in assuring the 
validity of the handling characteristics associated with these flight 
conditions. 
Serious consideration was also given the landing dynamics 
(described in a previous paper by McKay and Kordes (paper no. 5)) 
associated with the X-15 landing-gear configuration which locates the 
main skid-type gear far aft on the fuselage. This specific gear con-
figuration was selected in the interest of maintaining minimum com-
promise to the basic requirements of the airplane. Once again, analyses 
indicated that acceptable landing characteristics would be provided. 
Touchdowns were expected to be made at high landing speeds and at angles 
of attack of the order of 60 and at sinking speeds of 9 feet per second 
or less. 
These landing-gear design requirements provided gear strength for 
landing an 11,900-pound airplane within a sinking-speed--angle-of-attack 
envelope, as shown in figure 2, encompassing an angle of attack of 80 
at a sinking speed of 9 feet per second and an angle of attack of 9.50 
at zero sinking speed. Because of airplane growth and the difficulty 
encountered during early flights to land consistently within the design 
envelope, it appeared that this original landing envelope was not 
adequate. 
Subsequent to the first flight, when the main-gear cylinder bot-
tomed and the gear was damaged, additional energy-absorption capacity 
was added to the main gear. Later, a still greater capacity was pro-
vided by increasing the cylinder stroke and allowing even higher peak 
loads by adding some beef-up to the gear and backup structure. 
The nose-gear loads were known to be extremely responsive to air-
plane angle of attack as well as to airplane weight. The nose-gear 
energy-absorption capacity was thought to be adequate, even though the 
landing weights and touchdown angles during the first three landings 
were exceeding design values. However, during the fourth landing, a 
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hard emergency landing on Rosamond Dry Lake following an in-flight 
engine explosion, the nose-gear wheels were bent and the fuselage was 
broken aft of the cockpit area. 
The investigation that followed the accident revealed that the 
principal problem existed in the nose-gear arresting system. In order 
to conserve space when the nose gear was retracted, the gear was stowed 
in a nearly compressed position. Upon rapid gear extension, the nitro-
gen gas which had been entrapped by the oil under high pressure was 
released and produced a gas-oil foam within the cylinder. Approximately 
the first one-third of the cylinder stroke was rendered ineffective by 
this foam, and consequently the loads built up to excessive values 
during the remainder of the stroke. A permanent solution was achieved 
by redesigning the internal mechanism of the strut to incorporate a 
floating piston which keeps the gas and oil separated at all times. 
With the additional energy-absorption capacity provided in the 
main and nose gears, the operational sinking-speed---angle-of-attack 
envelope was enlarged as shown in figure 2 to encompass an angle of 
attack of 100 at a sinking speed of 9 feet per second and an angle of 
attack of 130 at zero sinking speed. Landing weights of 14,500 pounds 
are now permissible within the original envelope and a weight of 
13,500 pounds may be landed within the larger envelope. 
Since the first few flights, the landing techniques have been 
modified and these modifications have resulted in landing characteris-
tics that are quite acceptable. The lift-drag ratio realized during 
actual approaches is slightly higher than that predicted and the angle 
of attack at touchdown has been reduced so that the landings are well 
within the allowable envelope. The procedure of extending the gear 
shortly before touchdown has proven to be satisfactory and the l~~dings 
have become routine as indicated in a previous paper by White, Robinson, 
and Matranga (paper no. 9). 
SYSTEM TESTmG 
The problems associated with obtaining reliable components have 
been discussed in a previous paper by Wiswell, Olekszyk, and Gibb 
(paper no. 19). The advantages of system testing have been pointed out 
both in the previous paper by Wiswell, Olekszyk, and Gibb (paper no. 19) 
and in a previous paper by love and Palmer (paper no. 20) and were 
forcibly demonstrated on June 8, 1960, when the third X-15 airplane was 
severe~y damaged by an explosion. Figure 3 gives some idea of the 
extent of explosion damages. Investigation disclosed the initiating 
cause to be overpressurization of the ammonia tank, the result of a 
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combination relief valve and pressurizing gas regulator malfunction 
while operating on the ground with the ammonia tank vented through the 
vapor disposal system as shown in figure 4. Because of the toxic nature 
of rurumonia fumes, the vapor disposal system had been incorporated into 
the facility at Edwards Air Force Base to dispose of ammonia fumes from 
the airplane tankage. At the time of the explosion, the ammonia tank 
pressurizing gas regulator probably froze or stuck in an open position 
while the vent valve was operating erratically or modulating only par-
tially open. This condition had been considered as a failure possi-
bility in the airplane; however, these malfunctions in conjunction with 
the back pressure associated with the vapor disposal system combined to 
cause ammonia tank pressures high enough to fail the tank. Redesign of 
the pressurizing gas regulator to reduce maximum flow through an inop-
erable regulator, redesign of the regulator to provide additional 
closing forces in the event of freezing, relocation of the regulator to 
minimize possibility of the moisture entrance and subsequent freezing, 
and redesign of the relief valve and relief system plumbing, all were 
results of the explosion. 
This was a costly lesson, but it pointed out the need for more 
complete system analyses and/or testing under not only design condi-
tions, but also under operational and test conditions since analytical 
evaluation of such involved systems is extremely difficult and not com-
pletely reliable. Real-time monitoring of system and component per-
formance during testing is also indicated. 
The optimum approach then would include not only conventional test-
stand testing of the various systems and the ground testing of the com-
pleted airplane, but specific "fail safe" tests including the utiliza-
tion of any ground support equipment and/or facility equipment which 
become integral with the airplane system at any time. "Fail safe" tests 
are those in which critical components are intentionally failed to 
insure that no single failure can cause damage to the airplane. 
AERO HEATING AND STRUC'IURAL TEMPERA'IURES 
A primary design objective of the X-15 airplane was to achieve 
skin temperatures of 1,2000 F over significant areas of the airplane. 
Involved in this objective is structural temperature prediction. As 
indicated in previous papers by Banner, Kuhl, and Quinn (paper no. 2) 
and Kordes, Reed, and Dawdy (paper no. 3), sufficient data have been 
gathered to make it evident that modifications to standard thermo-
dynamic techniques are required for the successful prediction of 
hypersonic-flight structural temperatures. In the initial design, the 
predicted surface temperatures were calculated by assuming full turbu-
lent flow except for the wing and empennage surfaces where a transition 
l) •• •• • 
••• • ••• •• 
••• • • • • • • • • • ••• • • • " • • • • • •• • • ••• •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• • • 
••• •• •• • • • 
••• 317 
Reynolds number of 100,000 was assumed. It was always recognized that 
these assumptions might contain some conservatism for the specific 
design-type missions, but the structural design resulting from these 
criteria might therefore provide greater latitude in airplane flight 
missions for other investigations. No one had real confidence in the 
basic heat-transfer theory so an extensive wind-tunnel test was made 
with pressure and heat-transfer instrumentation. The model was tested 
in a manner to produce the maximum confidence in results with maximum 
available temperature gradients and turbulent flow. In figure 5, the 
introduction of the resulting wind-tunnel factors caused further con-
servatism in predicted peak temperatures as compared with actual flight 
data. The result of the basic assumptions and the modified heat-
transfer coefficients has been that average skin temperatures of primary 
structural areas of the fuselage, main wing box, and vertical tail are 
running several hundred degrees below predicted values at the peak Mach 
number by using the temperature-prediction methods used for design of 
the X-15. This is a conservatism in structura~ temperature prediction. 
This does not necessarily imply a structural integrity conservatism 
since thermal gradients may be adversely affected by this fact. Also, 
as mentioned earlier, there are some specific areas, such as the wing 
leading edge and speed brakes, which are experiencing local temperatures 
essentially equivalent to those which were predicted. This experience 
should serve as a reminder that extrapolation of heat-transfer model 
testing to actual airplane conditions may give results which are inac-
curate. This is not to say that the wind tunnels are at fault; it is 
believed that either they were used incorrectly or that their results 
were interpreted incorrectly. The continued flight program that will 
be conducted by the U.S. Government should help to improve this situa-
tion. Additional understanding of boundary-layer conditions and these 
highly transient conditions will greatly assist the designer in inter-
pretation of wind-tunnel results. 
Although surface temperatures in general have been somewhat lower 
than predicted, there have been those specific locations where the 
reverse is true as indicated in a previous paper by Kordes, Reed, and 
Dawdy (paper no. 3). As shown in figure 6, the wing leading edge is 
fabricated from an Inconel X bar which serves as a heat sink to absorb 
heat generated at the stagnation point. Principal loads are carried by 
the main wing box immediately aft of the secondQry structure leading-
edge box. In order to minimize attachment stresses between the bar and 
the wing skin, as a result of unequal thermal expansion, the bar was seg-
mented into five pieces with an expansion joint or slot about 0.080 inch 
wide between the segments. As indicated by previous papers, temperature-
sensitive paint on the wing defined the temperature patterns resulting 
from the turbulence generated by these leading-edge slots. Although 
this localized turbulence had been anticipated, the magnitude or profile 
of the resulting temperatures and the stresses induced locally on the 
-
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wing skin could not be adequately predicted. This condition contributed 
to the local permanent buckling. One obvious solution to this problem 
would be to replace this leading-edge structure with one which did not 
have high thermal expansion characteristics and which, therefore, did 
not require these expansion slots. This approach has some areas of 
concern, however, on mechanical attachment of the leading edge and the 
heat transfer within the structure. These problems will be aggravated, 
of course, by heat flux and transients occurring on higher performance 
vehicles. 
Aerodynamic heating of the outer panel of the double paneled wind-
shield provides another area of interest. The arrangement of the double 
panels is shown in figure 7. The original analysis for selection of 
outer windshield glass was based on theoretical heat-transfer data and 
the then known thermal properties of the glass selected. That analysis 
indicated that soda-lime glass would be adequate for conditions imposed 
by the X-15 flight program. Temperature data obtained during early 
flight testing of the airplane began to point toward a higher surface 
temperature and greater temperature gradient through the glass than had 
been originally predicted. A subsequent reevaluation of the wind-tunnel 
data showed that these data actually correlated well with the flight 
temperatures. A sample of the outer windshield soda-lime glass was then 
subjected to the surface temperature and temperature gradient extrap-
olated for a high-temperature flight and the glass failed. Meanwhile, 
alumino-silicate glass, developed under contract to the U.S. Air Force, 
had been qualified for aircraft glazing. This material, which has a 
greater heat capacity, higher thermal conductivity, lower coefficient 
of expansion, and greater strength at high temperatures than the soda-
lime glass, was subjected to the same thermal test and did not fail. 
The alumino-silicate sample was then subjected to a surface temperature 
of 1,05QO F with a temperature gradient from outer to inner surface of 
79QP F without failure. These temperatures are more than 150 percent 
of the maximum predicted. These thermal conditions are regarded to be 
considerably more severe than the X-15 mission will require; thus, the 
soda-lime outer windshields were replaced with alumino-silicate glass 
on all three airplanes. 
However, there have been two recent flights where failures of the 
outer panel have been encountered. As indicated in a previous paper 
by Kordes, Reed, and Dawdy, the first failure was primarily caused by 
the inadvertent installation of one of the original lower temperature 
tolerant soda-lime panels when the left-hand panel was replaced a few 
months prior to the failure. The second failure obtained during the 
speed flight on November 9, 1961, however, did involve the alumino-
silicate panel, but one thing common to both failures was the similar 
location of the initial point of failure even though the second failure 
involved the right-hand outer panel. In both cases, the failure 
-
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originated at a point approximately 1/2 inch down from the upper edge 
of the glass, nearly coincident with the trim line of the retainer, 
and at approximately the midpoint fore and aft. Since in both cases 
this location was approximately at the aft edge of a buckle in the 
retainer, it is deduced that the failure occurred as a result of thermal 
stresses produced by excessive local temperature gradients caused by 
the retainer buckle. It is noteworthy that the buckle was much more 
severe in the latter flight and would contribute to the higher local 
temperatures. Remedial action has been to convert the material for the 
retainer from Inconel X to titanium since the reduced coefficient of 
expansion of titanium compensates better for the differential expansion 
associated with the cooler Inconel X substructure frame. 
On the basis of what can really be considered as only preliminary 
data at this time, experience to date relative to aerodynamic heating 
and structural temperature prediction can be summarized as follows: 
(1) The assumption of turbulent airflow for hypersonic aerospace 
vehicles remains a good design criterion but it could be conservative in 
idealized areas. 
(2) No flight correlations have been obtained on the variation of 
transition Reynolds number with Mach number that has been indicated in 
some wind-tunnel tests. 
(3) Laminar-airflow tendencies can be made turbulent by local air-
flow disturbances such as leading-edge slots, production joints, and 
protuberances. These conditions should be evaluated in great detail in 
design stages, particularly when deformed structures due to aerothermo-
dynamic stresses are being investigated. 
STABILITY AND CONTROL DERIVATIVES AND HANDLING QUALITIES 
The handling characteristics of the X-15 airplane have been the 
subject of many studies prior to and during the airplane flight testing. 
These studies, which are currently being verified by flight tests, 
indicated that the X-15 airplane would display satisfactory ha~dling 
characteristics throughout its intended design envelope when all systems 
are operating normally; however, a control probTem area, as described 
in a previous paper by Petersen, Rediess, and Weil (paper no. 10) and 
as shown in figure 8, does exist should the pilot experience a critical 
stability augmentation system damper failure while he is operating in 
this area. Control problems are caused at the high angles of attack 
associated with reentry primarily by an aerodynamic derivative, adverse 
roll due to yaw, and these problems cause the pilot much difficulty in 
controlling the airplane in the lateral directional mode. 
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At the July 1958 conference on the X-15 airplane a paper by George 
B. Merrick and C. H. Woodling described the effects of angle of attack on 
controllability. Figure 9 is essentially a reproduction of the data from 
that paper. For the simulator evaluation for the condition of all damp-
ers off, flight characteristics for reentry maneuvers were satisfactory 
for angles of attack from 00 to 60 , acceptable for emergency for angles 
of attack from 60 to 170 , and unacceptable beyond 170 . 
Flight evaluations reflected in many papers of this conference 
indicate grossly different results. These more current analyses show 
acceptable characteristics at angles of attack below 70 to 80 and 
definitely unacceptable characteristics at angles of attack above 100 • 
There is little or no angle-of-attack range considered acceptable for 
emergency. 
There are at least two reasons which could contribute to this gross 
change in evaluation. The first is that the simulator mechanization 
used in the early phases of the program and in the centrifuge-simulator 
pilot-training phase did not include the secondary incremental effects 
of trimming the airplane with the horizontal tail. The position of the 
tail changes the rOll-due-to-yaw parameter C1~. 
The second reason is much harder to describe. It would appear 
that the centrifuge and these early simulator evaluations received a 
much coarser evaluation. Reentries were considered successful even 
where significant vehicle dynamic motions were experienced. Later, in 
the pilot training and especially in the actual flight evaluation, a 
much finer analysis was made and a more restrictive envelope was defined. 
No matter how realistic a simulation becomes, a pilot feels safer in a 
simulator than he does in an airplane. 
To the designer of aerospace vehicles, these evaluation trends 
should be remembered and final aerodynamic parameters should be incorpo-
rated into simulator studies as soon as possible. 
Wind-tunnel tests have shown that this aerodynamic derivative C1~ 
generally becomes favorable with the removal of the lower vertical 
stabilizer; thus,. the control problem is minimized. In retrospect, let 
us briefly review the design philosophy associated with the configura-
tion of the X-15 vertical tail. 
At the July 1958 conference on the X-15 airplane a paper by Jim A. 
Penland and David E. Fetterman, Jr., was presented on the high-speed 
static stability characteristics of the X-15 airplane. In that paper, 
it was indicated that for reasons of stability and control near zero 
lift, the vertical tail was changed from the original design configura-
tion of a large upper vertical tail and a short span lower vertical 
~
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tail to a vertical-tail arrangement which was more nearly symmetrical 
above and below the fuselage - the current configuration. 
It will be recalled that the X-15 airplane was designed specifically 
for an altitude and a speed mission. A representative altitude mission 
is shown in figure 10. These missions specified that an angle of attack 
of 00 be established as soon after launch and engine light-off as prac-
ticable, approximately 15 seconds, and be maintained during both the 
exit-powered phase and the ensuing free-fall ballistic trajectory. This 
specification placed a heavy emphasis on the aerodynamic characteris-
tics for zero angle of attack. The flight testing to date has not 
placed such an emphasis on operation at low angles of attack. 
In a paper by Windsor L. Sherman, Stanley Faber, and James B. 
Whitten in the October 1956 conference on the X-15 airplane, the original 
design configuration with the large upper vertical tail was shown to be 
unsatisfactory from a piloting standpoint for the altitude design mis-
sion when a random-direction l-inch thrust misalinement was considered. 
This was one of the several primary factors involved in changing the 
vertical-tail configuration and led also to the requirement for deter-
mination of the specific location of the thrust vector on each of the 
XLR99 engines delivered for flight use. Thus far, the thrust-vector 
information has been used to aline properly each of the engines when 
they were installed for flight. All flights to date have indicated no 
discernible thrust misalinement. However, since spare engine chambers 
presently under procurement for future support of the program will not 
be indexed for thrust-vector location and, hence, may not be properly 
alined when installed, a directional control problem may yet be encoun-
tered. The consequence of this condition would be to add somewhat to 
the pilot's workload with the ballistic control system in decreasing 
any airplane oscillations which may have been encountered. 
Now, to reiterate, the unacceptable handling characteristics 
encountered at angles of attack of approximately 100 and above due to 
adverse Cl~ are experienced only after loss of a critical stability 
augmentation system damper. Although the reliability of the stability 
augmentation system is generally good, in order to enhance the accom-
plishment of flight missions to altitudes beyond 250,000 feet, for which 
the X-15 airplane is capable from all other aspects, and which dictate 
reentry angles of attack well beyond the present unaugmented critical 
angle-of-attack range, a standby or backup damper is current~y being 
developed. This system will provide the necessary redundancy for the 
critical damper to assure adequate handling qualities. The redundant 
system should be ready for flight usage within the next 2 or 3 months, 
and this system should eliminate much of the uncontrollability con-
siderations for flight operations in the future. 
•• ••• 
• • • 
• • •• 
• • • 
•• ••• 
322 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•••••• 
•• • 
••• • 
• • • 
•• • • 
••• ••• • •••••• 
• •• ••• ••• 
. ... : : -:: . 
. ~
CONCllJDING RmARKS 
• •• 
••• 
• • 
••• 
••• 
In reviewing the broad aspects of the design analyses and develop-
ments which have been accomplished in the X-15 program, the following 
conclusions can be drawn: 
1. The exploratory flight studies conducted have indicated that 
hypersonic aerodynamic heating effects can be predicted with sufficient 
accuracy to support the design of a hot structure vehicle such as the 
X-15 airplane. The high-temperature structural design approach utilized 
for this configuration has been successful; no major design deficiencies 
were encountered nor major modifications required. The local thermal 
problems encountered have, with but few exceptions, not affected primary 
structural areas. 
2. In general, the aerodynamic derivatives extracted from flight-
test data have confirmed the estimated derivatives obtained from wind-
tunnel tests and thereby provided increased confidence in wind-tunnel 
evaluations at hypersonic speeds. 
3. The aerodynamic flight control system and the simple stability 
augmentation system of the X-15 airplane have proven to be good techni-
cal designs. The airplane can be flown with satisfactory handling 
qualities through the range of dynamic pressures from above 1,500 pounds 
per sq,uare foot to below 100 pounds per square foot through the range 
of Mach numbers from about 6.0 to subsonic landing conditions. 
4. Although only limited flight experience has been gained with 
the reaction-control system, its basic design appears to be completely 
adequate and this type of system apparently provides an adequate means 
of attitude control for future space vehicles. Pilot transition from 
aerodynamic controls to reaction controls has been accomplished without 
problems. 
5. Reports from the pilots, Robert M. White, Forrest S. Petersen, 
and Joseph A. Walker, indicate there are no piloting problems peculiar 
to the X-15 flight regime other than conventional pilot workload tasks. 
On the basis of this recapitulation, it can be said that the X-15 
airplane has essentially achieved the intended goals with satisfaction. 
Proof of the technical feasibility of the X-15 design and fabrication 
has been demonstrated since exploration of the flight envelope has not 
been hampered by major design deficiencies. 
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24. FUTURE PLANS FOR THE X-15 (J) 
By Paul F. Bikle 
NASA Flight Research Center 
and Edwin F. Pe zd.a 
Aeronautical Systems Division, U.S. Air Force 
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I This third X-15 conference has given us an opportunity to review 
, 
t and evaluate, in considerable detail, the progress that has been achieved 
in the flight research program to date. Figures 1 and 2 have been 
selected as a summary of the areas thus far explored. Similar results 
have been discussed in detail in the papers presented. Although it is 
not possible, in anyone or two figures, to show the desired information 
for all the varied areas of interest in the program, these plots of alti-
tude and angle of attack against velocity do represent two of the many 
parameters of interest, and the shaded areas demonstrate roughly the 
progress that has been made. It appears that most of the work originally 
planned is nearly completed, with perhaps 50 percent of the aerodynamiCS, 
structures, heating, and bioastronautics information already obtained. 
The X-15 program for the immediate future will be oriented toward 
continuing the research investigations in the following primary areas: 
Flight characteristics at high angle of attack 
Aerodynamic heating 
Reaction controls including rate damping 
Adaptive control system 
Performance 
Displays and energy management 
Determination of the flight characteristics at high angles of attack, 
in the range from 150 to 250 , is required before attempting flights 
above the 250,OOO-foot design altitude. Aerodynamic-heating informa-
tion has been of great interest thus far in the program, and a number 
of future flights will be pointed in this direction. Reaction control 
research data are just now becoming available from the flight program; 
future flights at high altitude and low dynamic pressure should be of 
great interest in this area. An important feature of flights to come 
will be the incorporation of rate damping in the reaction control sys-
tem. The flight behavior with both the stability augmentation system 
and the reaction rate augmentation system will be compared with the 
flight behavior with the adaptive control system described in paper 
no. 13 of the conference by Johannes, Armstrong, and Hays. During 
these flights, data will also be obtained to more completely define the 
lift and drag characteristics of the X-15 configuration. Work on 
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displays and energy management, an example of which was given in paper 
no. 11 by Hoey and Day, will be continued. In this particular case, the 
goal is to provide a working onboard display for the use of the pilot 
in selecting his landing site. 
A flight to the 250,000-foot design altitude will be attempted as 
soon as a satisfactory modification to the windshield has been designed. 
Altitude exploration flights above 250,000 feet will be initiated after 
the installation of a backup stability augmentation system, sometime 
after March 1962. Figure 3 shows the performance available in the air-
craft from an energy standpoint and also the probable limits dictated 
by high dynamic pressure, high acceleration, stability and control, and 
aerodynamic heating during the recovery. Although it appears that 
flights in the area to the left of the vertical dashed line could be 
safely executed, this area does not seem to be of sufficient interest 
to warrant special flights for this purpose. The future altitude 
exploration flights are planned to acquire information between 200,000 
and possibly 400,000 feet at speeds from 2,000 to 5,500 feet per second. 
Of major interest in this phase of the program will be such piloting 
aspects as display, guidance, precision of control, and bioastronautics. 
As these programs are completed, follow-on programs will explore, 
with new instrumentation, areas already partially investigated, such 
as display, boundary-layer nOise, skin friction at high Reynolds num-
bers, and structural panel tests. A large number of space experiments 
have been proposed which make use of the X-15 as a test bed to obtain 
information at altitudes from 150,000 feet to possibly 350,000 feet; 
heights greater than those obtained by balloons but lower than satel-
lite altitudes. These experiments capitalize on the ability of the 
X-15 to provide on-the-spot pilot input in the conduct of the experiment 
and the return of the experiment to the ground for detailed evaluation 
and adjustment or correction of deficiencies i~ required. A few of the 
many interesting experiments being considered for the follow-on program 
are: 
Ultraviolet stellar photography 
Infrared exhaust signature 
Landing computer 
Detachable high-temperature leading edges 
Horizon definition 
Hypersonic propulSion 
Many proposals that have been made are now in the process of evalu-
ation. Some of the experiments will ride free in piggy-back fashion. 
Others may be grouped together to share the cost of operation. Some 
proposals require extensive modifications and are expensive in both 
time and money. For example, figure 4 shows a stellar photographiC 
l 
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experiment which would involve a stabilized platforlli extended through 
clam shell doors from a modified instrument bay. 
It appears that the completion of the present research program 
will require about 30 flights in the next 18 to 24 months. The extent 
to which the addition of worthwile follow-on experiments will extend 
the program is to be decided by the Research Airplane Committee: 
Vice Admiral J. T. Hayward, Major General M. C. Demler, and Dr. H. L. 
Dryden. A recommended follow-on program is now being prepared for 
consideration of this Committee. 
At this time, some comment should be made concerning the degree 
of reliance, or degree of certainty, in any future plans involved with 
a research program. A future plan can only be as good as are the esti-
mates on what the problem areas are going to be - not only problem 
areas in the X-15 program but problem areas in other programs which may 
require information from the X-15. For example, when the X-15 was 
first approved, the objectives were clearly stated in terms of aero-
dynamic heating, speed, altitude, reaction control research, and bio-
astronautics. As the program has progressed, it appears that, while 
these worthwhile objectives have been or will shortly be achieved, many 
important benefits have been of a different sort. The X-15 program has 
kept in proper perspective the role of the pilot in future programs of 
this nature. It has pointed the way to simplified operational concepts 
which should provide a high degree of redundancy and increased chance 
of success in future space missions. And, perhaps most important, is 
the fact that all of those in industry and in the government who have 
had to face up to the problems of design, building the hardware, and 
making it work have gained experience of great value to the future 
aeronautical and space endeavors of this country. 
The same type of seemingly intangible consideration will influence 
our future X-15 program. The future program will be kept flexible and 
will be mOdified, extended, or terminated on the basis of timely reviews 
by the Research Airplane Committee. 
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